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United States v. Anthony Steven Wright, Also Known as Tony Zappa

Citations: 340 F.3d 724; 62 Fed. R. Serv. 455; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17747; 2003 WL 22004838Docket: 02-3445

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 26, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Anthony Steven Wright was convicted of two federal offenses: kidnaping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Following a two-week trial, the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the kidnaping and seven years for the firearm offense, with sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, Wright challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, the admission of hearsay evidence, the impartiality of the jury, and his classification as a career offender. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both his convictions and sentence.

The case details events from April 6, 2001, when Wright kidnapped seventeen-year-old Anne Sluti in a mall parking lot in Kearney, Nebraska, at gunpoint. Witnesses observed Wright assaulting Sluti, prompting two to call 911. Kearney police found Sluti’s belongings at the scene and later identified them as hers. After the abduction, Wright transported Sluti to a gas station in Ainsworth, where he bound her with chains and ordered her to stay quiet. He then continued driving north, ultimately rolling the vehicle into a ditch. Wright attempted to steal a pickup truck from a nearby farmhouse to retrieve the Suburban and later stole a front-end loader to extricate it.

Wright abducted Sluti, who managed to remove a chain from her wrist and discard it before being taken away. After traveling through several states, Wright restrained Sluti with duct tape, blindfolded her, and taunted her about her ability to escape. While attempting to free herself using a barbed-wire fence, she injured her wrist. Wright initially refused to remove the tape but later attempted various methods, including burning it off, which resulted in Sluti sustaining burns. 

On April 8, 2001, Wright further restrained Sluti and sexually assaulted her, threatening to continue this abuse. They entered a cabin where Wright stole a rifle, and Sluti seized an opportunity to call 911 for help, but Wright interrupted her. After fleeing the scene, they traveled to another location where Wright broke into a house, raped Sluti again, and then moved to a neighboring residence where he was briefly seen by a resident, John Koon. Wright continued his crime spree by robbing other residences, eventually abandoning the Suburban for a stolen Toyota Tercel, where he kept Sluti captive for two days in a remote cabin.

Wright engaged in a series of violent acts against Sluti, which included destroying evidence of his crimes by smashing a phone, burning it, and incinerating her clothing. Over a two-day period, he raped Sluti multiple times. In an effort to preserve evidence, Sluti concealed semen-stained underwear in a kitchen trash can and left two notes indicating her presence and distress, which were later discovered. After leaving Salmon Lake, Wright continued to transport Sluti, chaining her and taping her mouth shut during stops for gas and to purchase ammunition. On April 10, 2001, he broke into a cabin in Flathead Lake, where Sluti learned via television that police were searching for her. Upset by the news, Wright raped her again. The following day, a neighbor reported seeing Wright's vehicle at the cabin, prompting a response from law enforcement. Wright managed to hide the vehicle in another cabin before barricading himself inside, leading to an eight-hour standoff during which he threatened Sluti's life. He eventually surrendered on April 12, 2001. Post-surrender, Sluti received medical treatment for various injuries, including a black eye, burns, and lacerations, which indicated she had been physically restrained. A medical examination confirmed that she had been a virgin prior to the assaults.

Law enforcement recovered evidence hidden by Sluti at a cabin, including two notes and underwear. Wright's fingerprints were found on multiple items: the driver’s side of a Suburban, a revolver, and a rifle from the cabin. Sluti's fingerprints were identified on a phone near Livingston, Montana, which she used in an attempt to call 911, as well as on the Suburban’s back window and a book from the Salmon Lake cabin. Hair matching Sluti's DNA was found on duct tape from the Suburban, and DNA analysis confirmed Wright's semen was present on the recovered panties, with additional matter matching Sluti's DNA. Vaginal swabs from Sluti indicated Wright as the male contributor. On June 19, 2002, a jury found Wright guilty of both kidnaping and brandishing a firearm. He received a life sentence for kidnaping and an additional seven years for the firearm charge, to be served consecutively. Wright contends the evidence was insufficient for his convictions; however, when assessing such claims, the evidence is viewed favorably towards the government, allowing for circumstantial or direct evidence. A conviction under federal kidnaping law requires proof of involuntary transportation of the victim, with the victim's testimony typically being sufficient to support such a finding. During the trial, Sluti testified that Wright forcibly abducted her against her will.

Wright contends that Anne Sluti's actions during her six-day captivity indicate consent to transportation, referencing the Eleventh Circuit case United States v. Chancey, where a conviction was overturned due to lack of evidence of involuntary transportation. However, the circumstances in Chancey differ significantly; unlike in Sluti's case, where multiple witnesses observed Wright assaulting Sluti and heard her screams, Chancey lacked such witnesses. Sluti testified that Wright raped her multiple times, corroborated by medical evidence of forceful intercourse. In contrast, the Chancey victim did not attempt to alert others during her abduction and actively participated in her own transportation. Sluti was also physically restrained, leaving visible marks, and made attempts to contact authorities. Wright's capture followed an eight-hour standoff, confirming the severity of the situation. 

