Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; October 23, 2002; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Marcus Doron Floyd was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 18 years of hard labor without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension. The incident occurred on February 23, 2001, when Derrick Boone, a student, was threatened at gunpoint by Floyd and an accomplice, Darion Butler. After a struggle over the gun, Floyd and Butler attempted to restrain Boone, demanding money. Floyd shot a gun in the house, threatened Boone's life, and ultimately stole a gold bracelet and a cell phone. Butler was later arrested with the stolen phone and pled guilty to simple burglary, receiving an eight-year sentence with seven years suspended.
On appeal, Floyd argued insufficient evidence for his conviction, citing lack of physical evidence, and questioning the reliability of both Boone's and Butler's testimonies. The appellate review standard requires assessing evidence favorably for the prosecution to determine if a rational jury could find the essential crime elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, applicable to both direct and circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence must rule out any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, per Louisiana law. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
The court evaluates evidence in a criminal case by considering whether an alternative hypothesis proposed by the defendant is reasonable enough that a rational juror could not find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, following the precedent set in Jackson v. Virginia. The scope of the court's review is limited to assessing the sufficiency of the evidence and does not involve credibility determinations of witnesses, where great deference is given to the jury’s decisions. A single witness’s testimony, if credible, can support a factual conclusion, and the victim's testimony alone can suffice to establish the elements of an offense, even in the absence of physical evidence.
For a conviction of armed robbery, the state must prove five elements: (1) the taking of something of value, (2) belonging to another, (3) from or in the immediate control of another, (4) through force or intimidation, and (5) while armed with a dangerous weapon. The definition of "taken from the person of another" has been expanded to include taking in the victim's presence, even if the victim is in a different room.
In the case at hand, there were inconsistencies between Boone’s police statement and his trial testimony, which are factors the jury must weigh. Testimony from Butler indicated that he and Floyd planned to rob Boone. On the date of the incident, Butler and Floyd approached Boone’s apartment, where Floyd assaulted Boone with a gun. Butler stated that Floyd asked Boone about money, which led to a gunshot being fired from Boone's bedroom. Butler claimed he did not see Floyd leave with any items except the gun, and he admitted to taking Boone's cell phone but did not participate in the assault.
Officer Monty Keith Russell responded to a reported incident at Boone’s apartment, where he found Boone in a state of distress, bloodied and battered. Boone identified Butler as one of his assailants after Russell received a call from Officer Brian Davis, who had apprehended a blood-covered suspect nearby. After identifying Butler, Boone returned to his apartment where Russell called for medical assistance and notified Lt. Tommy Doss, who was responsible for investigating the scene. While medical personnel attended to Boone, he recounted that two men, including the defendant, forced their way into his apartment, assaulted him, and searched his belongings. Boone mentioned a struggle for a gun and noted that a shot was fired, though he could not identify the shooter.
Lt. Doss processed the crime scene but was unable to collect fingerprints due to the blood present. He discovered bullet fragments, duct tape, and Boone's robe, but the gun was not recovered, and no ballistics testing was conducted. Testimony revealed that the defendant, Floyd, had prior convictions and had traveled from Florida to Louisiana shortly before the incident. Floyd met Butler days earlier and, on the day of the incident, they went to Boone’s apartment, believing he sold marijuana. Floyd described a confrontation that escalated into a fight, during which he admitted to hitting Boone before leaving the scene. He claimed no blood was on his clothes when police arrived, and they did not attempt to fingerprint him or find any weapons in his possession.
Floyd testified he had no knowledge of an armed robbery, denied possessing a gun, striking Boone with a gun, or stealing from him. He offered to undergo gun residue testing, which was not conducted. Lt. Eric Hanna from the Ruston Police Department stated that Floyd claimed to have spent Thursday night at Vereen’s apartment, which Floyd later denied. Lt. Hanna testified they arrived at Vereen’s apartment shortly after 9:00 a.m. Friday, where Floyd was found exiting the bathroom and showed no signs of blood. Officer Marchale Canty noted a 20-minute interval between their arrival and Floyd's arrest. Vereen corroborated that Floyd visited Friday morning, took a shower, appeared panicked, and did not change clothes or have blood on him. The jury favored Boone's testimony, which, despite inconsistencies with Butler’s account, supported the essential crime elements: both witnesses claimed Floyd forcibly entered Boone's apartment, was armed, and assaulted Boone. Boone also noted a missing gold bracelet after the incident, linking Floyd to theft under duress while armed, satisfying all crime elements.
Floyd contended that his sentence was excessive compared to Butler’s lesser sentence and disproportionate to the offense's seriousness. The reviewing court assesses sentence excessiveness based on whether the trial court considered the criteria in La. C.Cr. P. art. 894.1. Although not required to enumerate every factor, the trial judge must reflect adequate consideration of these guidelines. A clear factual basis for the sentence suffices, even if not all procedural aspects were meticulously followed. Key considerations include the defendant's personal history, offense severity, and rehabilitation potential.
In State v. Jones and related cases, it is established that sentencing judges are not required to assign specific weights to particular factors during sentencing. The determination of whether a sentence is excessively severe is contingent upon the specifics of the case and the defendant's background. A sentence is deemed unconstitutional under La. Const. art. 1, §20 if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense or constitutes unnecessary suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if it shocks the sense of justice when evaluating the crime and its societal impact.
In the case at hand, the trial court assessed the pre-sentencing investigation report, which included the defendant's prior drug convictions and his social, educational, and work history. The crime was identified as a home invasion robbery, with aggravating circumstances noted, including the defendant's deliberate cruelty and the use of a dangerous weapon that caused significant injury to the victim. The court found no mitigating factors and concluded that a lesser sentence would undermine the gravity of the offense.
Additionally, the trial court complied with La.C.Cr. P. art. 894.1 by providing a factual basis for the sentence. The court highlighted that there is no obligation for equal treatment of co-defendants in sentencing, and any disparity in sentences must be considered alongside other relevant factors. The trial court acknowledged a misunderstanding regarding the involvement of co-defendant Butler but confirmed that it had adequately considered Butler’s sentence.
Testimony indicated that Floyd was the principal assailant, facing a sentence range of 10 to 99 years. Given the circumstances, an 18-year sentence for Floyd was found to be appropriate and not excessive. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.
