Leshon Young and Glendell Mays v. James Green Management, Incorporated

Citations: 327 F.3d 616; 61 Fed. R. Serv. 688; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 8513; 91 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1394; 2003 WL 21000388Docket: 02-2381

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 5, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Leshon Young and Glendell Mays, former employees of James Green Management, Inc., filed a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after being terminated based on their race. The jury ruled in favor of the defendant, prompting the plaintiffs to request a new trial due to perceived prejudicial evidentiary rulings, which the district court denied. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that these evidentiary decisions constituted reversible error; however, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment.

The case's background reveals that Young was hired as a maintenance worker and quickly promoted to acting maintenance supervisor at the Chateau Apartments in southern Illinois. Shortly after, Mays was hired as a painter. A significant allegation arose when property manager Gary Olson informed Young that he had been instructed by upper management to terminate Mays due to his race. Despite Young’s request to keep Mays unaware of this directive to prevent impacting his performance, Olson disclosed the information to Mays, who expressed uncertainty about the claim.

On the day of Young’s promotion, Olson resigned, citing instructions from a supervisor to "hide out" a minority worker and to ultimately terminate him, referring to the unacceptability of having too many Black employees. Olson’s testimony indicated that the individuals he mentioned were Young and Mays, highlighting the discriminatory practices within the company.

On February 11, 2000, Olson informed Mr. Young that he received a pay raise due to a resignation letter he sent to Green earlier that day. Olson faxed this letter to Young the following day and also shared its contents with Mr. Mays. In response to allegations in the resignation letter, Young advised Mays that they needed to work hard to avoid being fired. As of March 1, 2000, Chateau employed three maintenance workers: two African-American (Young and Mays) and one white, along with a white property manager, Magdaline Oates. On March 6, 2000, all crew members, including the plaintiffs, were terminated. Loren Brown, the General Manager, noted a decline in the property's condition and attributed it to the crew's lack of motivation and poor performance, including careless work from Mays and Young's excessive time in the office. Brown ultimately decided to replace the entire crew due to these issues. The plaintiffs believed their terminations were racially motivated, as they had increased their efforts after learning of management's intent to terminate Mays due to his race. Following their termination, Green hired four white subcontractors who were also dismissed after two weeks for not meeting standards. After leaving his position, Olson moved into Chateau to care for a disabled woman, Rebecca Luebbert. He later encountered Brown, who mentioned an EEOC letter and issues stemming from Olson's resignation letter. Olson agreed to retract his discrimination accusations in exchange for a recommendation and forgiveness of back rent, which he did, although Brown claimed no such agreement existed, stating their meeting was solely about a recommendation.

Gerald Clark testified at trial that he did not instruct Olson to "hide out" or terminate Mr. Mays based on race and denied any racist remarks attributed to him by Olson. Clark claimed Olson fabricated the conversation. Concurrently, Rebecca Luebbert testified that Olson encouraged Mr. Young to take his time on a painting job to get fired and provided his pager number for further contact if that occurred. She also indicated that Olson promised to share in any lawsuit winnings against Green if he assisted the plaintiffs.

Following a jury verdict favoring Green, the plaintiffs sought a new trial, arguing that the district court made reversible errors in its evidentiary rulings. They contended the court wrongly excluded Olson's resignation letter beyond its limited use for explaining a retraction, excluded EEOC discrimination determinations as unreliable, and allowed Green's counsel to discuss Olson’s past convictions and unrelated civil case testimony during cross-examination due to the plaintiffs’ counsel “opening the door” to those topics.

The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion, asserting that Olson’s resignation letter was inadmissible hearsay because it was written post-resignation, thus not an admission by Green. The EEOC determinations were also deemed inadmissible due to their unreliable nature. The court justified the inclusion of Olson's convictions and unrelated testimony as permissible based on the plaintiffs’ prior questioning.

The evidentiary rulings by the district court are granted deference and are only reversed for abuse of discretion, defined as an erroneous legal conclusion, a lack of evidence for the court's decision, or clearly erroneous factual findings. Even if errors are found, a jury's verdict stands unless the error had a substantial impact on the outcome. The plaintiffs argue that Olson's resignation letter should have been considered non-hearsay as an admission by an agent of a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).

