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Keungne v. U.S. Attorney General

Citations: 561 F.3d 1281; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10233; 2009 WL 604890Docket: 07-14501

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 10, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case concerns a petition by a Cameroonian national challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) ruling declaring him removable due to his conviction for criminal reckless conduct under Georgia law. The primary legal issue is whether this conviction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, thus precluding judicial review under U.S. immigration law. Despite the petitioner's application for asylum and related relief, the IJ ruled his conviction warranted removal, a decision supported by the BIA despite reversing the classification of the offense as an aggravated felony. The court found it lacked jurisdiction to review the final order of removal, given that the petitioner's conviction met the statutory conditions of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court's analysis focused on the inherent nature of the offense, emphasizing that moral turpitude is defined by a conscious disregard of substantial risks, aligning with previous BIA and circuit court rulings. Ultimately, the court upheld the BIA's determination, confirming the conviction's status as involving moral turpitude and thereby affirming the petitioner's removal order.

Legal Issues Addressed

Conscious Disregard and Moral Turpitude

Application: The court highlighted that a conscious disregard of substantial risks under the Georgia statute reflects a violation of societal duties, aligning with the BIA's interpretation of moral turpitude.

Reasoning: The Georgia statute describes criminal reckless conduct as causing bodily harm or endangering another's safety through a gross deviation from reasonable care by consciously disregarding a substantial risk of harm.

Consideration of Actual Injury in Moral Turpitude

Application: The court concluded that actual bodily harm is not a requisite for a conviction involving moral turpitude, as the conscious disregard of risk suffices to reflect moral depravity.

Reasoning: A conviction can occur even without physical injury, as the nature of the actions themselves reflects moral depravity.

Crime Involving Moral Turpitude under Immigration Law

Application: The court affirmed that a conviction for criminal reckless conduct under Georgia law constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, thereby rendering the petitioner removable under immigration law.

Reasoning: Keungne, a Cameroonian national, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) ruling that he is removable due to a conviction for criminal reckless conduct under Georgia law, deemed a crime involving moral turpitude.

Definition and Assessment of Moral Turpitude

Application: The court relied on the inherent nature of the offense to determine moral turpitude, establishing that reckless conduct under Georgia law involves a conscious disregard for substantial risks, qualifying as moral turpitude.

Reasoning: The classification of a crime as involving moral turpitude relies on the inherent nature of the offense rather than the specifics of the defendant’s actions.

Jurisdiction to Review Final Orders of Removal

Application: The court determined it lacks jurisdiction to review the final order of removal because the petitioner's conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission, satisfying statutory conditions.

Reasoning: The Court lacks jurisdiction to review a final order of removal if an alien is deemed removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) due to a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission, provided the sentence could be one year or longer.