Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; June 27, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Margaret D. Conneen appealed the dismissal of her lawsuit against MBNA America Bank, claiming her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Delaware law. The district court had granted summary judgment for MBNA, concluding that Conneen failed to show she could perform her job's essential functions, with or without accommodation. Although the appellate court disagreed with this conclusion, it upheld the summary judgment, stating there was no genuine issue of material fact indicating that MBNA terminated Conneen due to her disability or failed to engage in the required interactive process under the ADA.
Conneen worked at MBNA from July 1986 until June 1998, eventually becoming a Marketing Production Manager. After beginning a short-term disability leave in September 1996 due to clinical depression, she was prescribed Effexor. By December 1996, her condition improved, leading to her return to part-time work in February 1997. She resumed full-time hours in March 1997 without restrictions, but continued to experience morning sedation from her medication, affecting her punctuality. After concerns from her manager about her tardiness, MBNA accommodated her by adjusting her start time. Despite further accommodations, Conneen's attendance remained problematic, culminating in a final warning for reporting to work intoxicated in November 1997.
On January 20, 1998, Dr. Seltzer noted that Conneen was stable but chose not to adjust her Effexor dosage due to her ongoing divorce, which could affect her depression. On January 30, Conneen met with her new manager, Rose Behm, to discuss her work schedule. Behm was unaware of Conneen's adjusted schedule or her depression. Conneen indicated that her schedule had changed to start later but did not disclose that it was for medical reasons. When asked if anything prevented her from working a standard schedule, she stated there was no issue. Conneen then began reporting to work at 8:00 a.m. on February 9, 1998, but quickly resumed tardiness, being late multiple times throughout February and early March.
On February 24, 1998, Conneen met with her supervisors to address her tardiness, once again denying any issues preventing her from being on time. Despite her assurances, she continued to arrive late. On March 6, during another meeting, Conneen disclosed for the first time that she had a medical condition affecting her punctuality and offered to provide documentation from her doctor. Dr. Seltzer later confirmed that Conneen's condition required her to start work no earlier than 9:00 a.m., leading MBNA to adjust her schedule accordingly. However, Nurse Patricia Peterson later contacted Dr. Seltzer and learned that Conneen's morning sedation was likely temporary and anticipated that she could return to a normal schedule soon. Dr. Seltzer completed an MBNA disability form indicating Conneen suffered from 'dysphoria' but did not state that an adjusted schedule was necessary or confirm that her condition interfered with her punctuality.
Nurse Peterson informed Casey that Conneen could work at 9:00 a.m. until April 22, 1998, after which she was required to return to an 8:00 a.m. start time. Conneen expressed discomfort with this change and disagreed with the removal of her accommodation for a later start time, yet felt compelled to comply. Despite this, she reported late on April 17. On April 24, Casey and Willey reminded Conneen about the 8:00 a.m. schedule, to which she agreed without requesting to maintain her later start time. Conneen cited discomfort discussing her medical issues but did not pursue further accommodations or consult Dr. Seltzer after this meeting.
Following her assurances of punctuality, Conneen arrived late multiple times from April 27 to May 11. After being urged to meet with Nurse Peterson, she did so but failed to link her tardiness to her medication or depression. On May 15, Willey offered her a paid leave, a transfer opportunity, or the option to resign instead of facing termination. Conneen rejected these options, insisting she would be on time. Although she initially improved her punctuality after this meeting, she reverted to tardiness again by June 22. In a June 23 meeting with Willey, she again did not connect her lateness to her medication, providing unrelated excuses instead. Throughout these discussions, Conneen did not request further accommodations.
On June 25, 1998, MBNA terminated Conneen due to excessive tardiness. After her termination, Conneen learned from Dr. Seltzer that he had not communicated to Nurse Peterson that she was ready to work at 8:00 a.m. Subsequently, Dr. Seltzer wrote to MBNA requesting that Conneen be allowed to arrive late due to her condition and asked for her reinstatement. Conneen then filed a civil action against MBNA in the U.S. District Court for Delaware, alleging violations of the ADA for withdrawing a prior accommodation that allowed her to start work an hour later and claiming a breach of good faith and fair dealing under Delaware law.
The district court granted MBNA's motion for summary judgment, dismissing both claims. The court found that MBNA had no notice of Conneen's disability at the relevant time and that reporting to work at 8:00 a.m. was an essential job function. Therefore, Conneen could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, as she could not perform essential job functions even with accommodation. Additionally, the court rejected her bad faith claim and concluded that Conneen's appeal was based on the argument that the court erred in finding that Dr. Seltzer authorized her to resume the 8:00 a.m. schedule, contrasting with a prior finding by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Conneen asserts that the withdrawal of her late start accommodation was unreasonable, citing the adverse effects of her medication on her ability to report by 8:00 a.m. She contends that she could perform essential job functions if allowed to start at 9:00 a.m. The ADA mandates reasonable accommodations for known disabilities, but the crux of the dispute is whether Conneen communicated her need for further accommodation after the initial agreement. The determination of whether starting work at 8:00 a.m. was an essential job function is pivotal to resolving the case, as MBNA argues that Conneen's inability to meet this requirement prevents her from recovering under the ADA.
