Lamson Petroleum Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum Inc.

Citations: 824 So. 2d 1194; 0 La.App. 3 Cir. 695; 160 Oil & Gas Rep. 454; 2001 La. App. LEXIS 89; 2001 WL 83739Docket: No. 00 695-CA

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 30, 2001; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Billie Colombaro Woodard, Judge, asserts that the trial court's decision is free from legal or manifest error, commending Judge Brouillette for his thorough and fair analysis. The case revolves around ownership disputes concerning roadbeds in the Scott Field area of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, initiated by Lamson Petroleum Corporation against multiple defendants. Lamson seeks to validate its oil, gas, and mineral lease over three roadbed tracts totaling 1.25 acres, demand the payment of all production attributable to it, and request a report on sums owed from production sales. The action follows a consent judgment favoring some defendants in a prior possessory action, which recognized their mineral rights and allowed Lamson a 60-day period to file its petitory action. Defendants assert claims as landowners, mineral lessees, or royalty owners, and some have settled, while others contested Lamson's claims during the trial, which involved extensive testimony and document admissions. Previous case transcripts were incorporated to avoid duplicative evidence, as issues overlap between the cases. The property in question originally belonged to Clara Girard Beraud, who held title prior to November 8, 1943. The tracts are identified as Tract 'A' (part of Dulles Road), Tract 'B' (part of Westgate Road), and Tract 'C' (comprising portions of both roads).

The validity of Lamson’s claims regarding Tracts 'A' and 'B' hinges on two key determinations: (1) whether the 1944 sale from Clara Beraud to Ashton and Paul Beraud, Jr. of 100 acres included portions of public roads (Dulles Road and Westgate Road) on the southern and western boundaries; and (2) whether the 1947 sale from Ashton and Paul Beraud, Jr. to Joseph DeJack of 50 acres included portions of those roads. For Tract 'C', a similar determination is needed for the November 1943 sale from Clara Beraud to Lloyd Boudreaux of '4 acres, more or less'.

A critical issue is the interpretation of "bounded by the road" in the property descriptions, specifically whether this indicates the property ends at the edge of the road right-of-way or includes parts of the roadbeds. The court references a companion case (Docket 96-2277) to discuss the implications of such boundary descriptions.

In the 1944 deed, the property located in Lafayette Parish is described with boundaries that include public roads. Citing State v. Tucker, the court concludes that Clara Beraud did not convey any part of the southern boundary (Dulles Road) and retained ownership of the roadbed, designating the North right-of-way line as the property’s southern boundary. This retained portion constitutes Tract 'A'. Similarly, she did not convey the western boundary (Westgate Road), with the East right-of-way line defining the property’s western boundary, thus Tract 'B' is also retained by her.

Ownership of the roadbed strips was confirmed in a judgment of possession dated April 10, 1945, which recognized Paul Beraud, Sr. as the sole heir of Clara Beraud's estate. Although the judgment did not explicitly describe the roadbed tracts, it granted Paul possession of "all property" from the succession, leading to the conclusion that he inherited those roadbed tracts.

On October 20, 1947, Ashton Beraud and Paul Beraud, Jr. sold a 50-acre tract of land to Joseph DeJack, with specific boundaries outlined in the property description. This tract, part of a larger 100-acre parcel previously acquired from Clara A. Girard, is significant for the current case. A judgment dated June 21, 1956, recognized Ashton and Paul Beraud, Jr. as sole heirs of Paul Beraud, Sr., granting them possession of all property in his succession, although the roadbed tracts were not explicitly described. 

Lamson argues that the Berauds were not the owners of the disputed tracts at the time of sale to DeJack and that the sale's description did not include those tracts. Conversely, the defendants assert the Berauds were indeed the owners, having acquired the tracts in their purchase, or alternatively, they inherited them, thus DeJack would hold title under the doctrine of after acquired title. The court previously ruled that the sale from Clara Beraud did not encompass any roadbed portions. 

To assess DeJack's title under the after acquired title doctrine, it must be determined if the property description in his sale includes the disputed tracts, regardless of the sellers' ownership status at that time. The court refers to established principles indicating that sales based on boundaries are definitive, affirming that the buyer only acquires land within those specified boundaries. The intent of the parties and the hierarchy of legal guides for determining boundaries—including natural and artificial monuments, distances, courses, and quantity—are critical factors in this determination.

