Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 3, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
Johannes Weber appeals his jury conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, asserting three main arguments: (1) at the time he left a threatening voicemail for a federal judge, no judicial proceeding was pending; (2) the government failed to prove Weber had the intent to obstruct justice or that his threat was related to a pending judicial proceeding; and (3) the district court incorrectly sentenced him under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 for obstruction instead of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4 for impeding a federal officer. The court, with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirmed the conviction.
Weber had a prior conviction for wire fraud and was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison, followed by supervised release, which he violated by failing to report to the U.S. Probation Office (USPO) after his release in 1997. An arrest warrant was issued for him due to his failure to comply with supervised release conditions. During his international travels, Weber made multiple calls to the arresting officer and the USPO, discussing the outstanding warrant. In December 2000, he left a derogatory voicemail for a probation officer and later, on February 10, 2001, left another voicemail that included allegations of obstruction against the officer involved in his case. This latter message served as the basis for his conviction.
Frank Powers allegedly pressured the speaker to cooperate with the government, which he refused. In an emotional outburst, the speaker threatened violent actions, including bombing an embassy in Holland and killing a federal judge, citing anger over Powers' actions and lack of communication regarding ongoing matters. On February 22, 2001, a grand jury in Alaska indicted him for threatening an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. 2332(a)(2) and obstructing justice under 18 U.S.C. 1503. Following an arrest warrant issued by Judge Singleton, he was extradited from New Zealand on March 15, 2001, and transferred to the District of Alaska. The terrorism charge was dismissed, but after a two-day trial, he was convicted of obstructing justice and sentenced to eight-four months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, with an additional twenty-four months for violating prior supervised release conditions.
The legal framework under 18 U.S.C. 1503 outlines that one can be charged for obstructing justice if there is a pending judicial proceeding. Case law indicates that a judicial proceeding is considered pending even during appeals, with certain timelines determining when a proceeding is no longer active. In this case, the petition to revoke Weber's supervised release and the issuance of a warrant constituted a revival of the proceedings that were pending at the time he made his threats against Judge Singleton.
The issuance of a warrant led to Weber's court appearance to address charges, culminating in a revocation hearing that resulted in the revocation of his supervised release. This process satisfies the criteria for Weber's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, as established in relevant case law, including Johnson v. United States and others, which affirm that sanctions from revocation are part of the penalty for the original offense. The sufficiency of evidence is reviewed de novo, with the standard that a rational fact-finder could determine the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Since Weber did not seek acquittal, his claims regarding evidence sufficiency are assessed for plain error. He argues that the evidence is inadequate to demonstrate the necessary intent to obstruct justice and the connection between his actions and the pending judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court has clarified that the accused must intend to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings, requiring a "nexus" showing a relationship in time, causation, or logic to the proceedings. A successful attempt is not needed; the intention to interfere suffices, but lack of knowledge about the potential impact on the proceedings negates intent. Based on the jury's evidence, a rational trier of fact could infer that Weber intended to obstruct his arrest and revocation proceedings, demonstrating a relevant relationship to these judicial actions.
The government provided evidence indicating that Weber left a voice mail threatening to murder the judge who issued an arrest warrant for revoking his supervised release. This threat was made while Weber was aware of the warrant and referenced obstruction related to his case. The voice mail specifically mentioned individuals associated with Weber and was part of a broader pattern of communication regarding his legal situation, including a prior message about a plea agreement. The threat was deemed likely to influence the revocation proceedings due to potential fear for the judge's safety.
The legal standard for reviewing the application of sentencing guidelines is de novo. Weber contended that the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. 2J1.2, arguing his actions were more akin to impeding a federal officer than obstructing justice. He cited the Fulbright case, which emphasized that non-mandatory guidelines should be applied based on the nature of the offense in atypical cases. However, unlike Fulbright, Weber was convicted of obstructing justice, not impeding a federal officer, making the precedent inapplicable. The court concluded that Weber's conduct did not present an atypical case, affirming the application of U.S.S.G. 2J1.2.
The court ultimately found that (1) Weber's revocation proceeding was active as required by 1503; (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish Weber's intent to obstruct justice; and (3) the application of U.S.S.G. 2J1.2 was correct. Therefore, Weber's conviction and sentence were affirmed.
