United States v. Raymond Jennings

Citations: 323 F.3d 263; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941; 2003 WL 1269983Docket: 01-4927

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; March 19, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Raymond Henry Jennings appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). Jennings entered a conditional guilty plea following the district court's refusal to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his civil rights had been restored, thus exempting him from the prohibition on firearm possession. 

The statute prohibits individuals convicted of MCDVs from possessing firearms, and Jennings' March 1997 conviction for criminal domestic violence met the MCDV criteria. However, he was not incarcerated for this conviction, which meant, under South Carolina law, that he did not lose his civil rights. Both parties agreed that had he been imprisoned, his civil rights would have been restored upon his release.

Jennings possessed a firearm on December 2, 1999, leading to the federal indictment in June 2000. His motion to dismiss the indictment was based on the claim that his civil rights were restored, making him ineligible for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The appellate court, affirming the district court's decision, stated that Jennings' arguments did not warrant dismissal of the indictment.

On October 11, 2000, Jennings' motion to dismiss an indictment was denied by the district court. After this ruling, Jennings argued that he could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) due to his assertion that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel during his March 1997 domestic violence (CDV) conviction. He subsequently filed a written motion to dismiss on October 13, 2000, which led to a hearing on November 29, 2000. During this hearing, Sumter Municipal Court Judge Mary Herbert testified that she had no specific recollection of Jennings' case but described her standard procedures for securing waivers of rights. Jennings also testified, acknowledging that he was informed of his right to a jury trial but chose a bench trial to expedite the proceedings. On December 1, 2000, Jennings submitted another memorandum claiming he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial. The district court rejected Jennings' arguments against the indictment on December 15, 2000. Following this, he entered a conditional guilty plea to the violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), preserving his right to appeal the indictment's validity. Jennings filed a motion for reconsideration on April 24, 2001, which was denied. He was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment on November 14, 2001, but remained free on bond while appealing. The central issue on appeal is whether a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV), who has not had civil rights taken away under state law, can still be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). Jennings contends that he cannot be convicted because his civil rights were effectively "restored" under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), despite not being formally revoked.

Statutory interpretation starts with analyzing the statute's language, determining if it has a plain and unambiguous meaning. Courts must reference the language, its specific context, and the broader statute context to assess ambiguity. The courts' role is to enforce statutes according to their terms unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to deviate from that meaning. A literal interpretation may be set aside if it contradicts the statute's purpose or leads to absurd results. Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), a person is not considered convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) if the conviction has been expunged, pardoned, or if civil rights have been restored, unless such actions explicitly state restrictions on firearm possession. The argument presented by Jennings, regarding the restoration of rights, is weak as his civil rights were never taken away, making their "restoration" impossible. Jennings contends that it is absurd to treat those who never lost civil rights more harshly than those who had their rights temporarily revoked during incarceration. An example from *United States v. Indelicato* illustrates a defendant who faced misdemeanor charges with suspended sentencing, highlighting the context of misdemeanor classifications.

The defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing firearms and ammunition despite prior felony convictions, which carried maximum sentences exceeding two years. This disqualified him from the exception under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B) that applies to those convicted of state misdemeanors punishable by two years or less. The defendant contended that since Massachusetts had not revoked his civil rights, he should be exempt under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The district court rejected this argument, leading to an appeal. The appellate court, referencing Indelicato, evaluated whether the restoration exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) applies to individuals whose civil rights were never taken away. Although the court acknowledged that the term "restored" typically supports the government's position, it found that the legislative history did not suggest an intent to exclude individuals like the defendant. The court emphasized the purpose of the statute: to recognize a state's determination that certain individuals are trustworthy enough to possess firearms despite prior convictions. It argued that distinguishing between those who never lost their rights and those who had them restored would create inconsistencies in various jurisdictions. Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendant's civil rights should be considered "restored" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). This reasoning aligns with a similar ruling from the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Wegrzyn, where a defendant’s lack of incarceration for a domestic violence misdemeanor meant he retained his civil rights, thus preventing prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

