Montana Right to Life Association Montana Right to Life Political Action Committee Julie Daffin, President of Montana Right to Life Association v. Robert Eddleman, in His Official Capacity as County Attorney for Stillwater County, Montana, and as a Representative of the Class of County Attorneys in the State of Montana
Docket: 00-35924
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 11, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Montana voters passed Initiative 118 in 1994, which included campaign finance reforms that imposed limits on contributions to political candidates by individuals and political action committees (PACs). The initiative's provisions at issue are M.C.A. 13-37-216, which sets specific contribution limits based on the office sought: $400 for joint gubernatorial candidates, $200 for statewide candidates, and $100 for other public offices. Notably, these limits apply to each election within a campaign, effectively doubling permissible contributions during contested primaries. The plaintiffs, including the Montana Right to Life Association, challenged these provisions, arguing they infringe on First Amendment rights related to free speech and association. Following a four-day bench trial, the district court upheld the provisions, finding them appropriately tailored to serve the state's interest in preventing corruption. The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the factual findings were supported by the record and that the provisions did not violate constitutional protections.
M.C.A. 13-37-218 establishes contribution limits from political action committees (PACs) to candidates for the state legislature, capping contributions at $1,000 for state senate candidates and $600 for state house candidates, subject to inflation adjustments. At the time of trial, these limits were adjusted to $2,000 for senate candidates and $1,250 for house candidates. Candidates can accept additional PAC contributions beyond these limits by returning funds to earlier donors. The statute does not restrict PAC contributions to political parties or independent expenditures. The Montana Right to Life Association (MRLA) challenged several campaign finance measures from Initiative I-118, with the district court ruling on some provisions while upholding M.C.A. 13-37-218 after a trial. The court found that the contribution limits affected only the highest donations and that the average candidate received about 29% of their contributions from PACs. Despite the limits, candidates were still able to raise sufficient funds for effective campaigning, with average fundraising amounts significantly exceeding the contribution limits.
Witnesses in the case provided only vague assertions that their political campaigns would have been more effective with increased funding, lacking specific evidence to support this claim. The court found no substantial proof that the state's contribution limits adversely impacted campaign funding or effectiveness. Citing the Supreme Court case Shrink Missouri, it ruled that Montana's contribution limits were appropriately tailored to serve the legitimate interest of preventing campaign corruption and its appearance. The limits were deemed moderate enough to not significantly undermine political association or diminish a candidate's voice. The Montana Republican Legislative Association (MRLA) is appealing this decision.
The constitutionality of state statutes is reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are assessed for clear error. The district court's legal application of those facts is also reviewed de novo. Key Supreme Court precedents, particularly Buckley v. Valeo, are referenced for analyzing campaign finance restrictions. Buckley upheld limits on individual contributions to candidates while striking down restrictions on candidate expenditures, viewing them as violations of free speech. The Court noted that contribution limits impose only minimal restrictions on a contributor's ability to communicate support, as contributions primarily serve as symbolic expressions rather than detailed communications.
Contribution limits to political campaigns are constitutional as long as they do not hinder a candidate's ability to gather sufficient resources for effective advocacy. The Supreme Court's Buckley ruling confirmed that if candidates must raise funds from a larger number of smaller contributors, their free speech rights remain intact. Additionally, concerns about contribution limits primarily revolve around their potential interference with contributors' right of association, which is deemed a fundamental constitutional freedom. Such restrictions undergo rigorous scrutiny, though the Court acknowledged that neither the right to associate nor participate in political activities is absolute; significant interference may be justified if the state shows a compelling interest and employs narrowly tailored means.
The principles from Buckley were reaffirmed in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, where the Court upheld Missouri's contribution limits ranging from $275 to $1,075, asserting that such regulations could withstand constitutional challenges if they were closely aligned with a significant governmental interest. The Court clarified that while significant interference with associational rights is a concern, limiting contributions does not significantly impede communication, making it easier for such limits to pass constitutional scrutiny compared to expenditure limits. Furthermore, the Court indicated that no specific dollar amount serves as a constitutional minimum; instead, contribution limits are valid unless they severely undermine a candidate's capacity to amass necessary resources.
