Henry H. Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, and Robert R. Perez

Citations: 345 F.3d 802; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8869; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 11203; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20219; 2003 WL 22272563Docket: 02-35792

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 3, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Henry H. Cunningham filed a civil rights lawsuit against Robert R. Perez, a police officer in Wenatchee, Washington, and other officials, alleging violations of his rights during a sex abuse investigation stemming from claims made by his youngest daughter, Jessica. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied Perez's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, prompting this appeal.

Cunningham's legal troubles began when Jessica, while receiving treatment at Pinecrest Hospital for behavioral issues, accused him of sexual abuse. Following this claim, Child Protective Services contacted the Wenatchee Police Department, leading Cunningham to voluntarily visit the department, where he was interrogated by Perez after being informed of his Miranda rights.

During the eight-hour interrogation, Cunningham denied the allegations but was pressured by Perez, who threatened that his daughters would testify against him and suggested that a confession could result in treatment rather than prison time. Despite Cunningham's request to contact his therapist being denied, he ultimately confessed to abusing all his daughters. After his arrest, Perez interviewed Cunningham's other daughters and wife, all of whom denied any abuse. Perez then conducted a follow-up interview with Jessica, who initially denied the abuse but later provided details after prolonged questioning.

Cunningham pled guilty to the charges but had his conviction vacated by the Washington Court of Appeals after serving five years in prison, with the prosecutor subsequently dropping all charges. He then initiated a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations including self-incrimination, lack of probable cause for his arrest, evidence fabrication, and concealment of exculpatory evidence. Perez's appeal follows the district court's denial of his qualified immunity claim.

Jurisdiction over Perez's interlocutory appeal hinges on precedents set by the Supreme Court in Behrens v. Pelletier and Johnson v. Jones. In Johnson, police officers appealed a district court's denial of qualified immunity, which was based on the existence of a genuine issue of fact regarding excessive force. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, emphasizing that interlocutory appeals are not available when resolving factual disputes about the pretrial record. The appeal can only address legal questions that do not involve assessing the plaintiff's factual claims.

In Behrens, the Court clarified that not all interlocutory appeals regarding qualified immunity are barred if the district court finds material factual disputes. The appellate court may exercise jurisdiction if the district court also determines that the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law. This distinguishes Behrens from Johnson, as the former involved a determination of legal violation alongside factual disputes.

From these rulings, a rule emerges: appellate jurisdiction exists for interlocutory appeals that address both disputed material facts and violations of clearly established rights, while jurisdiction is absent for appeals that solely evaluate the sufficiency of evidence to support the plaintiff's claims. In exercising this jurisdiction, courts must resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff and focus on the legal implications of the defendant's actions.

In Jeffers v. Gomez, the Ninth Circuit exercised jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal by accepting the plaintiff's facts as true, focusing solely on the legal issue of whether the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law. The district court ruled that Perez was not entitled to qualified immunity, indicating that a reasonable state official could doubt the lawfulness of Perez's actions, without addressing the sufficiency of evidence or material factual disputes. The court emphasized that its jurisdiction extends to reviewing decisions on whether a defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, as established in previous cases like Knox and Armendariz. The appellate court's role is to interpret Supreme Court precedents, specifically the collateral order doctrine from Mitchell, which allows immediate appeal of qualified immunity denials. This doctrine is critical as it addresses immunity from both liability and trial, underscoring the necessity of resolving such claims early in litigation. The appeal does not require assessing the plaintiff's factual assertions or claims but focuses on whether the legal norms allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions.

Confusion exists regarding the appealability of summary judgment orders in cases concerning qualified immunity, particularly as illustrated in Johnson. In Johnson, defendants accused of excessive force claimed they were not present during the incident. The district court denied summary judgment, citing sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting the plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction, emphasizing that the case did not present a separable legal issue regarding qualified immunity, as it hinged on evidence sufficiency. Thus, the inclusion of a qualified immunity defense does not inherently allow for an appeal.

In Behrens, it was noted that once a case reaches the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must rely on evidence rather than pleadings to determine if the legal question can be separated from the merits. The Court clarified that a defendant could assert qualified immunity at different procedural stages and is entitled to dismissal before discovery if the plaintiff's allegations do not establish a violation of clearly established law. If discovery reveals insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue regarding the defendant's actions, summary judgment may be granted.

