United States v. William Quillen

Citations: 335 F.3d 219; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 14308; 2003 WL 21556912Docket: 02-3059

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; July 10, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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William Quillen, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania, sent a letter containing a powdery substance to the state parole board, which raised concerns of anthrax, prompting a hazardous materials cleanup. After pleading guilty, the District Court ordered Quillen to pay approximately $4,000 in restitution for the cleanup costs. Quillen appealed, arguing that the federal statute does not permit restitution because his actions did not cause actual damage to property. The Court affirmed the District Court's decision, stating that the costs incurred for the cleanup were directly attributable to Quillen's conduct. The incident involved an envelope from an inmate, Edward Nicholas, which was mistakenly linked to Quillen after he admitted to writing the threatening letter with harmless substances. The Parole Board initially sought significant restitution amounts for various costs but adjusted the claim, ultimately requesting a total of $4,191.30, which included hazmat clean-up costs and overtime pay.

At Quillen's sentencing hearing, he contested the Government's restitution request. The District Court rejected his claim for overtime pay, deeming it a consequential loss not covered by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), but allowed restitution for hazmat clean-up costs totaling $4,148.55, recognizing it as an actual loss to the victim. The appellate review of the restitution order is bifurcated: a plenary review of its legality and an abuse of discretion review for the appropriateness of the award. Quillen only challenged the legality of the order, thus the review was plenary.

The MVRA, enacted in 1996, requires convicted defendants to pay restitution to make victims whole and compensate them for their losses. A "victim" under the MVRA is defined as someone directly harmed by the offense. In cases involving property damage, restitution must equal the greater value of the property at the time of damage or at sentencing, minus any return value. Since the damaged property, the Parole Board's mail room, could not be returned, the District Court ordered Quillen to cover the costs to restore it to its prior condition.

The interpretation of the MVRA does not permit consequential damages; restitution is limited to actual losses directly resulting from criminal conduct. Quillen argued that his actions did not actually damage the mail room since the substances he mailed were harmless, suggesting that the hazmat clean-up costs were consequential damages and thus not recoverable under the MVRA. He cited United States v. Mitchell, where the court found that costs to restore property to pre-offense condition could not be claimed under the MVRA, challenging the appropriateness of the District Court's restitution order.

Restitution in property cases, as outlined in Section 3663(b)(1), is limited to either the return of stolen property or its value at the time of theft, minus any value when returned. It explicitly excludes compensation for lost income, restoration costs, or legal fees related to insurance recovery. Quillen contends that the restitution awarded for restoring the mail room to its pre-offense condition is similarly unauthorized under Section 3663A(b)(1). However, other jurisdictions have upheld restitution for repair costs in cases of damaged property, ensuring the victim does not receive double compensation. For instance, in United States v. Sharp, the court confirmed restitution for repair costs following property damage from a bomb, while disallowing claims for lost income. The court affirmed the inclusion of repair costs, highlighting that the value assigned by defendants did not accurately reflect the property damage sustained, as it ignored the context of the mine property affected. In United States v. Menza, restitution was also granted for clean-up costs incurred by the landlord following hazardous materials disposal by a contracted environmental clean-up company, indicating a broader acceptance of such costs in restitution calculations.

The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to establish missing findings regarding restitution principles. Key points include: restitution is permissible only for costs directly associated with the charged crimes, and the Government must substantiate victims' claimed losses with adequate documentation. The court noted that many jurisdictions do not allow recovery for investigatory costs, directing the District Court to assess whether the DEA's expenses for cleaning and disposing of chemicals were routine agency procedures or unique to Menza's criminal actions. Additionally, the landlord sought reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs, which overlapped with those claimed by the DEA. The court emphasized that if Menza is liable for these costs, he should not be charged twice.

Quillen attempted to differentiate his case from prior rulings, arguing that prior cases did not apply since actual property damage was undisputed in those instances. He contended that the Government misrepresented facts regarding cleanup costs, asserting that the invoice submitted pertained to Palmer Construction, not the Dauphin County hazmat team, raising concerns about potential duplicative claims. Quillen requested a remand for an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether his actions contaminated the property and if the cleanup expenses were legitimate.

However, Quillen's request for remand was deemed untenable as he did not raise this argument in his opening brief, thus waiving it. Even on equitable grounds, his claim lacked merit. The Government had previously provided an invoice detailing the cleanup costs, and the District Court ordered Quillen to pay a single hazmat cleanup expense, indicating no duplicative reimbursement was sought and confirming Quillen's responsibility for the costs incurred.

Quillen's arguments regarding compensability under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) lack merit. He contends that only 'actual damages' qualify for restitution, interpreting the MVRA's language as excluding recovery since his actions did not damage the victim's property. However, 'damage' is defined broadly, and his contamination of the Parole Board's mail room effectively rendered it unusable until proven safe. The court emphasizes that restitution should be limited to actual losses directly caused by the defendant's actions. Quillen's letter necessitated emergency hazmat services, resulting in a verified loss of $4,026.55 for the Parole Board. Although the cleanup was ultimately unnecessary, given the benign nature of the substance, it was a prudent response amid real anthrax threats following the September 11 attacks. The MVRA allows for recovery of cleanup costs as long as the defendant does not face double compensation for the same loss. The District Court's restitution order was thus upheld, confirming that the expenses incurred were indeed a direct result of Quillen's conduct and not subject to reimbursement for multiple services.

Judge Becker completed his term as Chief Judge on May 4, 2003. The court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Referencing a federal case concerning postal employees affected by the October 2001 anthrax mailings, the court acknowledged the significant impact of these attacks on national security. Quillen was sentenced to 40 months in prison, consecutive to his current sentence, followed by three years of supervised release. The decision in Davis related to restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) and noted that the language of the VWPA and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) is identical, making Third Circuit interpretations of the VWPA applicable to the MVRA. During oral arguments, Quillen’s counsel highlighted an invoice dated October 19, 2001, which was merely an estimate for cleanup costs; however, the government presented a second invoice from January 29, 2002, for $4,026.55 for completed hazmat cleanup. The court addressed the distinction between 'damages' and 'losses,' asserting that both must be actual and directly linked to the criminal act. It noted that while the Parole Board mailroom was not physically damaged, the associated cleanup costs were legitimate losses. Additionally, the emotional distress experienced by Parole Board employees, who faced a three-day period of uncertainty regarding their safety, was recognized as a significant and actual form of loss, even if difficult to quantify.