McGraw v. Furon Co.

Citations: 812 So. 2d 273; 2001 Ala. LEXIS 175; 2001 WL 527844Docket: 1991997

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; May 18, 2001; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The plaintiffs, represented by Bruce McGraw, appealed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Furon Company, following an incident in which McGraw sustained severe injuries leading to the amputation of his right hand while operating a batch-off machine at Diamond Rubber Products Company. McGraw initially filed the lawsuit against the machine's manufacturer and others on May 18, 1995, later amending the complaint to include Furon. Furon filed for summary judgment, which was granted in a non-final order on May 10, 1999, and finalized on June 7, 2000, after settling with the remaining defendants.

The batch-off machine, originally manufactured by Akron Standard Division of Eagle Picher, Inc., was sold to Reeves Rubber Company in 1978, which later merged with Furon. After being relocated to Furon’s plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma, the machine was never used and was eventually deemed scrap. Gene Fulbright of Furon indicated that discarded equipment was free for anyone to take. The machine was subsequently acquired by Mike Dyer, who did not repair it before selling it to Diamond, where it was connected to electrical service and used without modifications.

McGraw alleged that the batch-off machine was defective and unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate guarding and the removal of a safety cable. His claims against Furon included liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), negligent failure to provide safety features, and negligent failure to warn users of the machine's dangers. The court noted that under AEMLD, liability applies to sellers in the business of selling products. Furon demonstrated it was not in the business of selling such machines, shifting the burden to McGraw to provide substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Evidence is considered 'substantial' if it has sufficient weight and quality for fair-minded individuals to reasonably infer the existence of the fact being proved. McGraw failed to provide substantial evidence that Furon is in the business of selling batch-off machines. Although Furon processes used rubber and has occasionally sold used rubber machines, this does not indicate that it regularly engages in such sales, which negates liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD).

McGraw also claims Furon is liable for negligence in failing to provide adequate safety features. This claim is based on an affidavit from John Bordos, a design draftsman, which indicates that Reeves, the company installing the machine, was responsible for ensuring safety during installation. Since Reeves assumed this duty and McGraw was injured after the machine was removed from Reeves' system, Furon did not owe McGraw a duty of care.

Furthermore, McGraw's argument that Furon had a duty to warn users of the machine's dangers is unsupported. He cites a letter from the manufacturer that merely stated Furon was responsible for safety considerations, but this letter does not indicate that Furon knew or should have known of any defects. Previous case law cited by McGraw is distinguished from this case as it involved evidence of prior injuries and the defendant's knowledge of dangerous conditions.

Ultimately, the trial court's decision to grant Furon's motion for summary judgment is affirmed, and McGraw's wife's claim for loss of consortium does not present a separate issue for appeal.