To determine if Conneen is 'qualified' under the ADA, she must demonstrate that she meets the necessary skills, experience, and education for her job, as well as the ability to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation. MBNA does not dispute Conneen's qualifications but argues that consistent reporting for work is an essential function of her managerial position. The court disagrees, stating that 'essential functions' must be fundamental, not marginal, and this determination is factual, requiring case-by-case analysis based on relevant evidence, including the employer's judgment and job descriptions. In the Deane case, a nurse's inability to lift heavy weights was contested; the hospital claimed lifting was essential, while a vocational expert argued it was not among the critical tasks for nurses. The court ultimately found that a factual question remained for the jury regarding the essential functions of the job.
An employee, Skerski, diagnosed with panic and anxiety disorder after ten years at Time Warner, was advised by his doctor to stop climbing and working at heights, which were essential duties of his cable technician role. Despite Skerski's request for a bucket truck to accommodate his condition, the employer claimed none were available. Time Warner proposed retraining for climbing skills, but this effort ceased when his doctor confirmed his incapacity to perform at heights. Consequently, Skerski accepted a lower-paying position while wishing to continue underground repair work.
The district court initially ruled in favor of Time Warner, stating that Skerski was not a qualified individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) due to his inability to perform essential job functions. However, this decision was reversed upon appeal, with the court emphasizing the need to assess what constitutes 'essential functions' based on several regulatory factors, including the employer's judgment, job descriptions, time spent on functions, and the experiences of past employees. The appellate court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether climbing was indeed an essential function, noting that Skerski had effectively performed his job without climbing for three years, suggesting that not all functions may be as essential as Time Warner claimed.
MBNA's claim that an 8:00 a.m. start time is essential to the job lacks substantial support compared to precedents set by Time Warner in Skerski and the hospital in Deane. MBNA argues that punctuality is necessary for managerial employees to set a good example, but this assertion is not sufficiently backed by evidence. The argument that punctuality is critical could apply to various job aspects, such as dress codes, which are important but not fundamental job functions. The record indicates that Conneen performed her duties satisfactorily despite arriving later, with no evidence showing that her tardiness harmed MBNA's business.
MBNA's reference to Earl v. Mervyns Inc. to support its position on punctuality being essential is misplaced, as the retail context in that case differs significantly from Conneen's office setting. The assertion that flexibility undermines employer expectations is not the central issue; rather, it is whether MBNA can legitimately define punctuality as an essential function without substantial justification. The record does not indicate that Conneen's late start negatively affected her performance or MBNA.
While MBNA's characterization of punctuality as a requirement is noted, it does not equate to it being an essential function. The court finds no evidence to classify the 8:00 a.m. start time as essential in Conneen's case, concluding that she is a qualified individual under the ADA despite her tardiness. However, the court affirms the district court's summary judgment in favor of MBNA, citing Conneen's responsibility for the breakdown of the interactive process required under the ADA.
Under the ADA, while the statute does not explicitly mention an "interactive process," it mandates that employers provide reasonable accommodations for known disabilities unless it would cause undue hardship. Regulations indicate that employers should engage in an informal interactive process to identify specific limitations from the disability and potential accommodations. The EEOC guidelines emphasize that once an employee requests an accommodation, employers must make a reasonable effort to determine it through a flexible, collaborative approach. Both parties must assist in finding accommodations and act in good faith.
Key case law supports this, indicating that sufficient notice and good faith participation are essential for the interactive process. When successful, this process not only identifies accommodations but also enhances the employer's understanding of the employee's needs.
In the case at hand, both MBNA and Conneen participated in the interactive process, but they each blame the other for its breakdown. Conneen asserts that her requested accommodation was initially granted but later withdrawn unilaterally by the employer. Conversely, MBNA contends that the employee must keep the employer informed about her condition and that failure to renew accommodation requests can extinguish claims.
To hold the employer accountable for a breakdown in the interactive process, an employee must demonstrate four elements: 1) the employer was aware of the disability; 2) the employee requested accommodations; 3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated if not for the employer’s lack of good faith.
MBNA acknowledged awareness of Conneen's disability and her initial request for accommodation. However, it argued that by June 1998, it reasonably believed the disability had ended, as Conneen had resumed a normal 8 a.m. start time and had been punctual for a month after being warned about previous tardiness. When asked about her continued lateness, Conneen did not mention any medical issues. The law does not require employers to anticipate undisclosed disabilities. MBNA's conclusion that no disability issue existed was supported by the evidence, including a prior note from Dr. Seltzer suggesting a temporary accommodation. Discrepancies regarding the specifics of a conversation between Dr. Seltzer and Nurse Peterson about the duration of Conneen's disability were deemed insufficient to create a material fact dispute. Conneen's multiple opportunities to explain her tardiness were not taken to address any medical concerns, as she attributed her lateness to non-medical reasons. While recognizing the potential reluctance of disabled employees to discuss their conditions, this did not impact the analysis in this case.
