Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 6, 2004; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Personal injury claims were filed by three plaintiffs—Kim Wattigney, Cheryl Moore, and Henry Martin—after acoustical ceiling tiles fell on them in Dr. Dion L. Armstrong's medical office on June 3, 1998. Prior to the incident, Wattigney and Moore had arrived early due to water intrusion from a leaking air conditioning unit, which had persisted for two months. They attempted to mitigate the water damage by mopping, placing towels, and using fans, leading them to block the usual path to the examination room. While escorting Martin to his appointment, the ceiling collapsed, injuring both him and Moore, while Wattigney was burned by hot wax when she was knocked down during the fall.
Dr. Armstrong's office had repeatedly reported the leaks to the building owner, Kailas Management, L.L.C., with Armstrong sending two letters detailing the hazard and requesting repairs. Despite numerous complaints, the maintenance policy was inconsistently followed, and unqualified handymen were dispatched for repairs. A licensed technician was only called after the accident. The plaintiffs subsequently sued Kailas and its insurer, Colony Insurance Company, who then filed a third-party demand against Dr. Armstrong, claiming he held some liability for not addressing the known danger. The jury trial in September 2002 resulted in a verdict favoring the plaintiffs, assigning 90% fault to Kailas and 10% to Dr. Armstrong.
Mr. Martin received a total of $1,038,000.00 in damages, broken down into $600,000.00 for pain and suffering, $200,000.00 for mental anguish, $60,000.00 for past medical expenses, $70,000.00 for future medical expenses, $12,000.00 for past lost earnings, and $30,000.00 for future lost earnings. Ms. Moore was awarded $81,142.00, comprising $75,000.00 for pain and suffering and $6,142.00 for past medical expenses. Ms. Wattigney received $23,348.00, including $20,000.00 for pain and suffering, $3,223.00 for past medical expenses, and $125.00 for past lost earnings.
In the appeal, defendants Kailas and Colony claimed six errors, including the assertion that the jury improperly assigned only 10% fault to Dr. Armstrong, and that Mr. Martin's general damage award of $800,000.00 constituted an abuse of discretion. They contested the evidence supporting past and future lost wage awards and future medical damages for Mr. Martin. They further argued that Ms. Moore’s general damage award was excessive and that both she and Ms. Wattigney should have their awards reduced due to their comparative fault in knowing about the dangerous condition prior to the accident.
Conversely, the plaintiffs raised three errors, asserting that the trial court incorrectly assigned any fault to Dr. Armstrong, that Ms. Moore deserved more than $75,000.00 in damages without a future medical expenses award, and that Ms. Wattigney should have received more than $20,000.00 in general damages.
Key issues included the allocation of fault to Dr. Armstrong, with Kailas and Colony claiming he should bear more responsibility due to his knowledge of a leaking air conditioning unit, while the plaintiffs contended his fault was nonexistent as the negligence lay solely with Kailas. The lease agreement indicated Dr. Armstrong's responsibility was to notify Kailas about repairs, which he did, therefore placing the onus for repairs on Kailas as the lessor.
Dr. Armstrong’s potential liability may arise from Louisiana tort law rather than the lease agreement, as indicated by the factors from Watson v. State Farm Fire Cas. Ins. Co. that influence fault apportionment. These factors include awareness of danger, the risk created by conduct, the significance of the conduct, the capacities of the actors, and extenuating circumstances. Kailas and Colony argue that Dr. Armstrong was aware of the dangers from a leaking unit, supported by his previous letters describing the condition as hazardous. Although he was not primarily responsible for the air conditioning unit, he had the legal right to call for repairs and deduct the costs from rent.
Kailas and Colony further assert that Dr. Armstrong bore a greater duty to protect his office invitees than Kailas, the building owner, under a theory of privity. They reference Billups v. Lyons, where a termite inspector was held to have a heightened responsibility due to his awareness of the consequences of his inspection, and argue that Dr. Armstrong had a similar responsibility. However, they acknowledge that Billups may not be directly applicable, as the inspector misled parties with false certification. They also cite Arbon v. Charbonnet, where an orthodontist was found liable for damages caused by improper installation of a valve, highlighting that those involved in the installation shared responsibility for the malfunction.
Kailas and Colony contend that Dr. Armstrong contributed to the fault by neglecting to fix a leaking air conditioning system, asserting that both he and Kailas had duties to address known hazards before injuries occurred. While Kailas had a primary contractual duty to remedy the defect, Dr. Armstrong also bore a duty to protect individuals in his office from perceived hazards. The jury found that Kailas's failure to act constituted a greater breach than Dr. Armstrong's, who had made multiple attempts to prompt repairs. Consequently, the jury's apportionment of fault was upheld without manifest error.
Regarding general damages awarded to Mr. Martin for a cervical spine injury, Kailas and Colony argue that the $800,000 award was excessive. The appellate review favors the prevailing party, allowing overturning the award only if it is shockingly disproportionate to the injury. Mr. Martin, a 50-year-old Vietnam War veteran with prior injuries and a 50% VA disability rating, had a history of pain management treatment, particularly for injuries unrelated to the current litigation. He had previously seen Dr. Armstrong for pain management, rating his pain consistently at a severe level prior to the incident. His medical history also included treatment for chronic pain, depression, and anxiety, further complicating the assessment of his injuries related to the current case.
