United States v. John Gammarano

Citations: 321 F.3d 311; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3436; 2003 WL 470241Docket: 02-1499

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; February 25, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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John Gammarano appealed two rulings from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York regarding his supervised release. The court decided that Gammarano's incarceration for violating the conditions of his supervised release related to one conviction did not terminate his concurrent supervised release stemming from a separate conviction. Additionally, his motion to terminate the remaining term of supervised release was denied. 

Gammarano had pleaded guilty to extortion and tax violations in 1995, receiving a concurrent sentence of fifty-one months imprisonment and three years of supervised release, which ran alongside a separate Louisiana conviction for racketeering. After being released from prison on January 12, 2000, he began serving his supervised release. 

In July 2000, he was reported for submitting false employment and income reports, leading to a violation hearing. The judge only referenced the New York conviction during this hearing. On October 27, 2000, the judge revoked Gammarano's supervised release based solely on the New York conviction and sentenced him to eighteen months imprisonment. Gammarano began serving this sentence in December 2000 and was released in March 2002.

Upon his release, Gammarano was instructed to report to probation to begin serving his remaining supervised release from the Louisiana conviction. He subsequently filed a motion to terminate his remaining supervision, claiming that the revocation of his New York supervised release automatically terminated both terms, but this motion was denied. The appeals court affirmed the lower court's rulings.

On June 28, 2002, Judge Johnson ruled that the revocation of Gammarano's supervised release for his New York conviction did not affect the supervised release associated with his Louisiana conviction. He noted that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), a term of supervised release is paused during imprisonment for other crimes unless the imprisonment is less than 30 consecutive days, leaving Gammarano with twenty-five months of supervised release remaining for the Louisiana sentence. The court acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) allows for the termination of supervised release after one year, provided the court finds it warranted by the defendant's conduct and the interest of justice. 

The court scheduled a hearing to consider modifying or terminating Gammarano's supervised release. After the hearing on July 17, 2002, the court denied his motion to terminate the remaining supervision on August 8, 2002, stating that his request was not justified by his conduct or the interests of justice. Gammarano subsequently appealed this decision, arguing that the revocation of his New York supervised release should also terminate the Louisiana term, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) which mandates concurrent service of supervised release terms. 

The court rejected Gammarano's argument, clarifying that the revocation of one supervised release term does not automatically terminate another concurrent term, as no statute supports this interpretation. Thus, the District Court correctly concluded that Gammarano retained a twenty-five month supervised release period for the Louisiana conviction following his release from custody on March 25, 2002.

Gammarano contends that the District Court erred by not granting an early termination of his supervised release related to a Louisiana case, arguing that the court abused its discretion. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), a court can terminate supervised release after one year, provided it considers the factors in § 3553(a)(1)-(7) and acts in the interest of justice. Gammarano asserts the District Court failed to explicitly state it had considered these factors in its August 8, 2002 order denying his motion. However, it is established that district courts need not make detailed findings on each factor, but a general acknowledgment of consideration is sufficient. The District Court’s June 28, 2002 memorandum recognized the necessity of considering these factors and scheduled a hearing for this purpose. The transcript from the July 17, 2002 hearing indicates the court appropriately evaluated the relevant factors before denying the motion. Gammarano further argues that even a proper consideration of the factors still amounted to an abuse of discretion in denying his request; however, this claim is found to lack merit, as he is a member of the Gambino Crime Family with serious convictions and a history of violating supervision conditions. Consequently, the District Court's denial of his motion is affirmed.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) outlines the factors a court must consider when imposing a sentence. The sentence should be sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the statutory purposes. Key considerations include: 

1. The nature and circumstances of the offense, along with the defendant's history and characteristics.
2. The necessity of the sentence to:
   - Reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and serve as just punishment.
   - Provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.
   - Protect the public from further crimes by the defendant.
   - Offer the defendant necessary educational, vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment effectively.
3. The types of sentences available.
4. The sentencing range established by the Sentencing Commission for the specific offense and defendant category or relevant guidelines for probation violations.
5. Any pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission effective at the time of sentencing.
6. The need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentences among similarly situated defendants.
7. The requirement to provide restitution to victims of the offense.