O'Hare v. Hamric

Citations: 868 So. 2d 687; 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 4340Docket: Nos. 2D02-4010, 2D03-1404

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; April 1, 2004; Florida; State Appellate Court

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Lee O’Hare and Lynn Atherton appeal a court order that awarded compensation to their sister, Lalai Hamric, who is the guardian of their mother, Sara H. Sapp. The court also awarded attorney's fees and costs to Hamric's attorney, Melville G. Brinson, III. The appellate court determined that the attorney's fees were prohibited by the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and reversed this award. Additionally, the court reversed the compensation awarded to Hamric, remanding the case for further proceedings due to insufficient documentation supporting the compensation and because some of the awarded services fell outside her guardian duties.

The case began in November 2001 when O’Hare and Atherton filed petitions to determine their mother’s incapacity and to appoint a plenary guardian. At that time, she was 85 years old and living in a care facility. The siblings sought a professional guardian while Hamric, who had been managing the Ward's medical and financial affairs under a durable power of attorney, claimed her right to be appointed as guardian. James M. Sapp, another sibling, supported Hamric's appointment.

After extensive discovery, a settlement was reached on January 10, 2002, allowing Hamric to be appointed as guardian of the person and appointing a corporate guardian for the property. The agreement stipulated that $25,000 be allocated from the Ward’s trust to O’Hare and Atherton for attorney's fees, alongside similar compensation for Hamric. The circuit court approved the settlement on February 6, 2002, with modifications to ensure compliance.

Hamric was appointed as the guardian of the Ward's person, while Harold A. Foy was appointed as guardian of the Ward's property after Northern Trust Bank declined the role. Northern Trust agreed to act as custodian for the Ward’s assets, transferring funds monthly to Foy upon court approval and instructions from Hamric for the Ward’s expenses. The Ward passed away on November 23, 2003. 

A settlement agreement announced on January 10, 2002, stipulated that the Petitioners, O’Hare and Atherton, would have their fees and costs covered by the trust up to $25,000, with any excess being their responsibility. Mrs. Hamric's fees would also be covered up to $25,000. The trust was required to pay the examining committee and the court-appointed attorney, Mr. Lakeman's fees. The plan included executing mutual releases among the litigants and guardian for a complete settlement. 

Brinson, representing Hamric, received $25,000 from the Ward’s funds for fees and costs associated with the litigation. He later filed a petition for an additional $13,320.50 in attorney’s fees and $459.56 in costs for services rendered between January 11 and May 24, 2002. O’Hare and Atherton objected, arguing that the additional fees were barred by the settlement agreement. Brinson contended that the fees were for services related to the guardianship post-settlement and beneficial to the Ward. 

The circuit court awarded Brinson the requested fees and costs, but on appeal, O’Hare and Atherton argued that the settlement agreement prohibited any additional fee awards. The appellate court determined that the settlement agreement did indeed bar further fees to Brinson, thus not addressing the other arguments presented by O’Hare and Atherton. The standard of review for settlement agreements is based on contract law, applying a de novo standard.

Entitlement to attorney’s fees based on contractual interpretation is subject to de novo review by appellate courts. An attorney serving a ward or guardian is entitled to reasonable fees and reimbursement, per Fla. Stat. 744.108(1). In this case, the parties agreed to limit attorney's fees and costs from the ward’s assets to $25,000 per side for "this litigation." Fees exceeding this amount would be the responsibility of the party incurring them. Brinson contended that this limit applied only to fees incurred up to January 10, 2002, the settlement date, while Hamric and Brinson argued it did not cover fees incurred after that date for completing the settlement.

The interpretation of "for this litigation" in the settlement agreement is central to this dispute. Contracts are construed to reflect the parties' intent as expressed in the agreement, with terms interpreted in their natural or commonly understood meanings. "Litigate" involves contesting a legal matter, and litigation includes all activities necessary to resolve a lawsuit. Completing a settlement often requires additional legal work, such as document preparation, which is integral to the litigation process.

The court concluded that the limiting agreement applies to both the active litigation and the completion of the settlement. This interpretation is further supported by the attorneys' recitation of the settlement agreement, which highlighted the need for comprehensive releases and orders, indicating the extensive legal work required to finalize the settlement.

The attorneys involved did not indicate that the limiting agreement excluded additional legal work needed to finalize the case, implying such an exception was not intended. The limiting agreement did not correlate with services rendered or costs incurred before the settlement announcement. O’Hare and Atherton consented to appoint Hamric as guardian for the Ward and relinquished various claims in exchange for the limiting agreement, which aimed for mutuality in fee and cost limitations. Payment of any further fees or costs from the Ward's funds related to the litigation was to cease. Despite providing legal services for implementing the settlement, O’Hare and Atherton's attorney did not seek additional fees. The circuit court's order granting fees and costs to Brinson was deemed unequal, undermining O’Hare and Atherton's agreed benefits.

Hamric asserted that the fee award to Brinson was justified for services rendered as guardian. However, a review of Brinson's time records revealed that the services pertained to the Ward's assets, not Hamric's guardian duties. Legal counsel for a guardian cannot receive compensation for actions outside their authority. Hamric's argument that Brinson's beneficial services warranted compensation disregarded the limiting agreement's stipulations, which capped fees from the Ward's funds related to litigation at $25,000. Consequently, Brinson’s requested additional fees were not compensable.

In a related matter, Hamric, appointed guardian of her mother, sought fees and mileage reimbursement for services between February and September 2002, totaling $3,246.90. O’Hare and Atherton contested this request on three grounds: Hamric's prior agreement to not charge for guardian services, the inadequacy of her service records, and the claim that her actions were typical of a daughter. Following a hearing, the court awarded Hamric $2,818.75 in fees and $413.55 in mileage expenses.

