Barry Bernstein Anne Tracy Bolton Linda Buffington Brenda T. Campbell Alex Cremidan Patricia Dibos Ron Echandia Otis Funches Mary L. Lawlor, Dr. Jose Melchor Ciprianita Powell Lyle Rangel Duane Stevens Russell Vowinkel v. Edward Lopez Sue Braun John Debeck Ron Ottinger Frances Zimmerman Alan D. Bersin Anthony J. Alvarado San Diego Unified City School District, and Does 1-10
Docket: 02-55119
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 3, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs, former principals and vice-principals of the San Diego School District, filed a lawsuit against defendants, including school board members and the superintendent, claiming their reassignment to teaching positions violated their property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The reassignment, effective July 1, 1999, resulted in reduced pay and was justified by the defendants on the grounds of needing a different leadership style. The plaintiffs sought to appeal the decision, but the court found no applicable procedure for such an appeal.
In December 1999, the plaintiffs initiated this suit, which underwent various amendments and rulings. The district court ultimately denied motions for summary judgment from both parties, ruling that factual disputes regarding the applicability of certain administrative procedures must be resolved by a jury before determining if qualified immunity protected the defendants.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiffs did not have a clearly established right to their administrative roles, thus negating the need for further factual determinations. The court emphasized that qualified immunity serves to protect public officials' exercise of judgment and is designed to facilitate early dismissal in cases where immunity applies.
Plaintiffs assert a property interest in their higher administrative salaries based on the board's adoption of administrative procedures (APs) and memoranda of understanding (MOUs), claiming these limited the board's authority to assign administrative positions. They argue that this interest is "clearly established," but fail to demonstrate that the defendants violated a constitutional right necessary to overcome the defendants' immunity.
Public employment rights in California are governed by statute, and no employee has a vested contractual right to continued employment beyond statutory terms, as established in case law. Statutes regulating civil service employment cannot be circumvented by contract, and neither express nor implied contracts can limit termination procedures defined by statute.
The plaintiffs reference the case of Jones v. Palm Springs Unified School District, which involved a superintendent with a specific statutory term, asserting that procedural rights are only applicable during the term of a valid contract. However, none of the plaintiffs were employed under the relevant exceptions outlined in California Education Code.
They also cite McFall v. Madera Unified School District, which similarly underscores that procedural rights apply only during a contract's term, noting that the board's decision not to renew the principal's contract parallels the situation of the plaintiffs, who lack a valid claim.
The plaintiffs' cited cases do not substantiate their claims, as authority to contract is not exercised under the relevant Education Code provisions for the positions in question. Furthermore, statutory protections for teachers highlight the absence of tenure for administrators unless employed under specific contracts.
Jones and McFall did not adequately demonstrate the plaintiffs' asserted right, as the statutory framework does not mention it. However, the plaintiffs reference deposition testimony indicating that prior to the current administration, the district had followed established procedures (APs) and interpreted memoranda of understanding (MOUs) as requiring adherence to these procedures in administrator reassignments. The former superintendent's testimony establishes a past practice but fails to demonstrate a constitutionally protected property right, given California law grants school boards broad authority in appointing administrators. Consequently, more than mere past practice is needed to establish a property right. California law favors teacher tenure but does not afford the same protections to administrators, whose grievances should be pursued under state contract law rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As the APs and MOUs do not confer constitutional property rights, there are no factual disputes warranting resolution, making summary judgment appropriate. The plaintiffs' claims of being escorted by security after a board meeting, while administratively suspended, do not substantiate their case, as they were not unjustly treated in a manner that violated rights. The district court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a judgment in favor of the defendants.
In dissent, Judge Pregerson argues that genuine material factual issues exist regarding the defendants' qualified immunity, suggesting that summary judgment should be denied to allow these disputes to be resolved by a trial.
The document outlines the events surrounding the demotion of plaintiffs by the San Diego Board of Education on June 15, 1999. On the day of the demotion, the Board publicly announced the plaintiffs' impending demotions, which were executed that evening with the assistance of armed school district police officers. The plaintiffs were informed of their immediate removal from their positions as principals and vice-principals, placed on paid administrative leave, and instructed not to return to their schools without police escort.
Two weeks later, each plaintiff requested a statement of reasons for their demotion, which the Board provided, attributing the action to a mismatch between the plaintiffs' leadership styles and the District's reform vision. The plaintiffs subsequently filed administrative appeals, but were informed they were not entitled to appeal or other due process protections outlined in the District's Administrative Procedures (AP 7767 and 7113), which govern adverse actions against certificated employees and include rights to appeal and representation.
These procedures have been in place since 1976 and are authorized under California Education Code § 35160, which allows school districts to create local regulations. Additionally, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the School District and the Administrators Association, which provided enhanced due process rights, was also in effect. Despite this, the defendants argue they cannot be held to these due process guarantees, claiming they lacked authority under California law, and assert qualified immunity on the basis that the plaintiffs did not have a clearly established right contradicted by state law.
The majority acknowledges that California's public employment terms are governed by statute, concluding that the Education Code's silence on due process protections means only statutory rights are available to plaintiffs. They assert that contracts cannot override statutory provisions, preventing any property interest from arising from the Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs). However, the dissenting opinion finds no conflict between the California Education Code, San Diego's Administrative Procedures, and the MOUs. It references the California Court of Appeal and the District's interpretation of state law, indicating that the defendants provided legitimate additional due process protections for administrative and supervisory employees. Citing Misasi v. W.C. Jacobsen, the dissent emphasizes that the interpretation of statutes by relevant authorities is given considerable weight unless clearly erroneous. The additional due process rights, such as an appeal for demoted administrators and the right to counsel, created a property interest for plaintiffs, which was violated when they were denied these rights.
The dissent also looks to state court precedents, specifically McFall v. Madera Unified School District, which involved similar circumstances where a principal claimed due process violations due to a failure to follow administrative procedures during demotion. The Court of Appeal upheld the additional due process protections established by the Madera Board, without asserting any conflict with state law, affirming that the plaintiff was entitled to those protections. The court referenced Jones v. Palm Springs Unified School District, underscoring how incorporating school board rules into employment contracts can enhance due process rights.
The majority emphasizes that the plaintiffs in Jones and McFall completed their contractual terms, yet the application of the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) remains crucial. If the MOUs apply, they imply a contract with the District that includes administrative procedures, but state law cannot be bypassed by such contracts. The McFall court upheld additional due process protections derived from these administrative procedures, suggesting they are permissible under California law. Notably, a property interest can exist independent of a contract, as established in Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. and Roth, where even probationary employees may have property interests. Property interests can emerge from various sources, including institutional rules and policies, as seen in Perry v. Sindermann.
The plaintiffs argue that their property interests stem from the San Diego School District's Administrative Procedures and the MOUs, but significant factual issues must be addressed to ascertain their applicability. The plaintiffs' entitlement to due process under these procedures hinges on whether their demotions were performance-based, a fact that is disputed. Additionally, there are questions regarding the continuity of due process guarantees established in the 1992 MOU in light of the 1995 MOU's silence on the issue. Board member testimonies counter the notion that these guarantees were discarded post-1995, and the 1992 MOU stipulates that any modifications must be mutually agreed upon.
Due to these factual disputes concerning the basis of the plaintiffs' demotions and the status of due process guarantees following the 1995 MOU, the district court's denial of summary judgment was appropriate. The complexity of the relationship between statutes, local legislation, and contracts does not negate the clarity of a property interest. Therefore, the case should proceed to resolve whether the plaintiffs' reassignments were performance-based and thus constituted demotions under the Administrative Procedures. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