On appeal, the government argued that the district court's ruling disregarded the clear language of the relevant statutes and led to an "absurd result." However, the Wegrzyn court rejected this perspective, affirming that the district court's decision upheld the exception created by Congress and acknowledged the nuances of Michigan's criminal law. The court emphasized that 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) allows states to define the parameters of the statutory exception, reflecting the variability in state laws regarding civil rights loss upon conviction. The Michigan legislature's choice to revoke voting rights even for misdemeanants contributed to the current issues faced by federal prosecutors. Had Michigan opted to treat misdemeanants less harshly than felons, the complications surrounding the restoration of voting rights would not have emerged. The interplay among federal statutes, Michigan's legislation, and Sixth Circuit precedents has led to a scenario where a statutory exception undermines the intended rule, a situation that, while difficult for some to accept, aligns with the law and respects Congressional intent. The Michigan populace is affected by the legislature's decision to impose uniform penalties across all offenses. Additionally, the court found that four other circuit decisions presented more compelling arguments regarding the literal interpretation of "restored" as applied to Jennings, referencing the McGrath case where a petitioner, having not lost civil rights due to a suspended sentence for a felony conviction, later contested his status under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The district court dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the restoration of civil rights for felons. The petitioner contended that the exemption for felons with "restored" civil rights should apply to those whose rights were never revoked. The McGrath court rejected this argument, emphasizing that "restoration" implies the return of rights that were lost, which is inconsistent with rights that were never forfeited. The court further noted that the petitioner’s claim overlooked the intent of the 1986 amendment to the Gun Control Act, which aimed to exempt those felons whose civil rights were restored through mechanisms like pardon or expungement, acknowledging their rehabilitation.

The court also dismissed the argument that it was unfair for Congress to allow state legislatures to determine the restoration of civil rights. It recognized the varying state practices regarding civil rights restoration and concluded that Congress intended for such variability. The amendment was enacted in response to a 1983 Supreme Court ruling that established that the definition of predicate offenses under the Gun Control Act is federal, not state. This led to the creation of Section 921(a)(20), which allows state law to define predicate offenses and determine who qualifies for federal exemption from firearms restrictions. The court remarked that the petitioner's proposed changes would lead to new anomalies, potentially exempting dangerous felons in states that do not revoke civil rights while imposing restrictions on less serious offenders in other states. Ultimately, the court reinforced the federal policy of preventing convicted felons from possessing firearms.

In Smith, the defendant pleaded guilty in 1994 to a misdemeanor assault in Iowa, which was classified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) under federal law (18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A)(i) and (ii)). Iowa law does not strip civil rights from misdemeanants, allowing the defendant to retain his civil rights despite the conviction. In 1996, he was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) for firearm possession. On appeal, he claimed eligibility for a restoration exception under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), arguing that he effectively retained his civil rights. The court rejected this claim, distinguishing from Indelicato based on differing statutory language, specifically noting that Iowa law's lack of civil rights loss for misdemeanants precluded application of the restoration exception. The court also emphasized that interpreting the statute as the defendant suggested would undermine its intent, as it would allow most misdemeanants to qualify for the exception. The defendant further argued that his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection was violated by not fitting within the restoration exception; however, the court dismissed this argument, citing congressional awareness of varying state laws on civil rights restoration and the legislative history underlying 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Congress was particularly focused on preventing domestic abusers from evading firearm possession prohibitions by pleading down to misdemeanors, highlighting a specific concern for public safety related to domestic violence offenses.

The Smith court reinforced its equal protection ruling by indicating that the defendant had options to expunge his Iowa state law conviction or seek a pardon. In Hancock, the defendant challenged the dismissal of his indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) on equal protection grounds, arguing that the statute's restoration exception unfairly treated misdemeanants more harshly than some felons. The Hancock court, referencing Smith, explained that Congress recognized the variances in state civil rights restoration processes and that such disparate treatment was an expected outcome of relying on state law. The court identified several means—such as pardon, expungement, and setting aside convictions—by which offenders could regain firearm possession rights. It concluded that extending the firearm ban to domestic violence misdemeanants was rational, and the differences in treatment were not an equal protection violation, as they offered adequate legal avenues for misdemeanants. The court argued that Congress could reasonably determine that felons who had restored their rights were more suitable to own firearms compared to misdemeanants lacking expungement or pardon. In Barnes, the defendant's situation was similar, as he maintained his civil rights after a 1997 assault conviction, and upon being charged in 2000 for firearm possession, he claimed unequal treatment compared to individuals in jurisdictions permitting civil rights loss and restoration. The Barnes court found the defendant's argument regarding equal protection lacking a rational basis.

The Barnes court dismissed the defendant's claim by affirming Congress's rationale for integrating state law on civil rights forfeiture, despite state variances in restoration processes. It noted that Congress offered alternatives, such as expungement and pardon, for individuals like Barnes to qualify for exceptions under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33). The court emphasized that the requirement for Jennings to demonstrate both the loss and restoration of civil rights is not absurd, as Congress understood the differing state laws when enacting the restoration exceptions. The court acknowledged that accepting Jennings' interpretation could undermine federal policies aimed at restricting firearm possession among those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). Jennings' argument that his limited understanding of "restored" would prevent firearm possession for most MCDV convicts was rejected. The court concluded that it is illogical to allow firearm possession for individuals in states that restore rights only upon incarceration while denying it to those in states where civil rights are never forfeited.

