Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; November 20, 2001; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing plaintiff Linda Kay Welch's claims for punitive and other nonpecuniary damages related to the drowning of her partner, Byron Joseph Boswell, while working on a vessel owned by Fugro Geosciences, Inc. The court found that under general maritime law, which preempts Louisiana state law, punitive and nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable for the deaths of seamen or longshoremen in state waters. The case involved the sinking of a modified airboat in navigable waters, where Welch, as tutrix for their minor child, claimed negligence and unseaworthiness against Fugro and others. The defendants denied liability, asserting that any damages were solely due to Boswell's own negligence or that of unrelated parties. After the trial court's ruling on May 26, 1999, dismissing the claims with prejudice, Welch appealed, arguing that the court erred in ruling that nonpecuniary damages could not be recovered under her claims.
Appellate courts review summary judgments using a de novo standard, applying the same criteria as trial courts (Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd.; Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University). Maritime actions in state courts are primarily governed by federal maritime law, which state courts must apply consistently with federal standards (Miller v. American Dredging Co.; Prejean v. Industrial Cleanup, Inc.). While state law may apply to local maritime concerns, it cannot conflict with substantive maritime law.
The plaintiff seeks nonpecuniary damages based on precedents from Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. and Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, both concerning longshoremen's deaths in state waters. Defendants dispute the plaintiff's claim that the deceased, Mr. Boswell, was a longshoreman, asserting he was a seaman. Fugro contends that even if Boswell were deemed a longshoreman, the cited cases do not support recovery for nonpecuniary damages.
Moragne recognized a wrongful death cause of action under general maritime law for longshoremen in territorial waters, emphasizing the need for uniform application of federal policies. Gaudet involved a longshoreman's widow who pursued a wrongful death claim after her husband’s prior injury claim. The court ultimately affirmed that Moragne allowed for compensable claims for loss of society, aligning maritime wrongful-death remedies with broader state statutes and reflecting a humanitarian policy within maritime law.
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that the holding in Gaudet is limited to territorial waters and applies only to longshoremen. The court noted that the Jones Act, unlike the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), does not restrict damages to specific types, but it limits recoveries to pecuniary losses for seamen's wrongful death due to negligence. The court referenced the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), indicating that Congress must have intended to incorporate its pecuniary damage limitation when enacting the Jones Act.
The decision emphasized that there is no recovery for loss of society in Jones Act cases, aligning with established law and maintaining uniformity in wrongful death claims for seamen under various maritime statutes. The ruling addressed a previous inconsistency acknowledged in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, asserting that loss of society damages are unavailable for wrongful deaths of Jones Act seamen, regardless of the jurisdiction.
Additionally, the court examined the availability of non-pecuniary damages for longshoremen, concluding that similar principles apply as with seamen. In Robertson v. Arco Oil and Gas Company, it was determined that dependents of longshoremen cannot recover non-pecuniary damages, as no alternative means for such recovery exists under general maritime law.
Section 905(b) actions are recognized as maritime negligence claims, akin to those of ship passengers or visitors. Dependents of longshoremen injured on the outer continental shelf are not entitled to recover damages for loss of consortium under general maritime law, as doing so would create inconsistency with existing precedents that deny similar recoveries for the spouses of injured seamen. The principle of uniformity in maritime law is emphasized, asserting that federal admiralty law should operate uniformly across the nation. The court references the case of Vedros, which followed federal decisions in applying the Miles ruling that limits nonpecuniary damages. The 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act further restrict claims for nonpecuniary loss, reflecting a shift away from allowing such recoveries. The ruling reinforces that nonpecuniary damages for a longshoreman’s death or injury in territorial waters cannot be claimed, as it contradicts the trend against Gaudet and aligns with the Supreme Court's stance in Moragne on maintaining uniformity in maritime law.
Ms. Welch claimed a right to punitive damages under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.3; however, this law is preempted by federal maritime law in this case. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed, with costs assessed against the plaintiffs-appellants. Judge Pettigrew dissents with reasons provided. The rig involved collected soil samples, and co-plaintiff Lisa Periera, acting on behalf of Brandon Boswell and as personal representative of Byron Joseph Boswell, settled with the defendants and is not part of the appeal. Marshland Marine and XYZ Insurance Company, also defendants, are excluded from the appeal. Prior to the 1999 amendment of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915(B), such agreements were permissible. Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), individuals injured due to vessel negligence may sue the vessel as a third party, with the employer not liable for damages, and any contrary agreements deemed void. If the injured party was employed for stevedoring services, they cannot pursue action against the vessel for injuries caused by stevedoring personnel. Similarly, if employed in shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services, actions against the employer or its employees are prohibited. The vessel's liability is not based on seaworthiness warranties at the time of injury, and remedies provided in this section are exclusive. Summary judgments aim to resolve legal issues, and while the trial court did not explicitly determine the plaintiff’s longshoreman status, it is assumed that the parties agree on this fact; otherwise, the opinion would be advisory on unestablished facts.
