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Triple D Trucking, Inc. v. American Petroleum Equipment & Construction, Inc.
Citations: 865 So. 2d 1234; 2003 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 356; 2003 WL 21205859Docket: 2020216
Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; May 23, 2003; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Triple D Trucking, Inc. (Triple D) appeals a summary judgment favoring American Petroleum Equipment and Construction, Inc. (APEC) regarding a claim for work and labor performed. The court employs the same standard as the trial court in assessing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence if the movant shows no genuine issue exists. The evidence must be of sufficient weight to allow fair-minded people to reasonably infer the existence of the fact in question. The dispute arises from the construction of a Winn-Dixie Marketplace supermarket in Pinson, Alabama, where Pinson Marketplace, L.L.C. contracted with Charles Vinzant Construction Company, which subcontracted APEC for site work. APEC further subcontracted dirt hauling to Specialty Demolition, Salvage, Inc., which then subcontracted with Triple D. Triple D encountered issues receiving payment for its work and filed a mechanic’s lien for $44,858.97 on June 9, 2000. On October 23, 2000, the lien was transferred to a bond by court order. On November 30, 2000, Triple D sued Specialty, APEC, Charles Vinzant, Pinson Marketplace, and Compass Bank for recovery of work, labor, and equipment furnished. The complaint alleges a March 13, 2000 agreement with Specialty for $45 per hour plus materials for work on the Winn-Dixie project. Triple D claims to have provided services until June 1, 2000, when APEC discharged Specialty but induced Triple D to continue working, promising payment. Triple D invoiced APEC for $90,407.85 after completing its work, of which $49,108.95 was paid by the defendants. On March 4, 2002, Charles Vinzant and Pinson Marketplace filed for summary judgment, asserting that Triple D did not provide the required notice before enforcing its mechanic's lien per Ala. Code 1975, § 35-11-218. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Vinzant and Pinson on May 13, 2002, confirming that Triple D failed to give the necessary notice. APEC also moved for summary judgment, claiming that Triple D was an unlicensed general contractor under Ala. Code 1975, § 34-8-1, which renders contracts void. APEC supported its motion with an affidavit from the State Licensing Board confirming Triple D’s lack of licensing. Triple D countered, stating it was a motor-vehicle contract carrier licensed by the Alabama Public Service Commission and thus not required to be licensed as a general contractor. During the May 13 hearing, the court noted that Triple D did not provide evidence of its licensing as a common or contract carrier and allowed ten days for submission of proper evidentiary materials. On May 22, Triple D filed a brief opposing APEC's motion, including a decision from the Commission confirming its motor carrier certificate, an affidavit from its president, Dan Youngblood, and a letter from APEC. APEC subsequently moved to strike this filing, arguing the Commission's decision was not an original or certified copy and that parts of Youngblood's affidavit were inadmissible. The court struck the Commission's decision on June 12 and granted summary judgment in favor of APEC. Triple D appealed the ruling after its post-judgment motion was denied. APEC contends on appeal that Triple D was engaged in "site work" and "grading" as a general contractor, emphasizing that without proper licensing, Triple D's claims for recovery are void. Section 34-8-1 of the Alabama Code defines a 'general contractor' as an individual or entity that, for compensation, undertakes construction-related activities involving projects costing $50,000 or more. A 'subcontractor' is similarly defined as a general contractor working under another general contractor. Contracts made by unlicensed general contractors are considered null and void due to public policy, as established in case law. To successfully argue a non-licensure defense in court, a party must demonstrate that the contractor was unlicensed, that the work required a license, and that the cost of the work was $50,000 or more. In the case involving Eubank and Central Alabama Home Health Services (CAHHS), Eubank claimed breach of contract for $12,393.95 related to his role in coordinating construction projects. CAHHS contended that Eubank's work constituted general contracting, and he therefore needed a state license to recover damages. The trial court denied CAHHS’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the jury ruled in favor of Eubank. Upon appeal, the court found that Eubank's services did not constitute those of a general contractor, based on his role as a facilitator and both parties' testimonies. The case also referenced Triple D, which was unlicensed but invoiced $90,407.85 for its work on a project. The key issue was whether this work fell under the licensure statute. APEC highlighted Triple D’s claims regarding its work on a supermarket project and referenced a lien statement detailing labor and materials provided. Triple D's role in the project involved moving dirt to establish the foundation for construction on seventeen acres against which a lien was filed. They transported and filled the original foundation for buildings and parking, conducting inspections during the process. Triple D asserts that its invoices, presented by APEC for summary judgment, reflect charges solely for hauling dirt, not for site work such as spreading or compacting. Youngblood confirmed that Triple D acted as a subcontractor specifically for dirt movement. The court determined that the evidence shows Triple D was only involved in hauling and dumping, with APEC not providing proof of Triple D performing 'site work' or 'grading.' Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of APEC and remanded the case for further proceedings. The document also notes that Charles Vinzant and Pinson Marketplace were not part of the appeal, and Specialty, which was informed to be out of business with repossessed equipment, was not pursued by Triple D in claims. Neither Specialty nor Compass Bank is a party to this appeal. The court did not strike any part of Youngblood's affidavit. Additionally, a legislative amendment to Section 34-8-1(a), effective January 1, 1998, raised the monetary threshold from $20,000 to $50,000, but it was not contested in the referenced case, Eubank, leading the court to apply the previous limit. CAHHS's argument regarding Eubank's work as an 'architect' was omitted since the current case focuses on the nonlicensure defense related to general contractors.