Jennings' argument is flawed as it seeks to apply multiple definitions of "restored," which the court rejects. The court finds a rational distinction between incarcerated and non-incarcerated misdemeanants, asserting that Congress could reasonably conclude that those who have gone through a state's restoration process are more fit to own firearms than those who have not lost or had their civil rights restored. Jennings' civil rights were never revoked; therefore, he cannot claim the restoration exception under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Jennings conceded during oral argument that his interpretation of "restored" was weak, acknowledging that since his civil rights were never taken away, they could not be restored. The court references McGrath v. United States, which defines "restore" as giving back something lost, emphasizing that restoration is impossible if nothing was lost in the first place. Jennings contends it is absurd to treat misdemeanants who never lost their rights more harshly than those who temporarily lost theirs, a position that finds some support in United States v. Indelicato. In Indelicato, the defendant, who was convicted of misdemeanors and never lost his civil rights, was ultimately found ineligible for the restoration exception because his state crimes carried a maximum sentence exceeding two years, which is relevant under the felon-in-possession statute. The court in Indelicato confirmed that the restoration exception does not apply to individuals who never had their civil rights taken away.

The court identified two reasons why the language of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) does not preclude further examination. Firstly, it noted that Congress may have used the term "restored" without intending to exclude individuals like the defendant, as there was no evidence in the legislative history suggesting that Congress considered cases where those convicted of serious crimes did not lose their civil rights. Secondly, the court found no rationale for Congress to adopt the distinction urged by the government, leading it to investigate the statute's legislative history and purpose. The court concluded that the statutory scheme aimed to allow states to determine if individuals with prior convictions were trustworthy enough to possess firearms. It argued that there should be no distinction between those whose civil rights were never revoked and those whose rights were restored after a felony conviction, as such a distinction could result in inconsistent outcomes. Therefore, the court determined that the defendant's civil rights should be regarded as "restored" under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20).

The Sixth Circuit later reaffirmed this interpretation in United States v. Wegrzyn, where it ruled that a defendant, who had not lost civil rights due to probation for a domestic violence misdemeanor in Michigan, could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). This ruling emphasized the illogicality of allowing a more serious offender to possess a firearm after serving a jail sentence while treating a misdemeanant more harshly despite a less severe punishment.

On appeal, the government argued that the district court's ruling disregarded the clear language of relevant statutes, leading to an "absurd result." The Wegrzyn court countered, stating that the district court's decision correctly reflected Congress's intent and the nuances of Michigan criminal law. The court noted that under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), Congress allowed states to determine the criteria for statutory exceptions, acknowledging variations in state laws regarding civil rights loss upon conviction. Specifically, Michigan's decision to revoke voting rights even for misdemeanor offenders created a unique challenge for federal prosecutors. The court emphasized that this legal dilemma stemmed from the interplay of federal statutes, Michigan law, and Sixth Circuit precedent, which permitted exceptions that contradicted the intended rule. While the outcome may be unpopular, it aligns with legal mandates and congressional intent, reflecting the Michigan legislature's choices. The court also referenced four other circuit court rulings that found a literal interpretation of "restored" in this context could lead to an absurd outcome, citing the case of McGrath, where a petitioner argued he did not lose civil rights due to his suspended sentence for a felony conviction and thus was not prohibited from firearm possession under federal law.

The petitioner filed an amended motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2555, arguing that his counsel's failure to raise a claim during plea, sentencing, or direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the petition, prompting an appeal. On appeal, the petitioner contended that the exemption for felons with restored civil rights should also apply to those whose rights were never revoked. The McGrath court rejected this argument, stating that the concept of "restore" cannot apply to rights never lost. It emphasized that the 1986 amendment to the Gun Control Act (FOPA) was intended to exempt felons who receive some form of forgiveness, such as pardon or restoration of rights, as a recognition of rehabilitation.

The court further dismissed the petitioner's claims regarding congressional intent, noting that states have varying laws for restoring civil rights post-conviction. It highlighted that Congress intentionally allowed state law to determine the predicate offenses for federal firearms restrictions, thereby permitting state legislatures to dictate which convicted individuals could be exempt from federal prosecution. This legislative framework was established in response to the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., which clarified that state expungement does not affect federal firearm statutes. The McGrath court affirmed that the 1986 amendment aimed to revert the authority to define felon status back to the states.