In FEC v. Beaumont, the Supreme Court reiterated these principles, categorizing restrictions on political contributions as minor speech restrictions that warrant less stringent review under the First Amendment, as contributions are considered peripheral to core political expression.
State campaign contribution limits are constitutional if they serve an important state interest and are closely drawn. This requires that the limits (1) focus narrowly on the state's interest; (2) allow contributors to affiliate with candidates; and (3) enable candidates to gather enough resources for effective campaigning. Montana's campaign contribution limits are upheld, as the state provided sufficient evidence of its interest in preventing corruption or its appearance in politics. The argument against the limits being overly stringent is not pertinent; the focus is on whether the state has a valid interest rather than justifying specific dollar amounts. The court typically does not question legislative determinations on contribution limits. The interest in preventing corruption extends beyond bribery to include undue influence from large contributions. The Supreme Court has set a low threshold for the evidence needed to justify this interest, requiring only that the perceived threat is not merely speculative. In a related case, evidence of potential corruption was established through statements, media reports, and public sentiment favoring contribution limits.
The evidence presented by the State of Montana justifies the contribution limits imposed, demonstrating greater weight than that in Shrink Missouri. Testimony from a veteran legislator highlighted that special interests increase campaign funding as votes approach, citing a 1981 incident where a Republican senator urged colleagues to support a bill favorable to insurance PAC contributions. The senator's letter indicated a deliberate strategy to maintain financial support from the Life Underwriters Association and warned against revealing this strategy to Democrats. Although the senator faced no wrongdoing, the letter led to multiple investigations.
A 1982 poll revealed that 78.3% of Montana voters equate money with power, and 69% believe large contributors receive preferential treatment from elected officials. The district court found no evidence contradicting voter perceptions, and it argued that reliance on such evidence is valid, referencing its use in Shrink Missouri and other cases. This evidence supports Montana's interest in preventing corruption or its appearance, establishing that the state’s interest is substantial.
Montana Code Annotated (M.C.A.) 13-37-216 is deemed 'closely drawn' to avoid unnecessary infringement on associational freedoms. The Montana Republican Legislative Association (MRLA) contests the statute's effectiveness in preventing corruption, claiming it hampers candidates' fundraising efforts and discriminates against challengers. The court disagrees with these assertions.
A campaign contribution limitation is considered 'closely drawn' if it targets specific aspects of political association associated with corruption, while still allowing individuals to engage in independent political expression, volunteer, and provide substantial financial support to candidates and committees. The assessment of whether such limitations are tailored to a state's interests includes evaluating unaffected aspects of associational freedom as well as imposed limitations. Contribution limits should remain effective and not severely diminish political association or candidate visibility.
The district court determined that the state's contribution limits effectively serve the interest of preventing corruption and its appearance, affecting only the top 10% of contributions, including the largest amounts. The court rejected MRLA's argument that M.C.A. 13-37-216 unconstitutionally restricts both small and large contributions. Furthermore, while the statute reduces contributions from PACs and individuals, it nearly doubles the amount political parties can contribute to candidates and imposes no limits on self-funding or the number of contributors a candidate may seek. This allows candidates to seek funding from sources not restricted by M.C.A. 13-37-216, and the statute does not inhibit PACs from supporting candidates through alternative means, such as party donations, volunteer services, and independent advertising.
Montana remains one of the least expensive states for political campaigning, with an average of 7,991 people per house district and 15,981 per senate district. Candidates primarily rely on door-to-door campaigning, with limited radio and television advertising. Since the implementation of new contribution limits, the total funds raised in political campaigns have significantly decreased, with 24% to 30% of contributions in the 1992 legislative elections now violating these limits. However, this does not inherently render the limits unconstitutional, as upheld in similar cases like Shrink Missouri, where significant decreases in overall spending did not invalidate contribution limits.
