Joseph Hunt v. Cheryl Pliler, Warden Csp-Sac Cal Terhune, Director of the CDC California Department of Corrections California State Attorney General
Docket: 01-56963
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 8, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Joseph Hunt appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his habeas corpus petition following his 1987 conviction for the murder and robbery of Ronald Levin, for which he received a life sentence without parole. After exhausting state court remedies, Hunt filed a First Amended Habeas Petition in the district court on August 31, 1998. The respondents moved to dismiss, claiming that many of Hunt's claims were unexhausted.
On November 22, 1999, the magistrate judge determined that out of seventy-one claims, twenty-seven were fully exhausted, five partially exhausted, thirty-six unexhausted, and three did not present federal claims. The judge advised that if Hunt did not elect to file a Second Amended Petition with only exhausted claims, the entire action would be dismissed without prejudice. The judge also warned that pursuing only exhausted claims might result in the forfeiture of unexhausted claims if Hunt later sought to file another federal habeas action.
Instead of preparing a report for district court review, the magistrate issued an order allowing Hunt time to file a motion for leave to amend or request voluntary dismissal. Hunt was cautioned that failure to comply could lead to dismissal for failure to prosecute. On December 8, 1999, Hunt sought an extension to file a Second Amended Petition, contesting the magistrate’s findings regarding nonexhaustion of several issues. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case, citing the district court's failure to follow proper procedures under 28 U.S.C. 636.
The district judge did not address Hunt's objections or his request for an extension. Instead, on December 20, the magistrate judge ordered that Hunt would have 30 days from the court's ruling on his objection to file a motion for leave to submit a Second Amended Petition. On July 20, 2000, the magistrate judge issued an order concerning "timely Objections" to a prior non-dispositive memorandum and indicated that objections regarding exhaustion would be reviewed by the district judge. However, it required Hunt to file a motion for leave to submit a Second Amended Petition by August 18, 2000, warning that if he chose to rely on his First Amended Petition, the case could not advance due to its mixed petition status, which could lead to its dismissal without prejudice.
On July 31, 2000, Hunt reiterated his objections, expressing concern that filing a Second Amended Petition before a ruling on his objections might render them moot. The district judge did not rule on these objections, but on August 11, the magistrate judge extended Hunt's deadline to file a motion for leave to submit a Second Amended Petition to October 2, 2000, while denying a request for clarification of the July 20 order.
Additionally, Hunt had filed a state habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court on February 23, 2000, seeking to confirm that all his federal claims were exhausted. The California Supreme Court denied this petition on August 9, 2000, referencing prior case law. Following this denial, on September 8, 2000, Hunt applied to vacate the magistrate judge's earlier findings regarding non-exhaustion, arguing that the Supreme Court's rejection indicated that his claims were exhausted. However, on September 14, the magistrate judge denied this application, affirming that Hunt's claims remained unexhausted and reminding him of the October 2 deadline for filing a motion for leave to submit a Second Amended Petition.
On December 19, the district judge denied Hunt's request to vacate a prior order from September 14, stating that a later-filed state habeas petition could not be used to exhaust claims not previously exhausted at the time of Hunt's federal petition. Hunt was granted until January 16, 2001, to file a motion for a Second Amended Petition. On January 18, 2001, he submitted a proposed Second Amended Petition with most previously unexhausted claims and new claims, asserting that a Supreme Court order confirmed their exhaustion. He also submitted a Third Amended Petition with only exhausted claims, requesting it be held in abeyance while the Second Amended Petition was adjudicated.
On January 31, 2001, the magistrate judge denied leave to amend, citing that exhaustion must be established before federal court involvement, and gave Hunt until February 20, 2001, to either pursue a Third Amended Petition with exhausted claims or stand on his First Amended Petition, which included unexhausted claims. Failure to act would lead to a recommendation for dismissal. The magistrate judge did not inform Hunt about the stay and abeyance procedure.
Hunt objected on February 23, 2001, arguing for district court review of the January 31 order under 28 U.S.C. 636(b) and requested an election on how to proceed after the district judge reviewed his objections. The district judge did not address this application.
On March 26, the magistrate judge recommended denying the stay request, dismissing the First Amended Petition as a mixed petition, and recommending dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. After Hunt filed objections, the magistrate judge rejected them on August 27, 2001, asserting that there was no authority to hold a mixed petition in abeyance.
On the same day, the district judge adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations, dismissing the First Amended Petition as mixed and entering judgment with prejudice. The appeal focuses on whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute and whether the First Amended Petition was properly classified as mixed. Review of the dismissal is conducted de novo.