Conneen had previously authorized MBNA to communicate with her psychiatrist and was aware that discussions had occurred. The work environment was supportive, encouraging open dialogue about her tardiness, yet Conneen declined multiple opportunities to address her situation. Legally, no specific formalities are required for an employee to request accommodations, but the employee must clearly indicate a need for assistance regarding their disability. The employer must be informed of both the disability and the request for accommodation, and the amount of information needed is contingent on the employer's prior knowledge. In this case, MBNA had no indication from Conneen that she was still affected by her medication, as she had asserted otherwise.
Despite knowing about her morning sedation, Conneen was expected to provide more substantial explanations for her tardiness beyond personal excuses, especially after receiving numerous warnings. After a month of improved punctuality, Conneen was ultimately terminated. MBNA was not liable for failing to deduce her needs without clear communication from her. Both parties must engage in the interactive process in good faith, and the court highlighted that Conneen's prior experiences with accommodation requests should have informed her actions. She had successfully obtained accommodations before by providing necessary medical documentation when requested, indicating she understood the process.
Conneen's lack of communication after MBNA threatened to withdraw her accommodation is critical. She did not reach out to Dr. Seltzer or notify MBNA's health staff about her condition, failing to clarify the statements attributed to Nurse Peterson. The court noted that Conneen could not expect MBNA to obtain necessary medical information without her initiative. Additionally, all parties acknowledged that the initial accommodation was temporary, placing the onus on Conneen to provide further documentation if needed, which she did not do. Her inaction and misrepresentation of her situation hindered MBNA's ability to understand her condition, leading the court to conclude that Conneen acted in bad faith.
The court found undisputed evidence supporting MBNA's good faith efforts, including immediate accommodation upon receiving documentation, not withdrawing accommodations without Conneen's consent, allowing time for adjustment after accommodations were terminated, and multiple meetings to discuss her tardiness. The court affirmed that MBNA acted patiently and prudently throughout the process.
Conneen also alleged that MBNA breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Delaware law. Delaware courts are cautious about broadly applying this covenant to at-will employment to avoid undermining the doctrine itself. Four limited situations where a breach could occur have been recognized: termination violating public policy, employer misrepresentation affecting employment decisions, misuse of bargaining power depriving employees of compensation, and falsification of employment records. Conneen's claims against MBNA pertain to the first, second, and fourth grounds.
Conneen's claims regarding liability against MBNA mainly focus on allegations that Nurse Peterson misrepresented Dr. Seltzer's opinions about her work schedule. Conneen contends that Dr. Seltzer did not authorize her to resume an 8:00 a.m. work start. However, even if this were true, the evidence indicates a misunderstanding rather than a deliberate falsification by Nurse Peterson. Dr. Seltzer himself did not communicate with MBNA without Conneen's consent, and there is no evidence supporting claims of malicious intent. The court noted that Dr. Seltzer was ambiguous about the impact of Conneen's medication on her punctuality, which does not bolster her claims. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of MBNA, concluding that Conneen failed to establish a basis for liability.
Conneen admitted that her previous excuses were false. On January 14, 2000, MBNA's in-house counsel, Omar McNeill, and Nurse Peterson discussed Dr. Seltzer's April 1998 conversation with Nurse Peterson, concluding that Dr. Seltzer approved Conneen's return to an 8:00 a.m. start time. McNeill confirmed this in a letter, which Dr. Seltzer verified with a handwritten note. However, Dr. Seltzer later claimed inaccuracies in McNeill's letter, asserting he never communicated that Conneen was ready to work at 8:00 a.m. The court's review of the summary judgment is de novo, affirming if there is no genuine issue of material fact. In employment discrimination cases, the summary judgment standard is applied more rigorously due to the importance of intent and credibility.
There was a dispute over the availability of a bucket truck, with Skerski claiming there was an old one, contrary to his supervisor's denial. Conneen acknowledged that punctuality is crucial in employment but contended that her case does not revolve around attendance. She argued that a change in work time by one hour was not an essential job function under the ADA, meaning she did not concede the necessity of reporting at 8:00 a.m. versus 9:00 a.m.
The document references precedent regarding the interactive process required under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA, highlighting cases where employers were obligated to engage with employees about accommodations. It noted that Conneen had a history of tardiness, including one instance of arriving late and inebriated, without evidence suggesting a medical cause for her behavior. The court did not address Conneen's collateral estoppel claim regarding Dr. Seltzer's April conversation, finding it irrelevant. Even accepting Conneen's perspective on the conversation, her failure to engage in the interactive process for months was significant. Dr. Seltzer’s testimony supported MBNA’s view that Conneen's disability was a temporary reaction to medication, reinforcing the district court's summary judgment ruling.