The "Firearms Owners' Protection Act" allows states to determine if individuals with prior convictions can possess firearms based on their perceived trustworthiness. This state-dependent approach leads to inconsistencies across different jurisdictions, as laws on pardons, expungements, and civil rights restoration vary widely. These inconsistencies can result in situations where dangerous felons in states that do not revoke civil rights might still possess firearms, while individuals convicted of lesser offenses in other states might be prohibited from doing so. 

In the case of Smith, the defendant, who had a misdemeanor assault conviction in Iowa, did not lose his civil rights and was charged under federal law for possessing a firearm. The court rejected Smith's argument for applying the restoration exception under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), highlighting that Iowa law did not strip civil rights for misdemeanants. The court emphasized that a defendant must have lost civil rights according to state law to claim the restoration exception. Moreover, interpreting the statute as Smith suggested would undermine its intent, since it would allow most misdemeanants to claim the exception, effectively negating the rule.

The court concluded that Smith's Fifth Amendment right to equal protection was not violated, referencing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) and the divergent state laws concerning pardons and restoration of civil rights. Congress was aware of these discrepancies when enacting the law in 1996, which aimed to address concerns about domestic violence offenders potentially evading firearm restrictions by pleading down from felony to misdemeanor charges. The legislative intent was to prevent known domestic abusers from accessing firearms, treating those who might threaten physical force similarly to those who commit actual violence. The court clarified that loss of civil rights typically does not stem from misdemeanor convictions, suggesting that the language in the statute may not apply to most offenders affected by the new ban. Additionally, the Smith court noted that the defendant could have pursued expungement or a pardon for his conviction. 

In Hancock, the defendant's appeal against his indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) claimed that the restoration exception treated misdemeanants more harshly than some felons, given that misdemeanants in Arizona do not lose their civil rights. The Hancock court upheld the Smith decision, affirming that Congress recognized the disparities in state laws regarding civil rights restoration and that such differences were an unavoidable consequence of the legislative framework. The court emphasized that restoration is just one of several pathways—alongside pardon and expungement—through which individuals may regain firearm possession rights.

The court determined that extending the firearm ban to domestic-violence misdemeanants is rational, with the disparity in treatment arising from Congress's reliance on state law. The statute provides alternative pathways for misdemeanants to regain firearm possession rights, such as pardon and expungement, which do not violate equal protection rights. The distinction between felons and misdemeanants regarding the restoration of civil rights is deemed minimally rational; Congress could reasonably consider felons who have restored their rights to be more suitable for firearm ownership than domestic-violence misdemeanants who have not received similar relief. 

The court referenced the case of Barnes, where the defendant argued that he was unfairly treated compared to individuals in jurisdictions that restore civil rights. The court rejected this claim, asserting that Congress’s incorporation of state law regarding civil rights forfeiture was rational, regardless of state variances in restoration processes. Furthermore, the Barnes court acknowledged the existence of other remedies available to the defendant for regaining rights. The application of the term "restored" in the statute was found to be non-absurd, as Congress was aware of the differing state laws on civil rights restoration when enacting the relevant provisions.

Congress has linked the restoration of civil rights to state law, which results in potentially anomalous outcomes, such as favoring incarcerated misdemeanants over their non-incarcerated counterparts. Jennings has alternative options for restoration under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), including pardon and expungement. Accepting Jennings' interpretation would undermine the federal policy aimed at preventing firearm possession by individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence (MCDVs) by allowing nearly all such individuals to possess firearms. Jennings argues for a limited interpretation of "restored," suggesting that non-incarcerated misdemeanants have their rights restored, while those whose rights are retained under state law do not. This argument is rejected, as it would necessitate multiple definitions of "restored," which is inconsistent with the statute’s plain meaning. The distinction between incarcerated and non-incarcerated misdemeanants is deemed rational, as Congress could reasonably determine that those who have gone through a state restoration process are more suitable for firearm ownership. Ultimately, Jennings' civil rights were neither revoked nor restored, making him ineligible for the restoration exception under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Thus, the district court's refusal to dismiss Jennings' indictment based on this exception was upheld.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(I), a person is not considered "convicted" of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) unless they were represented by counsel or knowingly waived their right to counsel. Additionally, under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(II), a conviction is invalid unless the case was prosecuted in a jurisdiction where the individual was entitled to a jury trial, and either the case was tried by a jury or the individual knowingly waived their right to a jury trial. Jennings argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is invalid because he did not waive his rights knowingly and intelligently in his March 1997 CDV case. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel and a jury trial, with the understanding that defendants may waive these rights if done knowingly and voluntarily. The court reviewed the procedures used by Judge Herbert, who had extensive experience as a municipal court judge, and concluded that Jennings had indeed knowingly and intelligently waived his rights in the 1997 case. Consequently, the district court's judgment was affirmed. Notably, Jennings had a significant criminal history, including multiple CDV convictions. The text also contrasts the handling of civil rights restoration for felons under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) with those convicted of lesser offenses, raising concerns about inconsistencies in prosecution for firearm possession.