The district court found that candidates can still run effective campaigns under the new limits, evidenced by the average amounts raised by house and senate candidates in 1998 being $4,464.87 and $6,869.00, respectively. The court dismissed testimonies from three candidates claiming the limits hindered their campaigns, noting two candidates raised more after the limits were enacted, while the losing candidate's failure to campaign adequately during a critical period contributed to their loss. Additionally, a successful candidate had a substantial surplus, contradicting claims of ineffectiveness due to the limits.
While the contribution limits are among the lowest nationally, this aligns with Montana's overall lower campaign costs. As long as the limits are constitutional, the courts are not responsible for adjusting the specific amounts. The argument that candidates cannot run the same type of campaign under the limits is countered by precedents that distinguish between contribution limits and expenditure limits. The MRLA must demonstrate that the limits prevent candidates from gathering adequate resources for effective advocacy, which it has failed to do.
MRLA argues that contribution limits unconstitutionally favor incumbents over challengers, citing that 40-50% of legislative seats were uncontested in 1998. This claim is rejected for two main reasons: first, M.C.A. 13-37-216 prevents incumbents from using excess campaign funds in future elections, thus minimizing their fundraising advantages, evidenced by a minimal average fundraising gap of $65 between incumbents and challengers. Second, the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley requires evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers to support claims of incumbents' enhanced advantages due to contribution limits, which MRLA fails to provide. Consequently, M.C.A. 13-37-216 is deemed constitutional.
Regarding M.C.A. 13-37-218, which sets aggregate limits on PAC contributions, MRLA contends that it discriminates against PACs and imposes an unconstitutional spending limit on candidates. However, the aggregate PAC limit is upheld as serving a significant state interest, specifically addressing concerns about the corrupting influence of PAC money in campaigns. The differential treatment of PACs is justified as long as it furthers a legitimate government interest, which the state argues is the prevention of corruption, aligning with precedents that permit such distinctions when necessary to uphold electoral integrity.
The district court determined that aggregate PAC limits are essential for preventing undue influence by special interest groups, supported by substantial evidence surpassing that in Shrink Missouri. A significant piece of evidence was a letter from a state senator urging legislative support for a bill to maintain insurance industry PAC funding for Republicans, which, despite not resulting in criminal charges, was viewed by Montanan voters as indicative of PAC money's corrupting influence. Hal Harper, a veteran legislator, testified that PACs typically fund campaigns when their interests are at stake to "get results," paralleling Missouri Senator Wayne Goode's assertion that large contributions can effectively "buy votes." This reflects a broader concern about the corrosive effects of special interest groups and justifies governmental measures to mitigate such influences.
Numerous courts have acknowledged that the risk of corruption is heightened with PAC contributions compared to individual contributions, as seen in cases like Kentucky Right to Life v. Terry and Landell v. Sorrell, which supported stricter regulations on PACs. Courts have also recognized the constitutional validity of aggregate PAC limits due to the disproportionate influence of special interests on campaigns. The MRLA's argument against the aggregate PAC limit, claiming it fails to differentiate based on individual PAC contribution size, overlooks that individual contributions are already capped. The provisions work together to minimize PAC money's impact on elections and promote diverse candidate support. The district court's rationale that aggregate limits prevent PACs from circumventing individual limits through multiple committees was found persuasive, leading to the conclusion that the aggregate PAC limit is constitutionally justified by a significant state interest without discriminating against PACs.
The aggregate PAC limit in Montana is designed to address anti-corruption concerns effectively. The MRLA contends that M.C.A. 13-37-218 inadequately serves this purpose by restricting PAC contributions to candidates who have already reached the $2,000 limit. However, a key aspect of Montana law allows candidates to return contributions from one PAC to accept new contributions from others, enabling them to manage PAC support without infringing on associational freedoms.
