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Lamarca v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections
Citations: 568 F.3d 929; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10485; 2009 WL 1377235Docket: 08-16775
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 19, 2009; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Anthony Lamarca, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for first-degree murder, is appealing for a certificate of appealability (COA) regarding three claims from his 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas corpus petition, which the district court previously denied. The district court ruled against him on six claims for relief in a comprehensive 57-page order and declined to issue a COA. The Eleventh Circuit Court, including Circuit Judges Birch, Black, and Wilson, has denied Lamarca's COA application, citing his failure to demonstrate a substantial showing of a constitutional right's denial, as required by 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). Lamarca was convicted in 1997 for the murder of Kevin Flynn, with the incident occurring on December 2, 1995. Following a family gathering at a bar for his daughter Tonya's birthday, he borrowed the keys to her car but was instead driven home by Kevin. Later that evening, Lamarca returned to the bar, instructing Tonya to pick up Kevin at his father's house. There, he raped Tonya and threatened suicide with a rifle. After Tonya fled and alerted the police, they discovered signs of a violent crime at Joseph Lamarca's residence, including Kevin's body and matching bullet casings. Witnesses testified to Lamarca's presence and admission of guilt, indicating he confessed to killing Kevin. Lamarca was eventually apprehended in Washington state. Lamarca was under investigation while Smith awaited sentencing for probation violations. In July 1995, former inmate James Michael Hughes testified that Lamarca planned to kill his son-in-law due to a rape involving Lamarca's daughter. During the penalty phase of the trial, Lamarca chose to represent himself and did not present mitigating evidence. The court appointed standby counsel, who outlined potential mitigating factors that would have been presented. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of 11 to 1, which the trial court upheld, citing one aggravating factor—Lamarca's prior violent felony convictions—and concluded that mitigating evidence did not outweigh this factor. Lamarca was sentenced to death, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2001. In 2002, Lamarca filed a motion to vacate his judgment and sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising 23 claims. After a five-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 22 of these claims on September 12, 2003. Lamarca appealed this denial and also filed a state habeas corpus petition with four grounds for relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in 2006. Subsequently, Lamarca filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, asserting six claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and violations of his rights to present a defense and receive a fair trial. The district court denied all claims and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (COA). Lamarca's motion to amend the judgment was also denied. He has since applied for a COA regarding the first three claims in his federal habeas petition. The court states that a COA may only be issued if the applicant demonstrates a substantial showing of a constitutional rights denial, requiring that reasonable jurists might find the district court's assessment debatable or incorrect. The applicant need not prove he will ultimately succeed on appeal, as the focus is on the debatability of the constitutional claims. To obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) after a district court has denied a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a petitioner must demonstrate two key points: (1) that reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the procedural ruling by the district court, and (2) that reasonable jurists could find the petition presents a valid claim of constitutional right denial. If a clear procedural bar exists and the district court correctly applies it, a reasonable jurist would not conclude that the court erred in dismissing the petition. In the case of Lamarca, he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial, claiming his counsel failed in multiple areas, including not investigating key witness motivations, not challenging or impeaching certain testimonies, and not calling crucial witnesses to rebut testimonies. However, Lamarca did not request a COA concerning these specific issues, leading to their exclusion from consideration. The standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel is based on whether the conduct undermined the adversarial process to a degree that the trial result is unreliable. This involves two prongs: (1) proving that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) demonstrating that this deficiency prejudiced the defense's case. The performance of counsel is subject to highly deferential scrutiny, and strategic decisions made by counsel cannot be deemed incompetent if they could be considered sound strategy. For the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, absent the counsel's errors, the trial outcome would have differed. Jeremy Smith Lamarca asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating and presenting evidence regarding undisclosed benefits received by a witness, Smith, for his testimony. Lamarca argues that his counsel’s oversight of Smith’s misdemeanor retail theft conviction deprived the jury of critical information regarding the State's assistance to Smith. The district court determined that the state courts reasonably applied the Strickland standard, concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach Smith with the misdemeanor conviction. Additionally, the court ruled that Lamarca’s claim regarding the undisclosed consideration was procedurally defaulted, as it was not raised in state court as an ineffective assistance claim. This procedural default is significant, as federal law mandates that petitioners exhaust state