In United States v. Hall, the court emphasized that if Congress had intended a particular legal outcome, it would have articulated it more clearly. The case of Jennings assumes, without definitive ruling, that Jennings was entitled to a jury trial under South Carolina law for a March 1997 Criminal Domestic Violence (CDV) case. Jennings cited Shelton, where the Supreme Court determined that actual imprisonment or a suspended sentence triggers the constitutional right to counsel. It clarified that only cases resulting in the actual deprivation of liberty necessitate legal representation, while fines do not. Although Jennings was entitled to counsel, he knowingly waived this right, undermining his reliance on Shelton. The prevailing legal principle asserts that without a knowing waiver, no individual may face imprisonment for any offense without legal representation.

Circuit Judge Widener dissents regarding the majority opinion's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), which pertains to the restoration of civil rights. The majority's strict reading concludes that Jennings' misdemeanor conviction, lacking imprisonment, disqualifies him from the restoration exception. Widener argues that the majority neglects the statute's parenthetical language, which has led to differing circuit interpretations about Congress's intentions regarding gun possession. He acknowledges that Congress intended for state law to define the restoration exception, recognizing the resulting disparities across states concerning civil rights loss after conviction.

Congress chose to defer to state law regarding civil rights restoration, but it did not intend to create disparities both between and within states as suggested by the majority opinion. The majority's interpretation erroneously assumes that because a defendant's civil rights were never formally revoked, the restoration exception does not apply to him, akin to offering tea to someone who has had none. This interpretation overlooks the statute's provision concerning jurisdictions that allow for civil rights loss, which Congress included to distinguish between states that strip misdemeanants of their rights and those that do not.

The majority's reading implies that individuals within the same jurisdiction might be treated differently based solely on the nature of their misdemeanors. For instance, in South Carolina, a defendant whose crime did not lead to incarceration would be barred from firearm possession, while another whose crime warranted imprisonment would qualify for the restoration exception. This leads to unreasonable outcomes and contradicts decisions from other circuits, which found that the restoration exception does not apply in jurisdictions where misdemeanants do not lose their civil rights. Cases cited include United States v. Barnes, United States v. Hancock, United States v. Smith, and McGrath v. United States, all highlighting that in their respective jurisdictions, misdemeanants retain their civil rights and that Congress did not intend for the restoration exception to create unequal treatment among misdemeanants.

In United States v. Meza-Corrales, the court noted that the interpretation of the restoration exception, as articulated in McGrath, has faced dissent from multiple circuits, including the Ninth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Smith criticized the First Circuit's ruling in United States v. Indelicato for relying on state law to fit within the federal exception, labeling it a "fiction." Conversely, the Sixth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Wegrzyn applied the restoration exception favorably to a defendant not incarcerated, aligning with Michigan law that restricts civil rights loss to periods of confinement. The Wegrzyn court's approach emphasized Congress's intention for state law to govern civil rights concerning misdemeanors. The author of the excerpt supports Wegrzyn's reasoning, arguing against the majority's interpretation which could lead to inconsistent outcomes within a single state. The author asserts that recognizing the restoration exception would not undermine its intended scope, as it would be limited to specific jurisdictions. The discussion highlights the necessity of addressing the language in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) in the context of South Carolina, which aligns with Congress's anticipated anomalies regarding civil rights restoration. The author concludes that the statute's wording does not support the majority's broader application of the exception.

Congress intended for states to define the parameters of individual crimes, and as such, South Carolina's decision to strip misdemeanants of their civil rights should be respected. Consequently, section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) applies to misdemeanants in South Carolina. Allowing federal law to prevent misdemeanants, who did not serve time, from possessing firearms—while permitting those who have served time to do so—undermines state authority, contrary to Congressional intent. Therefore, the district court's decision should be reversed, affirming that the restoration exception of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) exempts the defendant from 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Additionally, the case of Indelicato is mentioned as it involves 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20), which differs in its language regarding the treatment of expunged convictions and civil rights restoration.