Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; January 15, 2003; Federal Appellate Court
On December 17, 1994, Eric Scott Patterson was at home with his sick three-year-old daughter, Lacey. He called neighbor Curtis Jack Taylor for Children's Tylenol, which Taylor delivered at 4:45 p.m. Taylor stayed until 9:30 p.m. Patterson’s wife, Lisa, returned around 11:00 p.m. Later, Patterson gave Lacey Pedialyte. Around 3:30 a.m., they noticed Lacey moaning and breathing heavily. They called for emergency assistance at 4:11 a.m., but by the time EMTs arrived, she was not breathing. Lacey was pronounced dead at the hospital at 5:01 a.m., with an autopsy revealing she died from peritonitis due to a ruptured small bowel, alongside multiple contusions and a distended abdomen.
The state of Ohio indicted Patterson for murder, alleging he abused Lacey. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based on child endangering and sentenced to 10 to 25 years in prison. After failing to appeal his conviction in Ohio courts, Patterson filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that a defective jury instruction violated his due process rights and that there was insufficient evidence for his conviction. The district court dismissed his petition, deeming his claims meritless.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, granting Patterson a conditional writ of habeas corpus, which would result in his release unless Ohio initiated a new trial within 180 days. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Patterson frequently checked on Lacey's condition throughout the evening. Taylor left the house at 9:30 p.m. and later called Patterson between 10:15 and 10:30 p.m. to inquire about Lacey, who had vomited. When Lisa Patterson returned home around 11:00 p.m., Lacey, who reported stomach pain, requested a soft drink. Patterson later called Taylor at 11:45 p.m. to ask about purchasing Pedialyte for Lacey; Taylor volunteered to find a store that stocked it. After locating a store, he informed Patterson, and Lisa purchased the Pedialyte, which Lacey consumed before falling asleep.
At around 1:00 a.m. on December 18, 1994, Taylor checked in again, and Lisa expressed concern but believed Lacey would be okay. The Pattersons stayed awake with Lacey until 3:30 a.m., when they went to bed. They were alerted by Lacey's moaning shortly after and found her in distress with a hard stomach. By approximately 3:50 a.m., they informed Taylor of Lacey's deteriorating condition, prompting Taylor to advise them to call for emergency assistance. Lisa called for help at 4:11 a.m., stating Lacey was unconscious. EMT Brenda Fay Forker arrived at 4:21 a.m., but despite attempts at CPR, Lacey could not be resuscitated.
Two emergency squads responded, with efforts to establish an airway proving unsuccessful. Upon arrival at Good Samaritan Hospital, Lacey was described as 'lifeless' and 'blue.' Nurse Mary Katherine McGuire noted multiple bruises on Lacey's body in various stages of healing, indicating they were not fresh injuries.
Attempts to resuscitate Lacey were ongoing when McGuire sought a case history from Patterson, who disclosed that Lacey had fallen down the stairs two weeks prior and had vomited the previous Saturday, for which he had given her Tylenol. After resuscitation failed, Lacey was pronounced dead at 5:01 a.m. Captain Sims questioned Patterson about the circumstances of her death. Initially reluctant, Patterson eventually agreed to talk but denied Lacey had any bruises until shown photographs, which visibly upset him.
Sheriff Bob Stephenson later spoke with Lisa Patterson in the hospital waiting room. She speculated that Lacey's bruises might be from CPR and mentioned not seeing bruises on Lacey's torso two days prior. Lisa recounted that Lacey had fallen down the stairs a week earlier and had injured her eye while playing.
Dr. Patrick M. Fardal conducted Lacey's autopsy on December 19, 1994, observing multiple bruises on her body, including recent ones on her abdomen. An internal examination found injuries to Lacey's jejunum caused by blunt force trauma, which could have initiated peritonitis leading to her death. Dr. Fardal estimated that the trauma occurred 24 to 36 hours before her death and indicated that the degree of force required for such injuries was moderate to severe, noting that bowel injuries are typically not linked to falls down stairs, although other sources of trauma could not be ruled out.
Dr. Fardal testified that various factors could cause blunt force injuries, indicating that Lacey's initial injury might not have been inflicted by another person. He detailed that Lacey suffered from a bowel perforation after the initial trauma, which could lead to survival for only six to eight hours. He clarified that while a second trauma could cause the perforation, it was also possible that the bowel weakened by prior trauma led to the perforation independently.
