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Moore v. GAB Robins North America, Inc.
Citations: 840 So. 2d 882; 2002 Ala. LEXIS 226; 2002 WL 1485975Docket: 1010298
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; July 12, 2002; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Michael Moore initiated a lawsuit against Wayne Hughes (an insurance adjuster), Burkholder Insurance, Inc., GAB Robins North America, Inc. (an independent adjusting agency), and certain Lloyd’s of London underwriters, following the denial of his insurance claim for lost rental income from his beach condominium during Hurricane Georges in 1998. Moore contends that he should be compensated under his insurance policy for the income lost due to inaccessible travel to the Gulf coast. After extensive discovery, the defendants filed for summary judgment, arguing that Moore's insurance policy did not cover loss of use. The trial court scheduled a hearing for September 21, 2001, on these motions. However, prior to this, on August 13, 2001, Moore sought a writ of mandamus to compel GAB Robins to produce documents requested in his third amended request for production. The trial court notified all parties that the summary-judgment hearing would be postponed pending the outcome of the mandamus petition. Nevertheless, on September 19, 2001, the court granted the summary judgments for GAB Robins, Wayne Hughes, Burkholder Insurance, and Lloyd’s of London. Moore appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion under Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 78 and 56(c) by issuing summary judgments before the mandamus petition ruling. He argued that the court's earlier suspension of the hearing also suspended his two-day deadline to file opposing materials, thus denying him the opportunity to adequately respond to the motions. Citing a precedent from Hill v. Chambless, Moore maintained that the trial court's premature ruling was erroneous, as it violated the procedural timeline outlined in Rule 56(c)(2), which allows a nonmoving party to file opposition materials until two days before the hearing. A nonmoving party is entitled to expect that a trial judge will not rule on a summary judgment motion before the party has had a fair opportunity to respond. Although the defendants argued that no hearing had been set, there was an original hearing date that was postponed pending a ruling on a writ of mandamus, with an assurance from the trial court that a new date would be established afterward. Moore references a case that emphasizes the importance of allowing a hearing before granting a summary judgment, asserting that denying him this opportunity was prejudicial. The defendants counter that Moore cannot demonstrate prejudice since the summary judgments were justified. However, the court distinguishes this case from a precedent where the plaintiff lacked a relevant insurance contract, highlighting that Moore did have such a contract and had made a claim that was denied. The court concludes that denying Moore the chance to contest the motions prevents him from presenting disputed facts and thereby having his day in court. The trial court's summary judgments are therefore reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.