The case of Meyer v. Comegys establishes that the intention of the parties is central to contract interpretation, as articulated in Articles 2045 and 2046 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 2045 emphasizes that interpretation seeks to ascertain the common intent of the parties, while Article 2046 states that clear and explicit contract language precludes further interpretation unless absurd results arise. Although these principles are straightforward, their application can become complicated, particularly when conflicting intentions are present. 

In scenarios where a boundary description is contradicted by other expressions of intent, such as a description that includes a road as a boundary, courts must decide if the contradictory indications sufficiently override the presumption that boundary descriptions limit property to those confines. The case of Bouligny v. Delatte illustrates the complexities of such interpretations, focusing on whether Claude Judice acquired legal title to a 20-foot servitude road in a 1950 sale from Odel Antoine Comeaux, or if Comeaux retained title, later conveyed to Delatte. The trial court concluded that the 20-foot strip was included in Judice's purchase. The case hinges on the precise language used in the sale deed and the implications of that language on ownership rights.

In Louisiana, a plat of survey attached to a deed takes precedence over written descriptions in cases of conflict. In the deed from Mr. Comeaux to Mr. Judice, although the property description includes a boundary defined by a 20-foot servitude road, the attached plat indicates that this road is included in the property being conveyed. The Court of Appeal, affirming the trial court's decision, noted that the ambiguous language in the deed required an assessment of the parties' intentions based on the entire deed. It emphasized that when discrepancies arise between a written description and an attached plat, the plat governs. 

The deed specifies a conveyance of 3.47 arpents, with the plat confirming the inclusion of the 20-foot strip as part of the property transferred. The ruling referenced the case of Bouligny, which illustrates that while a road as a boundary generally indicates property limits, this principle is not absolute. The overarching issue in such cases is determining what factors show an intent to include part or all of a boundary road in a property conveyance, particularly in transactions predating August 1, 1956.

The specific dispute in this case centers on whether the 1947 sale from Ashton Beraud and Paul Beraud, Jr. to Joseph DeJack intended to include the existing roads on the south and west as part of the property. The deed mentions boundaries as "public road," yet the property is described in reference to an attached survey plat. The court will consider various factors to establish the parties' intentions regarding the inclusion of the roadbed strips in the sale.

Tract 'A' of the Yandle survey's inclusion of public road portions (Dulles and Westgate) in the Lamson Lease is debated. Witness Michael Mayeux, a registered surveyor, concluded that the Yandle survey did not encompass the roadbed strips, primarily based on the sale history where Ashton and Paul Beraud did not own those strips, as they were described as 'public road' with no survey conducted during the sale from Clara Beraud. Mayeux's analysis suggested that it was possible to calculate 50 acres without including the roadbed, indicating an intent to exclude those areas to align with his earlier findings.

However, while Mayeux's calculations are reasonable, they do not sufficiently counteract evidence suggesting the roadbed was included in the survey. The court, referencing Louisiana law, concurs with Mayeux's assertion that the Beraud brothers did not acquire roadbed rights from Clara Beraud and thus could not sell them. This principle does not inherently negate the possibility of the Yandle survey including the roadbed.

Yandle appeared to interpret the Beraud acquisition as covering the southernmost 100 acres of Clara's property, an interpretation deemed not unreasonable despite the court's disagreement. Counsel argues that Clara likely did not intend to retain the roadbed strips. Conversely, surveyor Charles Camp contended that the roadbed was included in both the 100-acre and 50-acre sales, although his views on boundary descriptions were found lacking in persuasion, reflecting a disagreement with established Louisiana law. Camp’s interpretation, however, holds merit, indicating that tract 'A' encompasses the entire southern roadbed and half of the western roadbed as they existed in 1947. The court agrees with Camp’s assessment, bolstered by straightforward observations from the survey plat, which clearly delineated boundaries.

The heavy line south of the road marks a fence line designation and extends from the southwest to the southeast corner of the tract, indicating boundaries. If these lines are not recognized as Yandle’s boundary designations, there would be no corresponding lines for the south and west as seen on the north and east. The absence of a credible explanation for these lines suggests they serve as boundary indicators. Lamson highlights inconsistencies in the Yandle survey and Camp's testimony, though asserts the survey aligns with the written property description. Despite noted errors, the survey remains relevant, with the key issue being the parties' intent regarding the south and west boundaries. Evidence shows that the sale to DeJack referenced public roads as boundaries, and the Yandle survey included portions of the roadbeds, creating a discrepancy between the description and the survey. The court must determine if the parties intended to include these roadbeds. Citing the Bouligny case, the court emphasizes that in cases of discrepancy, the attached survey plat governs over the written description, a principle upheld by Louisiana jurisprudence. Notably, attached maps or surveys form part of the deed, and when conflicts arise, the survey takes precedence. The jurisprudential rules clarify that unless a survey is evidently incorrect, it prevails over the deed's wording in cases of ambiguity or error.