Patterson was indicted for murder under Ohio law, while his wife faced felony child endangerment charges. After a joint trial, Patterson was convicted of involuntary manslaughter due to child endangering and sentenced to 10 to 25 years, while Lisa received a six-month misdemeanor sentence. Patterson appealed, arguing due process violations regarding the exclusion of expert testimony and insufficient evidence; the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision. He then sought to reopen his appeal on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding jury instructions on causation, but the Ohio Court of Appeals denied this application. The Ohio Supreme Court also denied Patterson's appeal. Subsequently, he filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing.
Patterson filed a timely appeal, during which the district court granted a certificate of appealability concerning whether his due process rights were violated due to the omission of the proximate cause element in the jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on child endangerment. Additionally, the court certified another issue regarding the sufficiency of evidence presented by the prosecution to support the conviction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs Patterson's case, as his habeas corpus petition was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 post-AEDPA's effective date. Under § 2254(d), a federal court can grant habeas relief only if the state court's adjudication was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or if it was based on an unreasonable factual determination.
All of Patterson's claims fall under the 'contrary to' clause of § 2254(d)(1), which allows relief if a state court's conclusion contradicts that of the Supreme Court on a legal question or decides a case differently on materially indistinguishable facts. The 'unreasonable application' clause provides additional grounds for relief if the state court correctly identifies a legal principle but applies it unreasonably or refuses to extend it to a new context.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that a federal court must assess whether a state court’s application of federal law was objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Patterson argues that the omission of the proximate cause element in the jury instructions violated his due process rights as he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, a claim the state contends is both procedurally defaulted and without merit.
Patterson's claim is examined for procedural default, which bars federal court review of state court judgments based on independent and adequate state-law grounds. A procedural default precludes federal habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice or shows that ignoring the federal claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To assess procedural default, the district court must determine: (1) whether a relevant state procedural rule exists; (2) if the petitioner failed to comply with that rule; (3) whether the state court applied the rule in rejecting the claim; and (4) if the rule is an adequate and independent basis for denial of relief. The relevant state rule must be firmly established and regularly followed. Additionally, a procedural default does not bar federal consideration unless the last state court clearly states that its ruling is based on a procedural bar. In this case, Patterson's trial attorney did not object to the jury instructions, nor did the direct appeal address this issue. After hiring new counsel, Patterson raised the jury instruction matter in a subsequent appeal, arguing the prosecution needed to prove a causal link between the child’s death and the child endangering offense. The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed the jury instructions and determined they adequately addressed causation and foreseeability, concluding there was no error in the trial court's instructions.
The Ohio Court of Appeals denied Patterson's application to reopen his appeal without clearly stating that its decision was based on a procedural bar, indicating the judgment was based on a merits evaluation of his claims. The court did not address Patterson's failure to object to jury instructions during the trial, leading to the conclusion that he is not procedurally barred from pursuing his claim. The merits of involuntary manslaughter in Ohio are defined under Ohio Revised Code 2903.04(A) as causing the death of another or unlawfully terminating a pregnancy as a proximate result of committing or attempting a felony. The term "proximate result" refines the concept of causation, requiring that the death be a natural and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions. The trial court's jury instructions, which are based on the oral instructions provided during the trial, indicated that if the jury could not agree on a murder verdict, they should deliberate on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense. The trial court clarified that the distinction between murder and involuntary manslaughter lies in the absence of intent to cause death. For Patterson to be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on aggravated assault, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused Lacey Patterson's death as a proximate result of committing aggravated assault on December 18, 1994, in Muskingum County, Ohio.
The trial court outlined the legal definitions and responsibilities regarding the offense of aggravated assault and its relationship to the charges against the Defendant, Eric Scott Patterson. It clarified that "cause" is a critical element, defined as an act or failure to act that directly produces death in a natural and continuous sequence. The Defendant is accountable not only for the immediate results of their actions but also for the natural and foreseeable consequences that follow. A death is linked to an act if it is produced directly by that act without which it would not have occurred, and "proximate result" refers to a death that is foreseeably caused by the act.
