In Re: Aimster Copyright Litigation

Docket: 02-4125

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; June 30, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Owners of copyrighted popular music filed consolidated lawsuits against John Deep and his companies, claiming that Deep's "Aimster" Internet service (renamed "Madster") is liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. The plaintiffs, representing a majority of active copyrights in American popular music, sought a preliminary injunction that effectively shut down the Aimster service pending resolution of the case, from which Deep appeals. Aimster is among several services, including Napster, that have faced similar legal challenges for enabling the sharing of digital copies of copyrighted music online.

Teenagers and young adults often swap copyrighted music files, which constitutes copyright infringement due to the creation and transmission of unauthorized copies. While these users are considered direct infringers, companies like Aimster that facilitate this infringement may be held liable as contributory infringers, even if they do not directly infringe the copyrights themselves. This legal framework allows copyright holders to pursue claims against those who contribute to infringement instead of individually targeting numerous infringing users, which is impractical. The discussion draws parallels to the tort of intentional interference with contract, suggesting a legal basis for extending liability to third parties who enable breaches of copyright licenses.

The district judge determined that the recording industry has a strong likelihood of succeeding in its case regarding both vicarious and contributory infringement related to the Aimster file-sharing system. Aimster consists of several key components: proprietary software available for free download, a server that organizes user information without storing the swapped files, tutorials to assist users, and a paid service called "Club Aimster" for easier access to popular music files. Users must have access to an instant messaging service, such as AOL, to swap files, as Aimster connects users online in chat rooms. Users register by creating a username and password, allowing them to designate "buddies" for file sharing. All file transfers and communications are encrypted using software provided by Aimster. Users can share files by designating folders on their computers. When a user searches for a file, Aimster's server locates available files on online users' computers and facilitates the transfer. Although Aimster does not store the files, its system enables rapid distribution of copied music, raising concerns for the recording industry. Aimster's role is likened to a stock exchange, facilitating connections rather than holding the files, which distinguishes it from direct copyright infringement.

The excerpt addresses the issue of contributory infringement in relation to copyright law, particularly in the context of instant messaging services and the use of video recording devices like Sony's Betamax. It highlights that the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted materials among users does not automatically implicate service providers, such as AOL, as contributory infringers if their systems also enable substantial noninfringing uses. The Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America, Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. established that manufacturers of products with significant noninfringing applications are not liable for contributory infringement, even if some uses are infringing. The Betamax itself was used for time shifting (recording for later viewing), library building (making permanent copies), and skipping commercials (creating unauthorized derivative works). While time shifting was deemed a fair use that benefits the audience, library building and commercial skipping were considered infringing activities, as they involved unauthorized copying of copyrighted content. Ultimately, the court concluded that the sale of equipment like the Betamax does not constitute contributory infringement if it is capable of being used for legitimate purposes, emphasizing the need to assess the overall capacity for noninfringing uses rather than individual actions.

The determination involves assessing whether a significant number of uses of the Betamax are non-infringing, particularly focusing on the recognized noncommercial time-shifting use in homes. The recording industry contends that the Sony decision does not apply to services because service providers can monitor and prevent infringing uses, unlike product sellers. They argue that service providers should take active steps to curb infringement. The majority opinion, however, did not explore potential engineering solutions that could minimize infringement risks related to the Betamax. While acknowledging that service providers can influence infringing behavior, the court emphasizes this is not the sole factor in establishing contributory infringement. The recording industry's position could threaten services like AOL's instant messaging, especially given its ties to music companies involved in the case. The court also refutes the industry's claim that mere potential for infringement negates Sony's applicability, noting that the Betamax was acknowledged to have both infringing and non-infringing uses, yet was not deemed a contributory infringer.

The Court determined that copyright holders should not be able to prevent the use of new technology that benefits non-infringing consumers, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's stance in A. M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. that actual knowledge of specific infringements by a facilitator suffices for contributory infringement liability. The recording industry's criticism of the Sony decision, which emphasized that plaintiffs did not show substantial harm from the Betamax, is acknowledged but deemed misplaced. While copyright owners need not demonstrate financial loss to prove infringement, some assessment of non-infringing versus infringing uses is necessary for establishing contributory infringement. The decision in Sony was prescient, as it later became evident that video recorders were primarily used for lawful purposes, thus highlighting the importance of considering potential non-infringing uses. The Court dismissed Aimster's argument regarding constructive knowledge, asserting that willful blindness constitutes knowledge under copyright law, indicating that avoiding full awareness of infringing activities can imply criminal intent.

Knowledge and willful ignorance can reflect similar culpability in legal contexts. In the case of United States v. Diaz, the defendant attempted to distance himself from drug transactions to deny knowledge of them, but this did not absolve him of liability. The same principle applies to Deep, who cannot evade responsibility for potential copyright infringement by using encryption software to avoid recognizing the unlawful activities of his service's users. While encryption serves a legitimate purpose in fostering privacy, it does not grant immunity from contributory infringement when it is used to conceal knowledge of unlawful activities. The argument that a service provider should be immune if their product can potentially have lawful uses is rejected, as it would create an unreasonable loophole for those facilitating copyright infringement. Legal analogies illustrate this point: a retailer selling dresses is not liable for the actions of customers who may be prostitutes, whereas a massage parlor owner who knowingly employs women selling sex is culpable for aiding and abetting prostitution.

