James M. Dixon v. City of New Richmond, Mark Samelstad, David H. Levi

Citations: 334 F.3d 691; 20 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 212; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13430; 2003 WL 21508013Docket: 02-3727

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 2, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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James M. Dixon filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New Richmond, Wisconsin, Police Department, and its officials, claiming due process violations following disciplinary actions taken against him as a part-time police officer. The actions included suspension, demotion, removal, and constructive discharge after he faced charges from the Village of Somerset Police Department for violations related to alcoholic beverage laws, grant misconduct, falsification of time sheets, and theft of evidence. The Seventh Circuit Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment favoring the NRPD.

Dixon began his law enforcement career in 1998, working as a part-time officer for NRPD alongside full-time duties at Somerset. Following an employment complaint filed against him in January 2001, Dixon's attorney requested that the NRPD defer action until the Somerset matter concluded. Police Chief David H. Levi agreed not to assign Dixon shifts until the resolution of the Somerset case.

In February 2001, Somerset's Police Review Board found Dixon guilty of most charges and terminated his employment. Dixon appealed this decision to the St. Croix County Circuit Court. After Levi retired in June 2001, new Chief Mark Samelstad was informed of the agreement to defer action regarding Dixon. However, Samelstad issued new credentials to all officers except Dixon and subsequently requested the return of his credentials, which Dixon did not comply with, seeking legal counsel instead.

The circuit court upheld Somerset's termination decision in December 2001, citing adequate evidence. In January 2002, Dixon expressed interest in part-time shifts to Chief Samelstad, who confirmed that Dixon was still listed as a part-time officer but that his status would be reviewed.

Chief Samelstad informed Dixon on February 20, 2002, about an impending internal investigation regarding his dismissal from the Somerset Police Department, offering him a chance to present his account, which he declined to do during a scheduled meeting on February 25, 2002. On February 22, 2002, Dixon initiated a lawsuit claiming he was denied due process related to actions taken against him in January 2001 and October 2001 by the NRPD. Formal disciplinary proceedings commenced on April 25, 2002, with a statement of charges filed by Chief Samelstad, and a hearing set for May 22, 2002. Dixon claimed constructive discharge in response but did not attend the hearing, which resulted in his termination on May 23, 2002.

Subsequently, both Dixon and the NRPD sought summary judgment on Dixon's § 1983 claims. The district court recognized Dixon's protected property interest in his job but concluded he was not deprived of it, as the NRPD had not taken any actions that constituted suspension or removal. Even if there had been a deprivation in January 2001, the court held that Dixon was entitled only to post-deprivation procedures, which occurred in May 2002, and which he also refused to attend. The court denied Dixon's motion and granted the NRPD's. Dixon appealed.

The appellate court conducted a de novo review of the summary judgment, considering the evidence in favor of Dixon. The assessment of whether a protected property interest existed involved determining if Dixon had a legitimate claim to continued employment under state law, which would necessitate due process protections before any deprivation could occur.

Dixon's employment status is evaluated under Wisconsin law to determine if it was 'at-will' or subject to termination 'for cause,' which would invoke due process protections. Wisconsin Statute § 62.13 provides police officers with procedural safeguards against wrongful discipline or discharge, thus granting them a protected property interest in their positions. The parties agree that Dixon, as a part-time officer with the NRPD, held such a property interest. 

Dixon claims that being removed from the call list in January 2001 constituted a suspension and that the request to return his credentials in October 2001 amounted to constructive discharge. However, the NRPD contends that Dixon was not deprived of his property interest. The court finds this argument compelling, noting that Dixon's attorney had requested the NRPD refrain from disciplinary action while charges against Dixon were pending, leading Chief Levi to refrain from formal discipline but to keep Dixon off the call list. Dixon did not assert his rights under § 62.13(5) at this time, suggesting he did not view the situation as a suspension. 

The court further clarifies that part-time officers are called as needed, and the Chief has discretion over staffing. Therefore, Dixon's removal from the call list was not a suspension, as he remained listed as an officer throughout 2001 and until formal disciplinary actions began in May 2002. 

Regarding Chief Samelstad's request for Dixon to return his credentials, the court finds no evidence of demotion or constructive discharge, as there was no change in Dixon's rank, responsibilities, or pay. Dixon's interpretation of being 'removed' is considered as a claim for outright discharge, which is unpersuasive since no formal disciplinary proceedings occurred until April 2002, and he was not terminated until late May 2002. Thus, there was no discharge in October 2001.

Constructive discharge is defined as an employee quitting due to intolerable working conditions. In this case, Chief Samelstad upheld an agreement with Dixon while charges against him were pending, maintaining Dixon’s status as a part-time officer with the NRPD and communicating this directly. Since Dixon requested this arrangement, he cannot claim the conditions were intolerable. Although Chief Samelstad requested the return of Dixon's NRPD credentials, Dixon did not comply and did not raise concerns until months later. Dixon was aware of his due process rights under Wisconsin law, having utilized these protections regarding the Somerset charges. Furthermore, Dixon testified that he still considered himself a part-time officer and expressed willingness to work shifts even in early 2002, indicating he did not view himself as terminated before formal charges in April 2002. Consequently, it is concluded that Dixon was not constructively discharged and was not deprived of a protected property interest by the NRPD, leading to the affirmation of the summary judgment in favor of the NRPD.