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David Rem v. United States Bureau of Prisons
Citations: 320 F.3d 791; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2865; 2003 WL 346211Docket: 01-2117
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 18, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
David Rem, having pleaded guilty in 1991 to possession with intent to distribute cocaine, was sentenced to 151 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Near the end of his sentence, he completed a substance abuse treatment program that qualified him for early release under 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B). In October 2000, Rem filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 4042(b), which mandates written notification to state and local law enforcement prior to the release of individuals convicted of drug trafficking or violent crimes. He argued that the statute should not apply to him, claiming Congress did not intend it for those qualifying for early release, asserting his conviction wasn't covered, and contending the notification requirement violated constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), confirming the statute's applicability and its constitutionality. Rem was released in May 2001, with the BOP notifying law enforcement agencies as required. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that Rem's appeal was not moot since he remained subject to the statute during his supervised release. The court upheld that the plain language of 4042(b) applies to individuals convicted of drug trafficking, specifically referencing Rem's felony conviction under the Controlled Substances Act. Section 4042(b) does not provide exceptions for offenders eligible for early release, nonviolent drug trafficking offenses, or those not involving a firearm. Congress's definition of drug trafficking in relation to firearms does not imply that such offenses must involve a firearm for 4042(b) to apply. Rem's claim that 4042(b) violates procedural due process fails because he lacks a protected liberty interest in his reputation or classification as a drug trafficker, as established in relevant case law. Additionally, Rem's assertion that 4042(b) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is unpersuasive; the statute's purpose and effect are regulatory rather than punitive, aimed at notifying law enforcement of drug trafficker releases, which aligns with public safety and crime prevention goals. Lastly, Rem's Equal Protection Clause argument is also unsuccessful, as convicted drug traffickers are not considered a suspect class, and the statute serves a legitimate government interest without infringing on fundamental rights. The district court's affirmation of the applicability and constitutionality of 4042(b) stands.