The resignation letter from Gary Olson to James Green outlined allegations of racial discrimination within the company, citing a directive from a supervisor to "hide out" a minority worker and comments suggesting that the owner, James Green, disapproved of Black employees in supervisory roles. Olson expressed that he found these demands repugnant and a violation of state and federal laws, stating a refusal to comply with the supervisor's orders. He also noted pay disparities between minority and Caucasian workers, indicating a need for reevaluation of management practices.

Plaintiffs sought to introduce the letter as evidence of discrimination, but it was deemed inadmissible as hearsay under Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) allows statements made by an agent concerning their employment to be admissible, but the district court ruled that Olson's statements did not fall under this exception, as they were made after he had terminated his employment and were adversarial in nature. Therefore, Olson's resignation letter did not meet the criteria for admissibility, as he was not acting as an employee of Green at the time of writing the letter, thus lacking the protection of the agency relationship that would have justified the admission of his statements.

The district court's decision to exclude certain evidence was deemed potentially flawed, but any error was considered harmless, as it did not significantly impact the jury's verdict. Olson's comprehensive testimony at trial was believed to outweigh any potential influence of his unsworn resignation letter. The plaintiffs argued that the exclusion of EEOC discrimination determinations constituted reversible error under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which permits admission of public records unless deemed unreliable. However, the district court maintained discretion in this matter, ruling that the EEOC findings were unreliable and their prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. The EEOC had determined that discrimination occurred against Mr. Young and Mr. Mays, but the court ultimately decided not to admit this evidence based on concerns about the general unreliability of the EEOC's performance, as demonstrated by the inaccurate testimony of EEOC investigator Gerleen Smith regarding the number of employees, which could have affected the damage caps applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(B). The district court reiterated its decisions regarding the EEOC determinations and files throughout the trial, emphasizing that the jury had sufficient evidence to consider without them.

Olson's resignation letter was not considered as evidence because it was excluded properly, and its exclusion did not prejudice the plaintiffs since Olson provided full testimony on its contents at trial. The district court found the EEOC determinations to be unreliable, justifying the decision to exclude them. Substantial evidence was presented to the jury, reducing the probative value of the EEOC's statements. 

The plaintiffs argued that the district court erred by allowing Green's counsel to cross-examine Olson on irrelevant and prejudicial matters, including his prior convictions and unrelated civil case testimony. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, stating that plaintiffs' counsel initiated the line of questioning, which allowed for the cross-examination of Olson regarding his convictions. Olson admitted to a 1993 automobile theft conviction and three counts of aggravated battery in 2001. 

While the plaintiffs did not seriously contest the introduction of Olson's felony convictions, they objected to the details of those convictions being disclosed. Generally, only the crime, date, and disposition should be elicited for impeachment purposes; however, the court found no abuse of discretion in allowing additional questioning. Specifically, it was permissible for Green's counsel to reveal that Luebbert was a victim in two of the aggravated battery cases, as this information was relevant to Olson's testimony about his relationship with Luebbert at the time.

The district court allowed Green's counsel to question Olson about his 1993 automobile theft conviction during re-cross examination, particularly to challenge Olson's previous claims that he did not steal the vehicle and that the incident did not result in a conviction. Olson admitted to pleading guilty to a suspended imposition sentence (SIS) for the theft, asserting that it is not considered a conviction in Missouri. The court also permitted inquiries regarding accusations from Olson's former employer about document theft, as these questions were relevant to Olson's credibility. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), such inquiries can be made if they pertain to the witness's truthfulness. The plaintiffs' counsel initially raised the issue of Olson's departure from the law firm, allowing Green to pursue the topic on cross-examination without objection.

However, Green's counsel faced a limitation when attempting to impeach Olson regarding his feelings towards Luebbert, using extrinsic evidence from an unrelated civil case. This was deemed improper since the issue was collateral, as it could not be introduced for any purpose other than contradiction. Despite the error in allowing this impeachment, it was considered harmless because it did not significantly affect the jury's verdict. Ultimately, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.