remedies to allow state courts the opportunity to address federal claims. In his third amended 2254 petition, Lamarca also claimed ineffective assistance for not calling Smith’s friend, John Ehrke, to testify about Smith’s credibility. However, this claim was not presented in Lamarca's direct appeal or post-conviction motions, and he did not develop it during the state evidentiary hearing. Consequently, this claim also fails to meet the exhaustion requirements. The only ineffective assistance claim raised in state court pertained to Smith’s prior convictions for dishonesty, while claims regarding undisclosed consideration were framed as Brady and Giglio violations against the State and not as counsel ineffectiveness. Lamarca did not challenge the district court's ruling on this procedural bar in his application for a Certificate of Appealability (COA), failing to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the court's procedural ruling debatable. Lamarca further claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not impeaching Tonya Flynn regarding her allegations of sexual battery and her inconsistent testimony about an alleged break-in. This argument was initially presented in his post-conviction relief motion as claim 3, focusing on the ineffective cross-examination of Flynn. Lamarca was represented at trial by Ron Eide and Nora McClure, with Eide handling the guilt phase and McClure the penalty phase. During a five-day evidentiary hearing, Eide testified extensively about his trial preparation and strategy, particularly regarding his cross-examination of witness Tonya Flynn. The trial court found that Eide's decision to limit cross-examination was strategic, aimed at preventing the introduction of potentially incriminating evidence related to the sexual battery, including DNA evidence. The court noted that Eide’s approach allowed Lamarca a chance to present a credible narrative. Additionally, the court reviewed allegations of inconsistent statements from Lamarca that could have been used to impeach Flynn but concluded they did not undermine her credibility or provide grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court emphasized that Lamarca did not demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice, thus denying his claim under the Strickland standard. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this determination, recognizing Eide's tactical choices as virtually unchallengeable. In Lamarca's 2254 petition, he contested the state courts' conclusions regarding his counsel's effectiveness in impeaching Flynn, but the district court denied this claim, stating that Lamarca failed to show the state decisions were unreasonable or contrary to Strickland. The district court's ruling was deemed correct and not debatable among reasonable jurists. Lamarca's 2254 petition and application for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) fail to demonstrate that the state courts' decisions were 'contrary to' or 'an unreasonable application of' the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Lamarca does not address the state courts' legal conclusions nor provide evidence to counter the findings that his trial counsel, Eide, made a strategic choice to limit cross-examination of witness Tonya Flynn. The courts' factual determinations are presumed correct, and Lamarca has not met the burden of clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. Regarding the claim of ineffective assistance for not calling witness Steve Slack, Lamarca asserts that Slack's testimony could contradict Flynn’s account of events. However, Eide chose not to call Slack due to concerns about his drinking and inconsistent statements, as well as the potential negative impact of Slack’s testimony on the defense. The state trial court upheld this decision as consistent with professional standards, which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding Eide’s strategy reasonable. Lamarca has not cited any relevant federal law to challenge this conclusion or establish that the state court's resolution was flawed. Consequently, the district court denied the claim, indicating Lamarca did not adequately support his argument under Strickland. Lamarca's 2254 petition and COA application lack clear and convincing evidence to counter the state courts’ findings that trial counsel Eide made a tactical decision not to call Zaccagnino and that the basis for Eide’s credibility assessment regarding Zaccagnino was supported. Consequently, the district court's conclusions that the state courts’ decisions were neither 'contrary to' nor 'an unreasonable application of' Strickland, nor based on 'an unreasonable determination of the facts' were not debatable among reasonable jurists, leading to the denial of the COA regarding this claim. Lamarca contends that Eide was ineffective for not presenting Zaccagnino’s testimony, which he believes would have contradicted Hughes's claim that Lamarca intended to kill his son-in-law. During the state evidentiary hearing, both Zaccagnino and Eide testified. Eide explained his decision not to call Zaccagnino, citing Zaccagnino’s hearing difficulties, his status as a convicted felon serving a life sentence, and concerns about the implications of mentioning 'prison yard' to the jury. The trial court deemed Eide's decision credible and within professional standards, also determining that Lamarca did not demonstrate that Zaccagnino’s testimony would have altered the trial's outcome. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this denial, recognizing the sound basis of Eide's tactical decision. In his 2254 petition, Lamarca argued that Zaccagnino’s testimony would have significantly undermined Hughes's credibility and asserted that Zaccagnino’s hearing issues were not present during the time of the alleged statements. However, the district court dismissed this claim, noting Lamarca's failure to identify any factual inaccuracies in the state court’s findings and confirming that the state courts had correctly applied relevant Supreme Court precedent. No reasonable jurist would dispute the district court's evaluation of Lamarca's claim. In his 2254 petition, Lamarca fails to argue that the state courts' decisions were either "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of established federal law, nor does he demonstrate any "unreasonable determination of the facts" by the state courts. Lamarca does not support his assertion that Zaccagnino had no hearing problems in 1995 and overlooks the state trial court's credibility assessments of Eide's and Zaccagnino's testimonies. He reiterates the same arguments made in state courts without demonstrating any errors in those resolutions, leading to the decision not to issue a Certificate of Appealability (COA). In the second claim, Lamarca contends his due process rights were violated due to the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and the presentation of false testimony. He argues that the state did not reveal benefits received by witnesses Hughes and Smith for their testimonies and claims that the timing of Hughes's sentencing, which occurred after Lamarca's trial, should have been disclosed. He also states that communications between the prosecuting parties in his case and Hughes's case should have been shared with the defense. Regarding Smith, Lamarca claims the state should have disclosed the presence of a prosecutor at Smith’s sentencing hearing. This claim was raised in two sections of his 3.851 motion concerning alleged deals or benefits received by Hughes and Smith. Under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecution's suppression of favorable evidence upon request constitutes a due process violation if that evidence is material to guilt or punishment. The duty to disclose extends beyond exculpatory evidence to include impeachment evidence relevant for cross-examination, particularly when witness credibility is in question. This includes any agreements regarding future prosecutions and the obligation to correct false testimony that conceals bias against the defendant. To establish a Brady claim, Lamarca must show that the government had favorable evidence, he could not have obtained it with reasonable diligence, it was suppressed by the government, and that it was material, meaning there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had the evidence been disclosed. A "reasonable probability" is defined as one sufficient to undermine confidence in the result. After a five-day evidentiary hearing, the state trial court found that Lamarca did not prove that witness Hughes received any benefits for his testimony, leading to the denial of this claim. The court also dismissed the claim regarding witness Smith, citing a lack of evidence and mere speculation regarding any deals or benefits. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, explaining the relevant legal standards under Brady and Giglio, and concluded that the evidence did not support Lamarca's claims of suppressed deals. The court indicated that Lamarca failed to show any errors in the trial court's factual findings, which stated that no undisclosed agreements existed between the State and either Hughes or Smith. Consequently, the district court also denied Lamarca relief on these grounds, affirming that he did not establish any constitutional rights were violated. Additionally, Lamarca's claim regarding the limitation of evidence and cross-examination of Tonya Flynn was raised, where he argued that the trial court prevented him from presenting evidence related to her relationship with the victim prior to the murder, which he believed was crucial to his defense. Lamarca argues that the district court's ruling deeming the exclusion of certain evidence as harmless error is open to debate among reasonable jurists. He asserts that the conclusions reached by both the Florida Supreme Court and the district court contradict or unreasonably apply established law, referencing Chapman v. California. Under Florida and federal law, a trial court's exclusion of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, but such discretion must align with constitutional requirements, including a defendant's right to present a defense. Evidence exclusion that impedes a defendant's ability to mount a defense constitutes a constitutional error, although such errors do not automatically result in conviction reversal. For a conviction to be upheld despite a constitutional error, the reviewing court must find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning there is no reasonable possibility that the excluded evidence could have influenced the verdict. Lamarca contends that the trial court's limitation on evidence regarding Tonya Flynn's marital issues and extramarital affair infringed upon his due process rights, as his defense centered on the assertion that she murdered her husband. The trial court had partially granted the State's motion to exclude this evidence, prompting Lamarca to argue on appeal that this restriction undermined his defense. The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court abused its discretion in this exclusion. The court determined that the abuse of discretion was a harmless error due to the substantial evidence of Lamarca's guilt, referencing State v. DiGuilio and the Florida Supreme Court’s analysis. In his 2254 petition, Lamarca did not demonstrate that the Florida Supreme Court's harmless error assessment contradicted any U.S. Supreme Court decisions or was an unreasonable application of such precedents. The Florida Supreme Court employed the harmless-error standard from DiGuilio, which aligns with the Chapman standard requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any error did not impact the verdict. The district court affirmed this standard for habeas cases, citing Brecht, which states that constitutional errors are harmless unless they had a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome. The evidence supporting Lamarca's conviction included his disturbed behavior on the night of the murder, testimonies regarding his threats toward the victim, eyewitness accounts of his actions before and after the crime, and his admissions of guilt. Given this comprehensive evidence, the court concluded that no reasonable jurist would argue that the trial court's error had a significant impact on the jury's decision. Consequently, Lamarca's request for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) was denied, as he did not make a substantial showing of a constitutional rights violation.