The district court improperly dismissed the action for failure to prosecute and obey court orders by not adhering to the statutory procedure outlined in 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). A district judge cannot delegate the authority to a magistrate judge to hear and determine motions for involuntary dismissal; the magistrate can only make recommendations for the judge's review. In this case, the magistrate judge's decision on Respondents' motion to dismiss Hunt's First Amended Petition was beyond his statutory authority because it was a dispositive matter that required the judge's de novo review upon objections. The magistrate failed to submit the necessary proposed findings and recommendations, and although Hunt objected, the district judge did not conduct the required review. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the petition as mixed, which was with prejudice, was flawed. The dismissal relied on the magistrate's unreviewed determinations regarding Hunt's prosecution of the action and compliance with court orders.
On November 22, 1999, the magistrate judge determined that Hunt's petition was mixed and issued an unauthorized order requiring Hunt to forfeit unexhausted claims or face dismissal of the entire petition, effectively with prejudice due to AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. Hunt objected, but the district judge did not conduct the necessary de novo review as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The delegation of authority to the magistrate does not violate Article III, provided the district court makes the final decision, which it failed to do here. In his August 27, 2001, Final Report, the magistrate claimed his orders were proper, arguing they were non-dispositive. However, compelling Hunt to abandon his claims under threat of dismissal was not equivalent to a dismissal with leave to amend. The district court did not review the magistrate's findings in response to Hunt's objections, despite the requirement for such review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). The district judge's limited review did not address the critical November 22 order, and the respondents did not contest this failure. They incorrectly asserted that Hunt was not entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal of a later order denying leave to file a Second Amended Petition. Ultimately, the dismissal of Hunt's First Amended Petition with prejudice did not comply with statutory procedures, depriving Hunt of his right to de novo review and constituting an abuse of discretion by the district court.
The District Court erred by dismissing Hunt's petition with prejudice, citing failure to prosecute and comply with court orders. In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court established that a mixed federal habeas petition—containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims—must be dismissed without prejudice, allowing petitioners to either exhaust claims in state court or amend their petitions to include only exhausted claims. Although the magistrate judge noted Hunt did not request a stay for unexhausted claims, Hunt did seek to hold his Third Amended Petition in abeyance pending a decision on his Second Amended Petition. He also objected to the magistrate's finding of unexhausted claims in his First Amended Petition and requested a stay of the court's Memorandum and Order while these objections were resolved. Had the district court addressed his objections favorably, Hunt would not need to return to state court. Therefore, he should have been allowed to maintain his First Amended Petition without facing sanctions, rendering the court's dismissal an abuse of discretion.
The district court mistakenly ruled that all claims in the petition had to be exhausted at the time of filing, which contradicts established precedent. While a state prisoner must exhaust all state remedies before federal relief is granted, courts have the discretion to stay mixed petitions to allow for the exhaustion of unexhausted claims. Legal precedents confirm that district courts can hold exhausted claims in abeyance pending the resolution of unexhausted claims, which supports the argument against the dismissal of Hunt's petition as a mixed petition.
The district court's dismissal of Hunt's First Amended Petition was improper because it failed to inform him of the option to stay the petition after dismissing unexhausted claims, a requirement established by precedent (Kelly v. Small; Ford v. Hubbard). The court's reliance on the premise that all claims needed to be exhausted at the time of filing led to this oversight. As a result, Hunt's pursuit of claims he believed were exhausted ultimately culminated in a dismissal with prejudice.
Regarding Hunt's request for remand to a different judge, such a request is only warranted under unusual circumstances absent evidence of personal bias. The court must evaluate three factors: (1) the original judge's potential difficulty in disregarding erroneous views; (2) the necessity of reassignment to maintain the appearance of justice; and (3) the risk of inefficient duplication of efforts. In this case, the district judge showed indifference and deferred to the magistrate, indicating no substantial difficulty in adhering to the appellate court's mandate. Thus, there was no need for reassignment to preserve justice, and Hunt's request was denied.
The district court is instructed to conduct a de novo review of the magistrate judge's order from November 22, 1999. If the court determines that the petition contains mixed claims (some exhausted and some unexhausted), it must inform Hunt of his option to dismiss the unexhausted claims and stay the First Amended Petition while he returns to state court to exhaust those claims. The prior judgment has been vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this directive. Additionally, it is noted that the presiding judge, William W. Schwarzer, is sitting by designation. Relevant statutory provisions from 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) outline the authority of magistrates in pretrial matters and their ability to conduct hearings and provide recommendations to the court.