Dr. Shwery testified about Mr. Martin's medical condition, noting that his anxiety, depression, sleep problems, and sexual dysfunction were not caused by his pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He determined that Mr. Martin would require three years of individual counseling and two years of pain management, totaling an estimated cost of $70,000. Kailas and Colony contended that Mr. Martin's only injury was a cervical injury necessitating a two-level fusion and argued that the legal principle allowing a tort-feasor to take a victim as found does not apply here, as Mr. Martin had no prior neck injuries and his previous ailments were not aggravated by the incident. They claimed Mr. Martin was already in poor health before the accident, suggesting that the impact of the neck injury on his life was minimal. However, this argument was criticized for lacking legal support. Mr. Martin countered that the award was reasonable given his vulnerability due to prior disabilities, asserting the injury significantly diminished his quality of life and ability to work. Both parties referenced the case of Harvey v. Cole, with differing interpretations of the award amounts relevant to their arguments. Ultimately, the court found that an $800,000 award was not excessive given the physical and psychological injuries sustained, acknowledging Mr. Martin's significant pain and anguish while affirming that the jury had not improperly compensated him for unrelated conditions.
The court rejects the notion that Mr. Martin's pre-accident fragile health should reduce pain and suffering awards for a healthy individual, affirming an $800,000 award for his pain, suffering, and mental anguish. The defendants contest a $70,000 award for future medical expenses, arguing that much of the treatment he requires was necessary before the accident. They cite Dr. Shwery's testimony, which indicated Mr. Martin would need pain management over six years, but challenge its specificity and basis. Despite the speculative nature of future medical costs, the jury's reliance on Dr. Shwery's testimony is upheld.
Regarding lost earnings, the court agrees with the defendants’ contention that Mr. Martin, who had applied for full disability benefits from the VA prior to the accident and was declared 100% disabled for unrelated reasons, should not be awarded $12,000 for past lost earnings or $30,000 for future lost earnings. Testimony shows Mr. Martin had not maintained steady employment since the 1970s, performing minimal work sporadically. An economist estimated lost wages based on the assumption of a minimum wage job, but the court finds this unsupported by evidence. Mr. Martin's history of disability ratings and his statements to the VA indicate he had not worked since 1974, further undermining the case for lost earnings.
Mr. Martin provided general testimony about his work history but lacked supporting documentation. He argued that veterans on full disability can earn extra income, yet it appears he did not report his earnings to either the VA or the IRS, weakening his claim for lost wages. He contended that testimony alone could support a lost wage claim and that future earnings awards compensate for the loss of earning capacity post-accident. However, evidence indicates he was unable to work prior to the accident and would remain unable to work regardless of the injury, as per his representations to the VA. Consequently, the court found that awarding lost wages, both past and future, was an abuse of discretion, reversing the $12,000 for past lost earnings and $30,000 for future lost earnings.
Regarding Ms. Moore’s case, Kailas and Colony challenged the $75,000 general damages award, arguing it was excessive given her soft tissue injury. The court recognized the trial court's broad discretion in awarding damages, which should only be overturned if it shocks the conscience. Ms. Moore experienced various symptoms, including blurred vision and dizziness, after falling due to falling ceiling tiles. She underwent treatment for soft tissue injuries, with Dr. Mulvey later diagnosing cervical and lumbar strains and suspecting a compression fracture at L1. However, Kailas and Colony argued that Dr. Mulvey's conclusion lacked sufficient evidence, as subsequent evaluations by Dr. Trice showed no complaints of back pain, raising doubts about the credibility of her claims. They contended that the jury erred in believing her testimony.
Kailas and Colony contest the credibility of Ms. Moore’s testimony, advocating for a $20,000 award limited to soft-tissue injury treatment. In contrast, Ms. Moore asserts that $135,000 is a fairer compensation for her diagnosed fractured vertebra, emphasizing that her soft-tissue injury is separately compensable and that Dr. Mulvey’s assessment of a compression fracture remains unchallenged by other medical opinions. Although inconsistencies exist between her testimony and medical records, no expert discredited her compression fracture claim, leading to a conclusion that the jury's award of $75,000 fairly divides the claims of both parties.
Regarding comparative fault, Kailas and Colony argue that Ms. Moore and Ms. Wattigney should bear some liability for injuries due to their awareness of a leaking air conditioning unit. However, it is ruled that since they were employees of Dr. Armstrong, the responsibility to protect them from known risks lies with him, not them. The court established that an employee’s reasonable actions in the face of a known hazard do not equate to comparative negligence. Ms. Moore and Ms. Wattigney took reasonable steps to address the water leak, including mopping floors, using towels to absorb the leak, and placing fans to mitigate the hazard. The responsibility to repair the air conditioning unit rested with Kailas and Dr. Armstrong, as Ms. Moore and Ms. Wattigney likely lacked the authority to call for repairs. Ultimately, while the jury's award to Mr. Martin was deemed manifestly erroneous and reduced, the remaining judgments concerning Ms. Moore and Ms. Wattigney were upheld as neither manifestly erroneous nor clearly wrong.
The trial court's judgment is partially reversed, partially affirmed, and rendered. The court refrains from determining whether Kailas breached the lease with Armstrong regarding the air conditioning repair delays and resultant damage. Under La. C.C. art. 2694, a lessor's failure to make necessary repairs allows the lessee to undertake repairs themselves and deduct costs from the rent if proven indispensable and reasonably priced. Although not explicitly cited or included in the jury charge, the duty-risk analysis implicitly encompasses the responsibilities outlined in this article. Dr. Shwery, a clinical psychologist without a medical license, is mentioned alongside Mr. Martin, who rated his pain as a 10 out of 10 prior to an accident. Several case precedents are referenced, detailing significant damage awards for injuries related to back and neck issues, including substantial sums for surgical interventions and complications. Additionally, a haemangioma is described as a congenital, typically asymptomatic condition involving an abnormal collection of blood vessels.