Regarding the firearm charge, Sluti testified that Wright brandished a gun during her abduction, with witnesses corroborating the violent nature of the encounter, despite not seeing the weapon due to their distance. Sluti also indicated that Wright hid the gun before his surrender, and subsequent investigations revealed a fingerprint match to Wright on the firearm. This evidence was deemed sufficient to uphold Wright's conviction for brandishing a firearm during a violent crime.

Lastly, Wright challenges the admissibility of Dr. Lynne Holz's testimony regarding statements made by Sluti, arguing they were not relevant to her medical treatment and improperly bolstered her credibility. Wright claims this testimony should have been excluded under the hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4).

Review of the district court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 803(4) typically involves assessing for abuse of discretion. In this case, because Wright did not object to the medical history testimony during the trial, the review shifts to plain error. Under Fed.R.Crim. P. 52(b), an unchallenged error can be acknowledged if it is plain, affects the defendant's substantial rights, and compromises the fairness of the trial.

For a statement to be admissible under Rule 803(4), it must have two key criteria: the declarant's motive must be for medical diagnosis or treatment, and the content must be pertinent, meaning it is the type of statement that health care providers reasonably rely on for treatment or diagnosis. Dr. Holz testified that she introduced herself as the attending emergency room doctor and obtained written consent for treatment from Anne Sluti, as well as a medical history related to her injuries.

While most of Sluti's statements were relevant to medical diagnosis and treatment, two statements—regarding an unknown man with a gun and later a knife—were less directly related. Because Wright did not object to these statements, the district court could not address them at that time. However, these statements were cumulative of Sluti's own detailed testimony about the abduction and assault, which was subject to cross-examination by the defense. Consequently, even if the statements could have been excluded with a proper objection, they did not significantly impact Wright's rights or the trial's fairness.

Wright also contended that the district court abused its discretion by not striking juror Vivian Bianchi for cause and by not removing juror Nancy Kramer after alleged improper comments. The district court has considerable discretion during voir dire, and typically, rulings on juror challenges are assessed for abuse of discretion, requiring a demonstration of actual prejudice to warrant interference.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to an impartial jury, with the presumption of impartiality existing if jurors can fulfill their duty to apply the law to the case facts. The standard for determining a juror's impartiality involves assessing whether they can set aside personal opinions to render a verdict based solely on courtroom evidence. 

Wright contended that juror Bianchi should have been dismissed for cause due to her statements during voir dire, which suggested an assumption of guilt. Bianchi expressed her shock and anger at the crime but also indicated that she could be impartial and adhere to the presumption of innocence. Despite her mixed responses, she affirmed that her feelings would not hinder her fairness. The court ultimately denied the motion to strike her for cause, noting that her anger was directed at the crime rather than the defendant and that she expressed a willingness to consider the evidence.

Wright argued that this decision prevented him from using a peremptory challenge to remove another juror, Nancy Kramer. The district court justified its ruling, emphasizing that Bianchi's anger did not reflect bias against Wright. Since Bianchi was removed via a peremptory challenge and did not serve on the jury, Wright bore the burden of proving that the jury was biased. He alleged bias in juror Kramer but failed to demonstrate that any statements she made warranted her removal. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Wright did not meet the burden of showing jury impartiality.

Wright challenged the district court's denial of his motion to strike Juror Nancy Kramer for cause. During an inquiry, defense counsel presented concerns that Kramer had made negative comments about Wright's appearance at a birthday party. Kramer denied sharing any opinions about Wright, asserting her belief in the presumption of innocence. The court concluded that Kramer maintained an open mind and found no evidence of improper comments or bias, thus denying the motion to remove her from the jury.

Additionally, Wright was sentenced under the career offender enhancement of Sentencing Guideline 4B1.1 due to his age, the nature of the current offense as a felony crime of violence, and his two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. Wright argued that his prior burglary convictions should not count as crimes of violence since they could occur without a victim present. However, the Guidelines classify burglary of a dwelling as a crime of violence without distinction regarding occupancy. Both of Wright's burglary convictions involved residences, thus his argument lacked merit under the Guidelines.

The court affirms the conviction and sentence of Anthony S. Wright after reviewing and dismissing potential errors by the district court. Notable points include the transition of chief judges in the Eighth Circuit, with David R. Hansen stepping down and James B. Loken succeeding him. Wright's physical characteristics and past as an aspiring boxer are mentioned, alongside testimony from three witnesses who corroborated hearing a girl's screams and witnessing Wright assaulting her before forcing her into a vehicle.

The document also discusses the admissibility of certain statements made by a patient for medical diagnosis under the hearsay exception, referencing the case of *White v. Illinois* to support the credibility of such statements. There was a specific objection raised by Wright regarding Dr. Holz's testimony about the victim, Sluti, stating she had made false claims during a phone conversation with law enforcement. The district court allowed this testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) to counter any implications of Sluti's recent fabrication or influence.

Additionally, it is noted that Sluti's earlier testimony and subsequent cross-examination could have made her statements to Dr. Holz admissible as prior consistent statements. Finally, the court observes that any statements made by Kramer occurred after jury selection, indicating that even if Wright's motion to dismiss Bianchi for cause had been granted, there was no evidence of bias that would have influenced his decision to use a peremptory challenge against Kramer.