In the current case, the facts are distinguishable from Johnson. Acknowledging Cunningham's claims as true for the purpose of evaluating the legal question of qualified immunity, the court determined that the legal issue could be separated from the merits, granting jurisdiction to consider Perez's appeal concerning the qualified immunity defense. The court will now assess whether Perez is entitled to qualified immunity, reviewing the claim de novo. Government officials are generally immune if their actions do not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The initial inquiry focuses on whether the alleged facts demonstrate a constitutional violation; if not, the analysis concludes at that stage.

A constitutional violation must first be identified, followed by an assessment of whether the violated right was clearly established, meaning a reasonable officer would recognize the unlawfulness of their actions in the given circumstances. Cunningham claims that Officer Perez violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through coercive interrogation. A coercive interrogation occurs when the officer's tactics significantly impair the suspect's ability to exercise free will.

In evaluating Perez's interrogation of Cunningham, the court found no violation of free will despite the interrogation lasting eight hours. Perez provided breaks for food and water, did not use violence or threats, and while his questioning may have caused emotional distress, such feelings do not invalidate a confession. Continued questioning after a suspect claims innocence is not considered coercive and can be necessary for uncovering the truth. Perez’s suggestion that cooperation might lead to leniency was not deemed coercive, nor was his mention of past imprisonments relevant to undermining Cunningham's will. The court noted that officers can discuss potential sentences and leverage a suspect's fear of imprisonment.

Cunningham's request to contact his therapist was denied, but there is no constitutional right to such communication during interrogation. His bipolar medication does not automatically invalidate his confession, as confessions can be voluntary even if influenced by medication. Additionally, Cunningham's mental disorder cannot invalidate the confession without evidence of coercive tactics by Perez.

Perez's conduct did not undermine Cunningham's free will, as past cases of coercion involved more extreme circumstances. Examples include Mincey v. Arizona, where a confession was deemed involuntary due to the defendant's critical medical condition, and Haynes v. Washington, where a suspect was held for over five days without being informed of his rights. Other cases also invalidated confessions based on extended interrogation periods or disregard for a suspect's invoked rights. As for Cunningham's Fourth Amendment claim regarding his arrest, it was based on a confession that was not coerced, supported by allegations of abuse, thus providing probable cause for Perez. Cunningham's claim of deliberate fabrication of evidence also fails; he must prove that Perez continued the investigation despite knowing about his innocence or used coercive methods. The court found Cunningham's confession to be legal and noted that initial lack of corroboration from his daughters does not invalidate the investigation, as memory suppression is common among abuse victims. Therefore, Perez did not violate Cunningham's rights by continuing the investigation.

Cunningham claims that Perez employed coercive tactics during interviews with Cunningham's daughters, which he asserts led to false information. Although Perez continued interrogating the daughters after they denied the abuse and may have restricted Jessica's ability to leave until she confessed, these actions, while inappropriate, do not constitute a violation of the Devereaux standard. The court recognizes that interviewers have discretion in handling initial denials from child witnesses. Thus, Perez's interviews were not so coercive that he should have anticipated false information.

Cunningham further argues that Perez violated the Due Process Clause by failing to preserve exculpatory evidence. However, a police officer's failure in this regard only violates due process if it is shown that the officer acted in bad faith, as established in Arizona v. Youngblood. The determination of bad faith relies on the officer's awareness of the evidence's exculpatory value at the time it was lost or destroyed. Cunningham alleges Perez acted in bad faith by not documenting interrogations or collecting physical evidence that could exonerate him. Still, these claims lack specificity and do not convincingly demonstrate bad faith. Perez’s failure to document does not indicate an improper motive, as he likely believed his actions were lawful. Moreover, the value of the untested physical evidence remains speculative; it could potentially exonerate or incriminate Cunningham. 

Cunningham's allegations do not rise to the level of cases where improper motives were established, such as in Miller v. Vasquez, where the officer's conduct was overtly malicious. Ultimately, the court found that Cunningham did not provide sufficient, nonconclusory facts to support his claims of Perez suppressing exculpatory evidence. As a result, Perez is entitled to summary judgment, and the district court's judgment is reversed.

A factual summary of the sexual abuse charges in Wenatchee is detailed in the Devereaux v. Abbey decision. The case of Behrens addressed whether a defendant could appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity after previously appealing a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant could pursue a second interlocutory appeal. However, this ruling does not apply to Perez's case, as it is his first interlocutory appeal. The significance of Behrens lies in its third section, which clarified the appellate court's jurisdiction over such appeals despite the district court identifying material factual disputes. The Behrens Court remanded the case back to the appellate court due to the trial court's failure to specify which claims had adequate admissible evidence, highlighting the potential challenges for appellate courts in reviewing records under these circumstances.