Furthermore, M.C.A. 13-37-218 does not inhibit PACs from engaging with candidates through means other than direct financial contributions, such as volunteering, endorsing, or independently funding advertisements. Candidates can also raise unlimited funds from individual donors, personal funds, and political parties, while PACs may donate to parties without restriction. Despite the aggregate limit, PAC contributions constituted nearly a third of candidates' total campaign funds in the last election, demonstrating their ongoing influence.
The court found that the limits imposed by Montana voters do not significantly hinder political association or candidate expression, affirming the constitutionality of M.C.A. 13-37-218. The state's interest in reducing corruption and its appearance is deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional scrutiny, as supported by factual findings from a four-day trial. Consequently, the court upheld the statutes as constitutional and compliant with the First Amendment.
The document affirms a ruling by Judge James A. Teilborg regarding the contribution limits for political committees in Arizona, specifically addressing restrictions placed on political party organizations and their ability to form political committees. Political party organizations can form committees with specified aggregate contribution limits: $15,000 for joint candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, $5,000 for statewide office candidates (excluding governor and lieutenant governor), $2,000 for public service commissioner candidates, $800 for state senate candidates, and $500 for candidates for other public offices.
Judge Teilborg, while agreeing with the majority on the importance of preventing corruption in elections and upholding individual contribution limits, dissents regarding the constitutionality of aggregate PAC contribution limits. He argues that the state has not demonstrated a genuine threat to its governmental interests and has not implemented measures that avoid unnecessary restrictions on protected activities. He acknowledges that the Supreme Court defines corruption as the undue influence on elected officials through financial contributions but believes that Montana's individual contribution limits sufficiently mitigate the risk of corruption without the need for aggregate limits. He contends that these limits already prevent any single PAC from exerting undue influence over candidates, and he questions the necessity of the state's aggregate PAC contribution limit aimed at preventing overall influence by special interests.
All Political Action Committees (PACs) cannot be assumed to operate under a unified agenda; each has distinct interests and reasons for their contributions. The State has not presented evidence that all PACs exert unfair influence over candidates, nor that they collectively can do so, failing to demonstrate a genuine threat justifying the need to prevent corruption. Consequently, the means employed to limit PAC contributions do not align closely with the State's stated interest. The evidence does not substantiate the need for an aggregate contribution limit, as states must act proactively without infringing on constitutionally protected rights. Montana’s rationale for the limit—to prevent excessive influence from special interests—relies on generalized incidents rather than specific PAC activities, conflating all special interest contributions with corruption without adequate support. The discrimination between PACs and individual donors necessitates a substantial governmental interest, which the State has not proven. Even if certain PACs exhibit abusive behavior, imposing an aggregate limit on PAC contributions is unjustifiable, paralleling the ineffectiveness of limiting all individual contributions. The Supreme Court has noted that while PACs can present corruption risks, broad expenditure limits are excessive and indiscriminate, affecting both large aggregations of funds and grassroots fundraising efforts.
The legal document emphasizes that the justification for limiting corporate expenditures does not stem from the accumulation of wealth, but rather from the unique corporate structure conferred by the state. The court upheld these expenditure restrictions based on the inherent characteristics of corporations, which apply universally. It references the case of VanNatta v. Keisling, where the court found insufficient evidence to show that all PAC contributions lead to the corruption that Montana aimed to prevent. The document also notes the majority's view that VanNatta and Service Employees International Union v. Fair Political Practices Commission were superseded by Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, although this dismissal conflicts with the precedent set in Miller v. Gammie regarding how courts may reassess prior rulings in light of new Supreme Court decisions.
