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Reliance Insurance Co. v. Pro-Tech Conditioning & Heating
Citations: 866 So. 2d 700; 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 11145; 2003 WL 21713991Docket: Nos. 5D01-2998, 5D01-3433
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 25, 2003; Florida; State Appellate Court
Reliance Insurance Company appeals a judgment favoring Pro-Tech Conditioning and Heating, Inc., contesting the directed verdict granted to Pro-Tech and the attorney’s fees awarded. Pro-Tech cross-appeals, asserting the trial court miscalculated the fees. The case stems from a June 1999 subcontract between Pro-Tech and T. G Constructors, Inc. for HVAC installations at an Orange County school. Pro-Tech substituted the specified baked enamel air handler stands with an alternative due to sourcing issues, leading to rust complaints from the owner. Pro-Tech attributed the rust to external factors, while the owner linked it to the substitution. After receiving a certificate of substantial completion, Pro-Tech sought payment from T.G, who refused, prompting Pro-Tech to pursue a claim against Reliance, which had issued a payment bond. Reliance argued Pro-Tech did not substantially perform, citing the rust issue, and sought to introduce testimony from the owner's facilities director, Dale Michael Bradley, regarding damages. The trial court barred this testimony, ruling Bradley was not an expert witness. Consequently, Reliance failed to demonstrate a set-off, leading to the court granting Pro-Tech a directed verdict and payment. Reliance's new trial motion was denied. The trial court later awarded Pro-Tech attorney’s fees based on Florida Statutes. On appeal, Reliance contends the trial court erred in excluding Bradley's testimony, referencing precedents allowing corporate representatives to testify on property damages without needing expert status. In Kish v. McDonald’s Corp., the court affirmed that property owners can testify regarding the reduced value of their property, emphasizing their familiarity with its characteristics and uses. Similarly, Bastian v. Laffin allowed an owner to present evidence on repair costs through personal testimony. However, in Horn v. Corkland Corp., an owner did not testify about the property’s value, despite the general rule that owners can provide their opinion on value under Florida law. The admissibility of such testimony is not absolute; it is contingent upon the owner’s intimate knowledge of the property rather than merely holding title. Corporate officers can testify about property value if they possess relevant experience and knowledge, as seen in Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp. v. Boat Town U.S.A. Inc. The mere status of a corporate officer is insufficient; specific knowledge is required. In the current case, Bradley, as the owner’s program facilities director, had adequate familiarity with the property’s management and was thus deemed competent to testify regarding anticipated damages. The judgment favoring Pro-Tech was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial allowing the owner's representative to testify. Consequently, Pro-Tech’s entitlement to attorney’s fees was also reversed, as they were no longer the prevailing party under section 255.05(2)(a)2 of the Florida Statutes, which provides for attorney's fees for the prevailing party in payment bond claims.