The determination of guardian's fees is within the trial court's discretion and will not be overturned unless there is insufficient competent evidence supporting the award. Discretionary acts must be reasonable, logical, and based on substantial evidence. A guardian is entitled to reasonable fees for services rendered, as per Florida Statutes (section 744.108(1)), and the court must consider specific criteria listed in section 744.108(2). A petition for fees must include an itemized description of services, as mandated by section 744.108(5); failure to do so will result in reversal of the fee order. Guardians are not compensated for services outside their appointed duties, particularly when related to familial care, unless those services are reasonable and necessary within their guardian responsibilities. 

O’Hare and Atherton objected to Hamric’s fee petition, claiming she had agreed not to seek compensation upon her appointment as guardian. They cited Hamric’s prior statements indicating her capability and the undue expense of hiring a professional guardian. O’Hare and Atherton argued they relied on these assurances when entering a settlement agreement for her appointment. They noted that family guardians typically do not seek compensation, asserting that a non-compensated arrangement contradicts guardianship law.

A specific agreement from the guardian not to charge for services is required for enforceability; the statement referenced by O’Hare and Atherton supports Hamric’s appointment as guardian but does not indicate she promised to serve without compensation. The settlement agreement appointing Hamric as guardian did not include a commitment to serve without payment, and its provisions limited attorney fees, suggesting that Hamric was not intended to serve without compensation. 

Hamric’s records supporting her fee petition were inadequate, consisting of vague mileage logs and uninformative entries that failed to meet the statutory requirement for an itemized description of services per section 744.108(5). Hamric contended that her oral testimony at the hearing rectified this deficiency, but the court determined that the statute's requirement for itemization is mandatory and cannot be satisfied by supplemental information presented later. Strict adherence to this requirement promotes efficient guardianship administration and prevents unnecessary hearings, thus preserving judicial resources and reducing costs. 

Consequently, the trial court's order granting Hamric fees and costs was reversed due to non-compliance with section 744.108(5), and on remand, Hamric must provide adequate documentation if she reapplies for fees. The court also addressed concerns about the appropriateness of compensating Hamric for services that could be regarded as typical of a daughter rather than a guardian.

Mileage logs indicate that from March to September 2002, Hamric visited the Ward at the nursing home seven to eight times per month. During these visits, she performed various tasks including laundry, communication with nurses, companionship, and attendance at quarterly care meetings. The circuit court determined Hamric should be compensated for her claimed time and expenses, with minor exceptions regarding some mileage. Despite lacking formal training as a professional guardian, Hamric was awarded $55 per hour, aligning with the prevailing rate in Lee County, Florida.

The legal precedent set in Read v. Kenefick emphasizes that guardians with a close familial connection to the ward may not claim compensation for activities typical of their familial role. However, compensation is warranted for services clearly outside the normal duties of a family member, as demonstrated by Mrs. Kenefick's detailed records and testimony, which justified her fee award. The court affirmed this ruling due to the absence of a transcript from the unreported trial hearing.

Following this, the Neher case highlighted that a familial guardian could receive compensation for services beyond typical parental duties, as established by the mother's efforts in managing her daughter's guardianship. The court reversed the trial's denial of fees, instructing a reevaluation of compensable services performed.

Overall, these cases establish that familial guardians are entitled to compensation for services that would be compensable if performed by a non-family guardian.

A guardian with a close familial relationship to the ward cannot be compensated for normal family duties simply due to their status as guardian. The responsibilities of a guardian of the person include exercising the ward’s rights, such as applying for government benefits, determining the ward’s residence, consenting to medical treatment, and making decisions about the ward’s social environment. Guardians are required by law to file an initial guardianship report within sixty days of receiving guardianship letters, as well as an annual report thereafter, which detail their plans for the ward’s care and well-being.

In cases where the ward resides in a care facility, the guardian must regularly visit the ward, consult with healthcare providers, and participate in care planning. Hamric, the guardian in this case, sought compensation for an average of seven to eight visits per month. O’Hare and Atherton challenged the circuit court’s order that compensated Hamric for all her visits, arguing that not all were compensable, as some were typical familial duties. The circuit court lacked detailed information about Hamric's services due to her failure to provide an itemized fee petition. The ruling implies that some visits were outside the scope of a professional guardian's duties. The court should reassess the number of compensable visits and services, compensating Hamric only for those properly documented and aligned with a professional's responsibilities.

Hamric is not entitled to compensation for tasks that fall within the scope of typical familial duties, nor for services such as laundry, which are not part of her responsibilities as the guardian of the person. The circuit court made an error by compensating Hamric for attending a three-hour meeting regarding litigation settlement, as this also exceeded her guardian duties. In case number 2D02-4010, attorney Brinson’s request for additional fees and costs is denied, and the circuit court's order for these fees is reversed. In case number 2D03-1404, Hamric's fees are also reversed due to a petition failing to comply with section 744.108(5) and for compensating for non-qualifying services. The case is remanded for further proceedings. While it is permissible for parties to present additional information at a hearing regarding requested fees, this does not fulfill the requirements of section 744.108(5). O'Hare and Atherton suggest that if Hamric is compensated, it should be at a lower rate than that of professional guardians, who are generally more efficient. However, no evidence was presented to indicate a reasonable hourly rate for Hamric’s services, thus their claim of excessive compensation does not constitute reversible error. The National Guardianship Association outlines standards for guardians, including a requirement for monthly visits to the ward.