Anthony Toia v. Adele J. Fasano, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General

Citations: 334 F.3d 917; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 7241; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5709; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13216; 2003 WL 21488264Docket: 02-55436

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; June 30, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Anthony Toia, a resident alien, regarding his eligibility for relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(c). Toia pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess a controlled substance in 1989, when he was eligible for § 212(c) relief, which allowed discretionary waivers for lawful permanent residents with seven years of residency. In 1990, Congress amended the law to bar aggravated felons—those serving a sentence of five years or more—from applying for this relief. Toia's conviction fell under this aggravated felony definition, leading to his ineligibility for relief after the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings in 1997. Both the Board of Immigration Appeals and the district court denied his application for relief.

The court noted that the Supreme Court had previously ruled in INS v. St. Cyr that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) did not retroactively apply to those who pleaded guilty before its enactment in 1996, preserving their eligibility for § 212(c) relief. The crucial question was whether this reasoning extends to aggravated felons who pleaded guilty before the 1990 amendments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it does, thus ruling that Toia is eligible for § 212(c) relief despite his aggravated felony status, as he had relied on the law at the time of his plea.

To determine if IMMACT's aggravated felon bar applies retroactively to aliens who pleaded guilty before 1990, the analysis begins with examining whether Congress explicitly prescribed the statute's scope. The Supreme Court case Martin v. Hadix emphasizes the need for clear congressional intent for a statute to have retroactive effect, requiring that the statute's language must allow for only one interpretation. 

IMMACT amended section 212(c), which restricts eligibility for relief for certain aggravated felons, noting that this amendment applies to admissions occurring after November 29, 1990. The statute's language, however, does not clarify whether it also applies to convictions prior to this date. Courts, including the BIA, are divided on whether Congress intended for the amendment to apply retroactively to convictions made before November 29, 1990. 

While the statutory language bars discretionary waivers for aggravated felons who have served five years, it does not specify when convictions must occur to fall under this bar. The ambiguity surrounding whether the bar applies to pre-enactment convictions indicates a lack of clear congressional intent. Thus, the absence of unequivocal language in section 511(a) suggests that Congress did not intend for the aggravated felon bar to apply retroactively.

In determining whether a statute applies retroactively to the conduct of depriving aggravated felons who pleaded guilty prior to 1990 of § 212(c) relief, a court must first identify clear congressional intent for retroactive application. Absent such intent, the court assesses whether applying the statute would yield an impermissible retroactive effect. A statute is deemed retroactive if it impairs vested rights or creates new obligations regarding past transactions. 

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr, it was held that barring aggravated felons from applying for § 212(c) relief did not constitute impermissible retroactivity. However, St. Cyr emphasized a strong presumption against retroactive legislation, asserting that individuals should have clarity about the law to align their behavior accordingly, thus protecting settled expectations. The Court ruled that denying § 212(c) relief to individuals who entered plea agreements under the assumption that such relief was available imposes a new disability on past actions, constituting retroactive application.

The ruling highlights that alien defendants are generally aware of the immigration implications of their guilty pleas and would factor this into their decisions. Thus, removing the possibility of § 212(c) relief undermines fair notice and reasonable reliance. Consequently, the decision in St. Cyr leads to the conclusion that aliens who pleaded guilty before the enactment of IMMACT and would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief may still apply for it, overriding the earlier case of Samaniego-Meraz. The earlier ruling is therefore overruled, and the court's decision is reversed. 

Additionally, subsequent statutes have demonstrated Congress's ability to draft clearly retroactive legislation, indicating that the lack of such language in the current statute implies no intent for retroactive application.