The discussion highlights that neither VanNatta nor Service Employees is clearly irreconcilable with Shrink Missouri. The evidence presented in Shrink Missouri to justify contribution limits was substantial, differentiating it from VanNatta, where no evidence linked out-of-district contributions to corruption. Furthermore, Service Employees involved a ban on certain contributions, contrasting with Shrink Missouri's limits. The majority fails to clarify how these decisions are inconsistent, and it asserts that actual evidence, rather than mere conjecture, is necessary to impose restrictions under the First Amendment. The author disagrees with the majority's conclusion that the evidence in this case surpasses that presented in Shrink Missouri, noting that Shrink Missouri included direct testimony from a senator about the corruptive potential of large contributions, along with media reports suggesting impropriety.
The excerpt examines the implications of campaign contributions on political corruption, referencing various instances in Missouri where significant donations correlated with unethical behavior by public officials. Notably, a state treasurer engaged in business with a bank that had contributed $20,000 to his campaign. Other contributions included $40,000 from a brewery and $20,000 from a bank to a state auditor candidate, along with a $420,000 contribution from an investment bank PAC, which led to scandals involving a state representative and the former attorney general of Missouri. The latter pleaded guilty to conspiracy for misusing state funds to benefit campaign contributors. In response to these abuses, 74% of Missouri voters supported contribution limits to address both actual and perceived corruption, which justified the limits upheld in Shrink Missouri.
In contrast, Montana's examples of corruption are deemed less severe and insufficient to warrant restrictions on PAC contributions. The state cited a memorandum from a Republican legislator desiring to limit PAC money to the Republican party, but five investigations yielded no convictions. This situation illustrates the influence of PACs rather than justifying restrictions on their contributions. Further, Montana referenced industry efforts to influence legislation as evidence of PAC-related corruption without demonstrating any illegal conduct. A poll supporting campaign reform was also mentioned, but its relevance was questioned since it did not specifically address PACs and should not dictate policy based on public opinion. The excerpt concludes that public dissatisfaction should not justify restrictions on political speech, as indicated by the Tenth Circuit's stance.
Evidence such as newspaper articles and public opinion polls regarding perceived corruption is deemed insufficient to justify limitations on independent expenditures by Political Action Committees (PACs), as established in Campaign Comm. and affirmed in NCPAC. The Supreme Court has previously excluded such evidence as irrelevant in constitutional matters. In capital punishment cases, the Court similarly rejected the use of uncertain public opinion as a foundation for legal decisions. The State's reliance on low voter turnout to illustrate negative perceptions of PAC money in politics is acknowledged, but it does not provide a compelling justification for imposing aggregate PAC contribution limits beyond existing individual limits. Voter turnout in Montana is notably high, and the assertion that low turnout reflects voter disillusionment lacks supporting evidence. Consequently, there is insufficient justification for imposing further restrictions on PAC participation in elections, as the individual PAC limits already serve to mitigate potential undue influence. The majority opinion incorrectly asserts a heightened risk of corruption from PAC contributions, which undermines the goal of fostering diverse electoral support. Restrictions on PAC contributions are seen as unjustified abridgments of First Amendment rights, as they are not closely aligned with the State's purported goals. The degree of legislative restriction should closely relate to the State's reasons, with alternative approaches available that do not infringe on constitutional rights.
To survive constitutional scrutiny, any restriction on First Amendment rights must serve an essential government interest through the least restrictive means, with the benefits outweighing the loss of protected rights. The State argues that imposing an aggregate limit on PAC contributions encourages a more diverse contribution base and mitigates undue influence from special interests. However, it fails to prove that individual limits on PAC contributions of $400 or $200/$100, depending on the office, do not sufficiently address corruption concerns. Although courts recognize a greater risk of corruption from PAC contributions than from individual contributions, this does not justify a broad aggregate limit that primarily restricts free speech and association rights.