The excerpt analyzes the relevance of legal principles regarding land boundaries to the current case. It emphasizes the hierarchy of legal guides for determining boundaries: natural monuments, artificial monuments, distances, courses, and quantity, with the parties' intentions being paramount. Surveys are not ranked but fall under the intention of the parties. In this case, a conflict arises between artificial monuments (public roads) and the Yandle survey attached to the deed. Precedent cases demonstrate that surveys prevail over written descriptions in deeds when discrepancies occur, even when the conflicting boundaries involve natural monuments. The court concludes that the Yandle survey includes the disputed roadbed acreage within the 50-acre tract sold to Joseph DeJack, despite the sellers not owning the land at the time of sale. Their eventual ownership through succession allows the title to vest in DeJack under the doctrine of after-acquired title. Consequently, Lamson has not proved title over the properties designated as Tract 'A' and Tract 'B' in the petition.

Lamson's claim as a lessee of Tract C hinges on whether Clara Beraud conveyed her interest in the roadbeds to Lloyd Boudreaux in a 1943 sale of "4 acres, more or less." The property description includes specific boundaries: north and east by Beraud’s land, south and west by a public road, starting from a defined point in Section 32, Township 9 South, Range 4 East. It is established that Beraud owned only the East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 32 at the time of the sale, making the starting point, located at the Southeast corner of the West half of the West half of the section, the Southwest corner of her property.

The parties disagree on the starting point's location, with Michael Mayeux's report suggesting it is 318 feet west of Westgate Road's centerline, while defendants claim it lies on the centerline, asserting that the road was the western boundary of Beraud’s property. Regardless of the exact location, the court notes Beraud believed the public road marked her western boundary and intended to convey a 4-acre tract in her property’s southwest corner. 

Mayeux’s report indicates the intent was to locate land at the intersection of the two roads, though the dispute centers on whether the southern and western boundaries are defined by the right-of-way limits of the public roads. Any potential error in the starting point is deemed irrelevant to the parties’ intentions, as all parties assume it begins at the roads' intersection. No survey accompanied the sale, limiting the court’s analysis to the deed's wording. 

Without definitive case law, determining intent is subjective, and the defendants argue that a seller would not retain a roadbed strip without explicit indication. While this argument is logical, the court recognizes that prior jurisprudence holds that a seller conveys only what is within the recited boundaries in sales per aversionem prior to 1956. The defendants' reasoning overlooks that a seller might not be aware of ownership within the roadbed, making it unreasonable to include unmentioned land solely due to the seller's ignorance.

In pre-1956 sales, to overcome the per aversionem rule established in Tucker, evidence must demonstrate a clear intention to convey property boundaries. The court concludes that the language in the deed indicates that the parties intended to sell up to Clara Beraud's ownership limits on the south and west of the 4-acre tract, as she owned to the township line. Despite potential discrepancies regarding the starting point's east-west location, Beraud's intent to sell to her ownership limits is evident, irrespective of any roadbed encroachments. The court emphasizes the importance of interpreting all words in the deed, noting that the phrase "more particularly described as" suggests a need for specificity due to the lack of a survey. This specificity supports the intention of the parties, favoring the starting point over boundary recitations. The court distinguishes this case from Levraea v. Boudreaux, highlighting critical differences in the descriptions that affect the interpretation of property boundaries. Ultimately, the court finds no other cases that contradict its determination of the parties' intent.

Lamson Petroleum Corporation failed to prove title in its lessors for the property described as Tract “C,” leading to the court's decision to reject Lamson's demands and dismiss the case against all defendants. Lamson is responsible for all costs incurred during the proceeding, subject to any pretrial cost agreements. The trial court's decision is fully affirmed. The doctrine of after-acquired title in Louisiana states that if a vendor sells property they do not own but later acquires it, the title automatically transfers to the buyer. Relevant civil code articles pertain to sales contracts and boundary dispute resolutions, emphasizing the importance of the parties' intent over strict statutory interpretation. Testimony regarding property boundaries was deemed speculative and unconvincing. The law presumes that a seller includes property bounded by a road or servitude they own unless clearly indicated otherwise. Deed clauses must be interpreted collectively to ascertain the parties' true intent, particularly when inconsistencies arise.