United States v. Daniel P. Boos

Citations: 329 F.3d 907; 2003 WL 21101272Docket: 02-3006

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; June 11, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case United States v. Daniel P. Boos, the Seventh Circuit Court addressed the sentencing of Boos, a former president of the Iron Wings motorcycle club, who pled guilty to drug-related offenses and possession of firearms. The case stemmed from the 1990 discovery of a severed arm belonging to Robert Melby, which led to allegations that Boos had murdered Melby. During sentencing, the district court applied a murder cross-reference under the guidelines, significantly increasing Boos' sentence from a range of 121-151 months to 30 years (240 months on one count and 120 on another, to run consecutively).

Boos appealed, arguing that using a preponderance of the evidence standard to establish his involvement in Melby's murder violated his due process rights, as it substantially raised his sentence. He cited *Apprendi v. New Jersey* to claim that the murder's proof should meet a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard because it added an element to the crime. However, the court determined that *Apprendi* only applies when a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, and since Boos' 30-year sentence did not exceed the combined maximum for his convictions, no violation occurred.

Additionally, Boos contended that at least a clear and convincing evidence standard should be required due to the severity of the sentence increase. While he acknowledged the general application of the preponderance of the evidence standard for uncharged conduct at sentencing, he argued for an exception in his case. The court referenced previous cases where other circuits had employed a higher standard under similar circumstances.

A higher burden of proof may be warranted when a factual finding leads to a significant sentencing increase, potentially characterizing the sentencing hearing as disproportionately influenced by the offense. This principle, recognized in cases such as United States v. Corbin and United States v. Schuster, suggests that in exceptional circumstances, a greater showing than the typical preponderance of evidence may be necessary. However, the courts have not formally required a clear and convincing standard for such increases. Although critical of the Kikumura analysis regarding due process, the courts have not rejected its holding, deferring the decision on whether to adopt a higher standard for sentencing increases.

In the case at hand, the defendant Boos received an over 17-year increase in his sentence, deemed "exceptional," which revives discussions on requiring a higher standard of proof. Nonetheless, the evidence against Boos is substantial enough to support a conviction even under a clear and convincing evidence standard, making the choice of standard less critical. Boos contends that the evidence fails to support guilt under a preponderance standard, noting the absence of physical evidence from the crime scene, which complicates the investigation.

No bullets were found in the leg recovered by police, and the other leg was missing, which Boos argues contradicts the account given by Randy Simonsmeier, the prosecution's key witness. Simonsmeier's written description indicated that Boos shot Melby in the kneecaps, implying both legs should have been hit. Additionally, no fingerprints were found on the plastic bags that contained Melby's arm and leg, and similar bags were not located at the Iron Wings clubhouse. The lack of physical evidence might have prevented state murder charges against Boos, but the evidence was deemed sufficient to establish that it is "highly probable" he killed Melby, meeting both the preponderance and clear and convincing evidence standards.

Simonsmeier, who became friends with Boos in federal prison, testified that Boos confessed to killing Melby, whom he suspected of informing on illegal activities. Boos allegedly lured Melby to the Iron Wings clubhouse basement, shot him in the knee when he denied theft, and then shot him in the head after further denial. Following the murder, Boos, aided by his wife Carrie and Iron Wings member Roger Waite, dismembered Melby and discarded the body parts in dumpsters.

To corroborate his account, Simonsmeier presented an undated letter detailing the murder and his subsequent guilt. Waite's demeanor during Simonsmeier's confession inadvertently supported the narrative. Additional evidence against Boos included testimony from Iron Wings member William Wilson, who recounted Boos's comments on Melby’s tools and suspicious activities surrounding the clubhouse's septic system. Wilson's wife also testified that Carrie Boos admitted involvement in Melby's murder. The district court found the majority of witnesses credible, except for Waite, who appeared untruthful in his denial of drug dealing.

Collectively, Simonsmeier's testimony, his letter, Waite's unintentional validation, and corroborating witnesses provided clear and convincing evidence of Boos's guilt. In his defense, Boos challenged the murder cross-reference application and a 2-level enhancement for obstruction, seeking a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, arguing clear error is required for either claim to succeed.

Boos' obstruction of justice enhancement arises from his interactions with Tony Allen, an Iron Wings member who was arrested alongside Boos' step-son and daughter-in-law on drug charges. Boos suspected Allen of informing the police about the Savages' activities. After Allen's release from jail, he discovered that his vehicles and valuables were missing. Boos assured him he would retrieve his belongings if Allen had not provided police information. 

Subsequently, as Allen was set to testify before a federal grand jury, Boos confronted him outside the hearing room, inquiring about the proceedings. When apprehended by police in a van nearby, Boos claimed he was there to support his daughter-in-law Melissa Savage, who was also testifying. The district court found this explanation implausible, noting that the two were not particularly close and had traveled separately.

The court concluded that Boos intended to intimidate Allen by suggesting his property would only be returned if Allen refrained from cooperating with the police. This conduct was deemed sufficient to uphold the district court's findings without clear error. Additionally, Boos' attempts to intimidate Allen precluded him from obtaining a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b), as such conduct typically signifies a lack of acceptance of responsibility. Boos failed to demonstrate that his case was extraordinary enough to warrant an exception to this rule. Consequently, the district court's decision was affirmed.