Anthony Boyd v. City of New York, Daniel McKenna Det. Shield 4339, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Kenneth Destefano, Det. Shield 2353, Individually and in His Official Capacity, and John Doe 1-10, the Name John Doe Being Fictitious, as the True Names Are Presently Unknown, Individually and in Their Official Capacities

Citation: 336 F.3d 72Docket: 02-7574

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 15, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Anthony Boyd v. City of New York, the events leading to Boyd's arrest on January 4, 1996, are contested. New York City Police Detectives Daniel McKenna and Kenneth DeStefano were surveilling a stolen black Isuzu Amigo, which had been reported stolen six weeks prior. The vehicle appeared undamaged and intact. Upon seeing two individuals enter the vehicle, the detectives questioned them, who identified "Tony" as the owner, leading them to Boyd's residence.

At approximately 4 a.m., the detectives forcibly entered Boyd's apartment. When confronted, Boyd confirmed he was "Tony" and acknowledged ownership of the Isuzu. The detectives claimed they asked Boyd to dress and come outside to identify the vehicle, which he did voluntarily. However, Boyd argued that he was arrested and handcuffed inside his apartment as soon as he presented his insurance card, which was in the name of Anthony Lee. This discrepancy is crucial because it affects the admissibility of Boyd's statements made while descending the stairs; if he was in custody without Miranda warnings, those statements would be inadmissible.

Boyd was charged with criminal possession of stolen property and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, later being convicted and sentenced to 2-4 years in prison. He appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed his convictions, ordering a new hearing on the suppression of his statements.

At the Huntley hearing, the court granted Boyd's motion, determining that his statements to the police regarding the purchase of a vehicle for $75 and his identification of an Isuzu were made while in custody and before receiving Miranda warnings, leading to the dismissal of all charges against him after he had already served over two years in prison. Boyd subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of New York and detectives McKenna and DeStefano, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The district court found that probable cause existed for both Boyd's arrest and prosecution, resulting in summary judgment for the defendants.

Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, favoring the nonmoving party. Probable cause for an arrest exists when authorities have sufficient trustworthy information to warrant a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed. In Boyd's case, the police had adequate grounds for believing he knowingly possessed stolen property, supported by evidence including the stolen Isuzu, a witness identifying Boyd, and Boyd's own admissions. The court concluded that the officers had "arguable" probable cause, which warranted qualified immunity, thus affirming the dismissal of the false arrest claim.

For malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prosecution was initiated with malice and without probable cause, and that it ended favorably for the accused. A grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause, which can be rebutted by evidence of police misconduct or bad faith. The court found that the elements for both false arrest and malicious prosecution were satisfied, confirming the appropriateness of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

To succeed in a malicious prosecution claim following an indictment, a plaintiff must prove that the indictment resulted from fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or bad faith police conduct. Boyd's prosecution was initiated by police and ended in his favor. He argues that the police lacked probable cause, as the prosecution needed to demonstrate that he knowingly possessed stolen property. Evidence suggests Boyd was unaware the Isuzu was stolen, indicated by the car's good condition, intact locks and VIN, and original license plates. His only incriminating statement involved purchasing the car for $75 from an unknown person at the airport, which could establish minimal probable cause unless made post-arrest, making it inadmissible.

The timing of this statement relative to Boyd's arrest is a critical material fact. If the statement was made after his arrest, it undermines probable cause. While Boyd was indicted by a grand jury, which typically implies probable cause, he can counter this presumption by demonstrating that the indictment was obtained through misconduct. For the purposes of summary judgment, Boyd's account is accepted as true, indicating he was arrested in his apartment before making the incriminating statement.

Conflicting testimonies between police and Boyd raise questions about the integrity of the police's actions. The arrest worksheet shows Boyd was arrested inside his building, contrary to police claims of an outdoor arrest. This discrepancy could suggest the police acted in bad faith, allowing a jury to reasonably infer malicious prosecution. Therefore, the question of probable cause cannot be resolved through summary judgment, and the issue of malice also arises as a material fact, as a lack of probable cause typically infers malice.

Summary judgment for the defendants is not granted regarding the malicious prosecution claims. The appellate court affirms the district court's summary judgment on false arrest claims but reverses it on malicious prosecution claims. Under New York law, a person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property when knowingly possessing stolen property (N.Y. Penal Law § 165.45) and unauthorized use of a vehicle when operating it without the owner's consent (N.Y. Penal Law § 165.05). Boyd waived several claims in the district court, which focused on 1983 claims and state law malicious prosecution and false imprisonment claims. Questions of qualified immunity are evaluated through a probable cause analysis. The false arrest claim is linked to the false imprisonment claim. There is no conflict in the definitions of probable cause, which can refer to the "probability of guilt" or "probability of success." The key question is whether there was probable cause to believe the prosecution against Boyd could succeed.