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National Bank of Commerce v. Jupiter Mortgage Corp.

Citations: 890 So. 2d 553; 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 175Docket: No. 2D03-5357

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; January 13, 2005; Florida; State Appellate Court

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National Bank of Commerce appeals a summary judgment favoring Jupiter Mortgage Corporation, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction since National Bank had previously dropped Jupiter as a party before the hearing. The appellate court agrees and reverses the summary judgment order. Additionally, Jupiter attempted to cross-appeal regarding an order on attorney's fees, arguing it should have been awarded fees from National Bank’s counsel under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2003). However, since National Bank dismissed its appeal concerning this order and the attorney's fees order is deemed nonfinal and nonappealable, the court dismisses the cross-appeal as well. 

The dispute originated from correspondent agreements between National Bank and Jupiter that required Jupiter to repurchase loans under specific conditions, including borrower default. National Bank also had agreements with Dupont Mortgage Group, and Jupiter registered the fictitious name 'Dupont Mortgage Group' while conducting business at the same address as Dupont. When National Bank sought loan repurchases from both Jupiter and Dupont, their refusals prompted National Bank to file a lawsuit against them. After the lawsuit was initiated, Jupiter argued it was not a proper party and filed multiple discovery requests that went unanswered. 

Prior to the summary judgment hearing on March 7, 2003, National Bank served a notice dropping Jupiter as a party, claiming jurisdiction was lost for the summary judgment. Jupiter contended the notice was defective as it did not conform to the necessary rules. The circuit court sided with Jupiter, proceeding with the summary judgment. However, the appellate court identified the circuit court's error in entering judgment against a party that had been properly dropped from the lawsuit, affirming that the rules allow for dropping parties without a court order before a summary judgment hearing.

In situations where a plaintiff seeks to dismiss one party among several, Florida Rule 1.250(b) is applicable for dropping that party. If there is only one defendant or if the plaintiff wishes to dismiss all defendants, Rule 1.420(a)(1) applies instead. A critical distinction exists between a notice of dropping a party, which concludes the action as to that specific party, and a voluntary dismissal, which typically ends the action entirely. Before trial, a notice to drop a party must be in writing and served to the opposing parties, and it must be filed before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment to be timely. Once filed, the court must accept the notice, having no discretion to deny the plaintiff's request to drop a defendant. The effect of dropping a party is akin to a dismissal, with the court losing jurisdiction over the dropped party. A voluntary dismissal allows for potential refiling unless barred, while a dropped party can only be rejoined through service of process. The court's jurisdiction is divested regardless of the motivations behind the notice. The summary judgment for Jupiter is reversed, the cross-appeal is dismissed as nonfinal and nonappealable, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.