Narvis G. Nonnette v. Larry Small R. Schelke E. Castro D. Johnson M.A. Corbin J. Builtman

Citations: 316 F.3d 872; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12402; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 14629; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26809; 2002 WL 31873386Docket: 00-55702

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 26, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Narvis Nonnette filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials from Calipatria State Prison, claiming violations of his constitutional rights due to (1) miscalculation of his prison sentence and (2) unjust revocation of 360 days of good-time credits, along with 100 days of administrative segregation, following a disciplinary hearing that lacked supporting evidence. The district court dismissed the miscalculation claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the disciplinary claim, ruling that Nonnette's claims were effectively challenges to the legitimacy of his confinement decisions, which had not been overturned. As a state prisoner, he was precluded from pursuing a § 1983 action according to the precedent set in Heck v. Humphrey.

On appeal, Nonnette argued that he had completed his sentence, including the additional year imposed by the disciplinary decision, and therefore his challenge to the disciplinary proceeding should be allowed as moot, referencing Spencer v. Kemna. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Nonnette, vacating the district court's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. The background details indicated that the disciplinary action stemmed from a July 1998 incident where Nonnette allegedly stabbed another inmate, resulting in the loss of good-time credits and administrative segregation. Initially, the district court dismissed two of Nonnette's claims for failing to state a claim, citing the need to pursue habeas corpus first, but later allowed the third claim to proceed until it was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment due to the disciplinary ruling still being in effect.

Both parties focus their arguments on the summary judgment ruling, which also pertains to the dismissals of the initial claims. A de novo review is conducted for both summary judgments and dismissals for failure to state a claim. For over thirty years, state prisoners seeking injunctive relief regarding good-time credits must use habeas corpus rather than § 1983. Although Nonnette seeks damages, the precedent set in Heck v. Humphrey establishes that such claims cannot proceed under § 1983 if they imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless the conviction has been invalidated by specific means. The Supreme Court has ruled that this applies to claims regarding the deprivation of good-time credits if the alleged violation would imply invalidity.

Nonnette's case is similar to Heck and Edwards, as he seeks damages for the unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, which could imply the invalidity of the revocation. However, a critical distinction exists: following the district court's decision, Nonnette was released and is now on parole. Thus, a habeas corpus petition would be moot since validating his disciplinary proceedings would not affect his incarceration or parole status.

The Supreme Court's ruling in Spencer v. Kemna indicates that while a released prisoner can challenge their conviction in habeas corpus due to lasting collateral consequences, no such consequences arise from parole violation incarceration. Therefore, Nonnette's potential habeas corpus petition concerning his good-time credits and administrative segregation would also be moot, as he has served the entirety of the incarceration in question.

The central issue in this appeal is whether the mootness of a habeas corpus remedy allows Nonnette to pursue a § 1983 action for damages, despite that claim potentially implying the invalidity of the disciplinary proceeding that revoked his good-time credits. The court aligns with the Second and Seventh Circuits in concluding that a § 1983 claim can proceed under these circumstances, despite ambiguities in the precedent set by Heck v. Humphrey. 

Heck suggests that a prior overturning of a conviction is generally necessary for a § 1983 action that implies the conviction's invalidity; however, Heck involved a prisoner still incarcerated, whereas Spencer dealt with a released prisoner whose habeas petition was deemed moot due to the completion of his sentence. Justice Scalia's opinion in Spencer implied that a § 1983 action should not always be available, but this was contested by concurring Justices, including Justice Souter, who argued that Heck did not bar a § 1983 claim for a released prisoner in circumstances similar to Spencer's.

The court concludes that Heck does not prevent Nonnette's § 1983 action, consistent with the views expressed in Spencer and the reasoning of the Second and Seventh Circuits. At the time of the district court's decision, Nonnette was still incarcerated, and thus the court found no error in that ruling based on the availability of habeas corpus to challenge the disciplinary action. The State's argument for affirming the district court's judgment is rejected, as this would leave Nonnette without any potential remedy for his constitutional claims after his release on parole.

The Supreme Court has established that appellate courts possess the authority to correct errors and to take actions necessary for justice, considering any changes in fact or law since the original judgment. Citing Patterson v. Alabama, it affirms this principle with reference to 28 U.S.C. § 2106, allowing for appropriate relief based on circumstances. In this case, the court vacates the district court's judgment and allows Nonnette to proceed with his § 1983 claims. The validity of the dismissals related to Nonnette's miscalculation claims is similarly affected by these considerations, leading to their vacatur and remand for further proceedings.

Nonnette argues that his challenge to 100 days of administrative segregation should not be subject to the Heck doctrine, as it addresses conditions rather than the duration of confinement. While the State asserts Nonnette waived this argument by not raising it in the district court, the court decides it need not address this due to its ruling that Heck does not bar Nonnette's claims. It also agrees with the State that Nonnette did not challenge the conditions of his administrative segregation in the district court. However, the court dismisses the notion that he waived his claim regarding the due process violation stemming from a lack of evidence in the disciplinary hearing. Consequently, the judgment dismissing Nonnette's claims is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The disciplinary action against Nonnette initially imposed a 15-month term in a segregated housing unit, later suspended after he served 100 days of administrative segregation. Nonnette exhausted his prison administrative remedies, fulfilling the requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. A prisoner seeking damages for unconstitutional procedures, without challenging the validity of the resulting loss of good-time credits, can pursue a § 1983 claim without first invalidating the disciplinary proceeding. The State does not argue that invalidation of Nonnette's disciplinary proceeding would affect his parole term; it contends he remains 'in custody' while on parole, making him eligible for habeas relief. However, the relevant barrier to habeas relief is the 'case or controversy' requirement, which could render Nonnette's claims moot if brought as a habeas corpus proceeding. The court clarifies that if the Heck precedent barred Nonnette's action, it could not consider it in light of Spencer, but concludes that Heck does not control this case. It acknowledges Nonnette's release from incarceration distinguishes his situation from that in Cunningham v. Gates, where the plaintiff's civil suit could impugn an ongoing conviction. The court emphasizes that its decision is unlikely to encourage prisoners to delay challenges to good-time credit losses, as the prospect of release incentivizes timely action. The ruling specifically pertains to former prisoners contesting administrative actions related to good-time credits and parole revocation, while the ability to petition for habeas corpus remains intact for those challenging their underlying convictions or sentences.