The slinky-dress case aligns with the Sony precedent, establishing that liability can be imposed on sellers of products or services that are primarily used for infringement, even if they have noninfringing uses. In contrast to the recording industry's view, which treats any known infringing use as grounds for contributory infringement, and Aimster's claim of immunity from liability due to noninfringing uses, a nuanced position is necessary. Aimster's tutorial predominantly showcases the sharing of copyrighted music, including specifically identified infringements, thereby serving as an invitation to infringement absent in the Sony case. Membership in Club Aimster allows users to download popular copyrighted music for a fee, which is Aimster's primary revenue source, linking the club directly to the free software provision. The operational mechanism involves searching for and transmitting files from online users, with only popular copyrighted songs listed. While there is potential for substantial noninfringing uses, evidence presented is sufficient to shift the burden to Aimster to prove substantial noninfringing uses in a preliminary injunction context. Although some music may not be copyrighted or may be waived by artists for exposure, the primary focus remains on copyrighted material. Users may engage in noninfringing activities incidental to infringement, such as discussing music or sharing non-copyrighted content, although these activities are secondary to the predominant use of the service for copyright infringement.

A user who owns a popular music CD but has not downloaded it to their laptop attempts to use Aimster's service to download a copy while away from home. This scenario raises the question of fair use, drawing parallels to the Sony case, which allowed time-shifting. However, previous cases such as A. M Records v. Napster and UMG Recordings v. MP3.com rejected similar analogies, primarily because Napster did not restrict downloads to owned CDs and MP3.com’s copies were deemed unauthorized derivative works. Aimster's potential for non-infringing uses was deemed speculative; the service lacked evidence showing it was used for such purposes. The court emphasized that Aimster failed to demonstrate any actual non-infringing uses and that claims of legitimate use were unsupported. Consequently, the absence of evidence led the district judge to conclude that the recording industry was likely to prevail on contributory infringement claims. The court ruled that if a service primarily facilitates copyright infringement, the financial impact on the industry is irrelevant to liability. Furthermore, even with non-infringing uses present, if infringing uses are significant, the service provider must show that eliminating those infringing uses would be disproportionately costly, which Aimster also failed to do. Aimster's request for an evidentiary hearing was denied, aligning with precedent that requires such hearings only when genuine material facts are disputed.

A party seeking an evidentiary hearing must demonstrate that the issue is genuine and material, showing that evidence could potentially weaken the moving party's case and influence the judge's decision on an injunction. Aimster faced challenges in gathering evidence due to its use of encryption, which it must bear responsibility for. Regarding vicarious infringement, doubts exist about the recording industry's likelihood of success if the case proceeded to trial. Vicarious liability involves a principal's responsibility for the actions of an agent, but users of Aimster’s system are not its agents. This liability concept has been expanded in copyright cases where effective relief is only attainable from parties akin to principals. For example, a dance hall owner may be held liable for unlicensed music played by bands it hires, even if those bands are not its agents. The dance hall's failure to control infringement can result in vicarious liability, though it may also be considered a contributory infringer due to indirect benefits from such actions. The extent of vicarious liability remains unclear, as illustrated by the Sony case, where the court did not classify Sony as a vicarious infringer despite its potential to mitigate infringement through design changes. Aimster's lack of proactive measures to monitor its system’s use for copyright infringement supports its classification as a contributory infringer. The discussion then shifts to Aimster's defenses under the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act of the DMCA.

The DMCA was enacted to address issues arising from the digital revolution, particularly concerning Internet service providers (ISPs) and their liability for copyright infringement due to file sharing among users. ISPs, defined broadly under 17 U.S.C. 512, include entities like Aimster, which was found to fall under this definition by the district judge. While the DMCA offers safe harbors for ISPs, Aimster did not qualify because it failed to take reasonable steps to deter repeat infringers. Instead, Aimster facilitated copyright infringement by instructing users on how to evade detection.

In evaluating a preliminary injunction against Aimster, the court weighed the potential harms to both parties. Aimster argued that the injunction incapacitated its business, while the recording industry contended that Aimster's operations had led to significant copyright violations. The court found that any harm to Aimster was less severe than the irreparable harm the recording industry would suffer if the injunction were lifted, particularly since damages from Aimster's infringement could not be reliably calculated and Aimster likely lacked the means to pay them.

Aimster's objections to the injunction's scope were dismissed, as it failed to propose alternative language during the proceedings, resulting in a waiver of its objection. The court also rejected Aimster's claim that the injunction infringed on free speech rights, noting that copyright law includes First Amendment considerations and that such rights are less pronounced when it involves the rights of others. Thus, the court affirmed the injunction against Aimster.