James J. Terry, Claimant-Appellant v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Citation: 340 F.3d 1378Docket: 02-7416

Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; October 23, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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James J. Terry, a U.S. Army veteran, filed a claim in March 1996 with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for compensation related to service-connected presbyopia, an age-related refractive error of the eye. The VA Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma, denied the claim, a decision upheld by the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which cited 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) as the basis for barring the claim. Terry's subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's ruling, referencing the precedent set in Winn v. Brown. Terry's appeal to the Federal Circuit Court sought to challenge the validity of the regulation. However, the court upheld the validity of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court, thereby denying Terry's claim for compensation for presbyopia. The factual background indicates that while no vision defects were recorded during Terry's enlistment or in a 1979 examination, his medical records did indicate a diagnosis of central serous retinopathy in the left eye, and presbyopia was diagnosed in May 1996 during a VA examination.

In March 1996, Mr. Terry filed a claim for service connection for presbyopia, which was denied by the Regional Office (RO) in Muskogee, Oklahoma, on the basis that the evidence did not demonstrate a qualifying disability. The Board of Veterans' Appeals affirmed this denial, classifying presbyopia as a refractive error of the eye—considered a constitutional or developmental abnormality—not a disability under VA law, citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). The Board concluded that this regulation barred Mr. Terry's claim, leading to the determination that he was not entitled to compensation for his condition. The Veterans Court later upheld this decision, referencing the case of Winn v. Brown, which validated the regulation against similar challenges.

Mr. Terry subsequently appealed the Veterans Court's ruling, contesting the validity of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) as it pertains to his claim for presbyopia. He argued that the regulation conflicts with 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1111, 1131, and 1153, asserting that the VA Secretary overstepped his authority by excluding refractive errors from compensable disabilities. The government contended that the VA's interpretation of these statutes, as reflected in the regulation, should be upheld and given deference as a reasonable interpretation by the implementing agency. The appeal centers solely on the legal challenge to the regulation's validity, not on any factual determinations.

In evaluating an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, the court follows a two-step process established by Chevron v. NRDC. The first step examines whether Congress has addressed the specific issue at hand. If Congress has clearly articulated its intent, both the court and the agency must adhere to that intent. If not, the second step assesses whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

The analysis begins with the statutory language of Sections 1110 and 1131 of Title 38 of the U.S. Code, which empower the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to compensate veterans for disabilities resulting from injuries or diseases incurred in the line of duty, during both wartime and peacetime. Section 1110 specifies that compensation is available for disabilities resulting from personal injury or disease contracted in the line of duty, excluding those caused by the veteran's willful misconduct or substance abuse.

The court notes that Congress has not specifically defined "injury" or "disease" within Title 38. Consequently, Congress has not directly addressed the definition of these terms, allowing for ordinary meanings to be presumed. The definitions provided by Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary clarify "injury" as harm inflicted on the body by an external force and "disease" as any deviation from normal bodily structure or function. While these definitions do not create ambiguity in the statute, they do not specify what conditions qualify as compensable injuries or diseases for veterans' benefits.

Congress authorized the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to create rules and regulations necessary for executing laws administered by the Department, as outlined in 38 U.S.C. 501(a). The definitions of 'injury' and 'disease' are crucial for assessing the validity of the Secretary's interpretations under the Chevron framework, which limits judicial review when Congress grants interpretative authority to an agency. The court must determine if the statute explicitly forbids the agency's interpretation and, if not, whether the interpretation exceeds permissible bounds. The Secretary's interpretation cannot be overturned unless deemed arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute.

In the regulation 38 C.F.R. 3.303(c), the VA excluded specific conditions, including 'refractive error of the eye,' from the definitions of 'injury' and 'disease.' The regulation establishes that certain pre-existing disabilities do not require additional evidence if clearly proven. It emphasizes that congenital defects, refractive errors, personality disorders, and mental deficiencies are not classified as diseases or injuries under the applicable laws. The VA justified the exclusion of 'refractive error of the eye' based on medical literature categorizing such conditions as constitutional or developmental abnormalities, specifically citing presbyopia, which is related to aging, not trauma from military service.

Since presbyopia arises from natural aging processes and not from external forces or injuries, the Secretary's interpretation in section 3.303(c) aligns with the definitions of 'injury' and 'disease.' Thus, the court concludes that the Secretary's construction of the statute is permissible and not arbitrary or contrary to statutory intent.

Mr. Terry contends that the VA's interpretation of a statute is invalid if it does not favor the veteran, citing the well-established rule that ambiguous statutes should be construed in the veteran's favor (Gardner case). However, this argument is rejected as the principle does not influence whether the VA's regulation is a permissible interpretation of the statute. When faced with conflicting canons of statutory construction, the Chevron principle applies, which allows deference to a reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.

Mr. Terry further argues that 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1131 should be understood in conjunction with §§ 1111 and 1153, asserting that Congress intended for veterans to receive compensation for pre-service disabilities aggravated during active duty. The interpretation of statutes requires consideration of their context within the overall statutory scheme (Tyler v. Cain).

Section 1111 establishes a presumption of soundness for veterans at enlistment, asserting that they are assumed to be in sound condition unless noted otherwise during examination or unless there is clear evidence demonstrating a pre-existing condition not aggravated by service. If this presumption is rebutted, veterans cannot claim service-connected disability benefits unless they prove that their condition was aggravated by military service.

No defects or disorders were found during Mr. Terry's entry examination, which typically entitles him to a presumption of sound health. Consequently, the Secretary must provide clear evidence that his presbyopia preexisted his military service and was not aggravated by it. Presbyopia, which usually develops around age forty, is rarely detected in entrance examinations. According to 38 C.F.R. 3.303(c), established medical principles assert that refractive errors, like presbyopia, result from the normal aging process that begins before military service. Thus, the VA reasonably concluded that presbyopia rebuts the presumption of soundness and can be excluded from the definitions of 'injury' and 'disease.'

Mr. Terry argues that Congress intended for 'injury' and 'disease' to be broadly interpreted due to the inclusion of 'defects' in section 1111, but this argument was dismissed in the Winn decision. The court clarified that the term 'defect' in section 1111 refers to defects arising from diseases or injuries, indicating that Congress did not intend for every defect to qualify for VA compensation. 

Regarding section 1153, Mr. Terry claims it mandates a presumption of aggravation if a condition worsens during service unless the increase is due to natural progression. However, the interpretation in section 3.303(c) is consistent with this, as the evidence shows that any increase in presbyopia is a result of normal aging, not military service. Mr. Terry has not provided evidence that his presbyopia was caused or aggravated by military-related events, reaffirming that the Secretary's interpretation aligns with 38 U.S.C. 1153.

The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims' decision is affirmed. Relevant statutes referenced are from the 2000 United States Code and the 2002 Code of Federal Regulations. Central serous retinopathy is defined as a localized retinal detachment. The Board's classification of presbyopia as a 'refractive error of the eye' remains unchallenged. Under 38 U.S.C. § 1131, veterans are entitled to compensation for disabilities incurred during peacetime service, provided the injury was not due to the veteran's own misconduct or substance abuse. While 38 U.S.C. § 1101 defines 'chronic disease,' the statutes in this case do not utilize that term. Presbyopia is characterized by the need to hold reading material away from the eyes. The language of 38 U.S.C. § 1110 and § 1131 is clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretive doubt.