Montana's aggregate limit imposes more restrictions than the individual contribution limits upheld in Shrink Missouri, particularly since candidates must return part of their PAC collections to receive contributions from other PACs. The State has not shown that its aggregate limit is closely tailored to address a significant interest, indicating a failure to utilize the least restrictive means. While Montana claims that corruption occurs when PAC contributions constitute a large share of a candidate's funding, it has not established a clear threshold for what constitutes "large" PAC contributions, relying instead on an arbitrary cap. The district court noted that the limit has reduced PAC contributions to about 29% of total contributions, but similar reductions could be achieved through increased individual or party contributions, suggesting the aggregate limit unnecessarily infringes on First Amendment rights. Testimony from veteran legislator Hal Harper indicates that PACs primarily contribute during election cycles relevant to their interests.
The perception of corruption in legislative elections could be mitigated if candidates accepted contributions from PACs representing diverse viewpoints, rather than being restricted to a single side due to contribution limits. Current state regulations do not effectively promote a varied base of support; instead, they prevent candidates from receiving contributions from a broader range of PACs, leading to the same issues of perceived corruption that the state aims to address. Although candidates can accept PAC money funneled through political parties, this creates circumvention opportunities and does not alleviate the influence of special interest money.
Imposing limits on direct PAC contributions to candidates, while allowing unlimited PAC donations to parties, could inadvertently encourage the very corruption the state seeks to prevent. The aggregate contribution limits significantly restrict PACs’ rights of association and free speech, as candidates may be forced to reject PAC contributions, limiting their fundraising options. The current system requires candidates to return portions of previously accepted PAC contributions to make room for new ones, which poses logistical challenges and disincentives to accept additional PAC support. This raises the question of whether the state's restrictions are counterproductive to their stated goal of expanding candidates' support bases. The process of refunding contributions to accommodate new donations may discourage candidates from seeking further PAC contributions.
A candidate's rejection of a contribution, due to being "PAC'd out" and unable to refund funds, infringes upon the associational rights of the rejected PAC. This infringement, while not directly caused by the state, constitutes an indirect abridgment of First Amendment rights, as established in Buckley v. Valeo. The state's legitimate interest in preventing corruption is undermined by its failure to demonstrate actual corruption or threats posed by PACs collectively. The state's measures to limit PAC influence are inconsistent, allowing higher contributions from political parties to candidates without similar restrictions on PAC contributions to those parties. Furthermore, the state does not differentiate between direct and indirect contributions, ignoring that influence may arise from non-monetary forms. By restricting PACs' ability to choose how to contribute—whether through giving or spending—the state impedes their associational freedoms. The First Amendment favors the autonomy of speakers in determining their expression. The document critiques the state's pejorative use of "special interest" and emphasizes that all supporters represent special interests, only becoming problematic when such interests are corrupt. The legal precedents referenced, including FEC v. Beaumont and others, affirm that contribution limits must be closely aligned with significant state interests to be permissible.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals referenced polling data as evidence of corruption, paralleling the district court's use of polls in Landell v. Sorrell to illustrate diminishing public confidence. Courts have commonly utilized polls and media coverage to assess governmental interests in implementing contribution limits. In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, public opinion polls informed the majority's decision regarding the existence of a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide; however, this case is distinguishable because the Supreme Court acknowledged a significant state interest in curbing perceived corruption, as seen in Buckley v. Valeo. Unlike that case, the State here attempts to use public opinion polls as evidence of corruption rather than to establish the existence of an important state interest. Judge Trott's dissent argues that the Constitution's amendment process should not depend on public opinion sampling but rather on government processes. Montana presents complaints from the 1988 election, alleging illegal transfers by political parties as evidence of corruption. The Supreme Court has pointed out that political parties share interests similar to PACs, complicating the effectiveness of Montana's aggregate PAC contribution limit in curbing large monetary influences in politics. The dissent criticizes the majority's view that PACs can contribute to candidates through non-monetary means, arguing it does not reduce perceived corruption and points out that the arbitrary limits imposed restrict participation in political speech without addressing the overall monetary influence. Ultimately, the dissent concludes that Montana's aggregate PAC limit does not meet the standards set by Buckley.