The court instructed the jury that if they found the Defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on aggravated assault, or if they could not agree on a verdict for that charge, they should deliberate on whether the State proved the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter based on child endangering. To convict Patterson of endangering children, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he recklessly abused Lacey Patterson on December 18, 1994, in Muskingum County, Ohio. "Abuse" encompasses any act causing physical or mental injury that threatens the child's health or welfare, and recklessness is defined as a heedless disregard for known risks. A "substantial risk" indicates a strong possibility of harm.
The instructions for involuntary manslaughter based on child endangering differ from those concerning aggravated assault by not requiring a finding that Patterson's actions were the proximate cause of Lacey's death. Consequently, the jury could convict him of child endangerment without establishing that the "reckless abuse" directly caused her death. If the jury found him not guilty of child endangering or could not reach a verdict, they were to continue deliberating on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter based on assault.
To convict Eric Scott Patterson of assault, the trial court required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to Lacey Patterson on December 18, 1994, in Muskingum County, Ohio. The court defined "knowingly" and emphasized that causation is a critical element of the offense, indicating that Patterson's actions or inactions must have directly produced Lacey's death. The court clarified that Patterson's responsibility extends beyond immediate consequences to include natural and foreseeable results of his conduct. Physical harm encompasses any injury or physiological impairment, regardless of severity or duration. If the jury found Patterson guilty of assault and established that his unlawful act proximately caused Lacey's death, they were instructed to convict him of involuntary manslaughter, even without any intention to cause her death.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed Patterson's appeal concerning jury instructions but deemed them "sufficiently detailed" to support his conviction. This conclusion was based on the inclusion of causation elements in the instructions for other crimes charged but not resulting in conviction. Nonetheless, the appellate court failed to acknowledge the Supreme Court's mandate that a jury must determine every element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in United States v. Gaudin. The appellate court's focus on legal rather than factual determinations meant that the "unreasonable application" standard under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) was not applicable. Instead, the analysis was guided by whether the appellate court's decision contradicted established federal law, as defined by the Supreme Court. A decision is deemed "contrary" if it applies a conflicting rule or reaches a different outcome based on materially indistinguishable facts from a Supreme Court ruling.
In Gaudin, the defendant faced charges for making false statements on HUD loan documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The trial court improperly instructed the jury that materiality, a required element of the crime, was a matter for the court's decision rather than the jury's. The Supreme Court ruled that this violated the defendant's constitutional rights, emphasizing that convictions must rely on a jury determination of guilt for every element beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, the Ohio Court of Appeals incorrectly deemed the jury instructions "sufficiently detailed" based on the correct instruction of other charges, thereby misapplying the standard set by Gaudin.
In the appeal, the state admitted to an error in the jury instructions related to involuntary manslaughter but argued it was harmless. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant cannot be convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all crime elements. However, the Supreme Court clarified that omitting an element does not automatically invalidate the trial's fairness unless the omission is not a harmless error. This principle applies to cases where the jury was not instructed on an element, allowing for harmless-error review.
In federal habeas corpus review, the omission of an essential element is not considered harmless if there is significant uncertainty regarding its impact on the jury's verdict. The state argues that the omission of proximate cause was harmless because earlier jury instructions clarified the distinction between murder and involuntary manslaughter and included proximate cause in other manslaughter instructions. However, these instructions were deemed insufficient, as the general distinction mentioned does not explicitly state that lack of intent to kill is the sole difference. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility of other distinctions between the offenses.
Moreover, evidence indicates that the jury was confused about the elements of involuntary manslaughter, as they requested clarification during deliberations. Instead of addressing their confusion, the trial court directed them back to the confusing instructions. The state’s assertion that proximate cause was adequately included in nearby jury instructions does not hold, as the omission in the specific charge of involuntary manslaughter based on child endangering undermines clarity. Overall, the instructions may have exacerbated the jury's confusion regarding the necessary elements of the charges.
The jury's consideration was likely influenced by the absence of the proximate-result element, creating a significant distinction between involuntary manslaughter charges based on child endangering versus those based on aggravated or simple assault. The court found that the omission of this element, within the overall context of jury instructions, did not mitigate the trial court's error or reduce potential juror confusion. Concerns were raised regarding the jury's understanding of involuntary manslaughter. Despite acknowledging that an erroneous instruction could be deemed harmless if the omitted element was uncontested and overwhelmingly supported by evidence, the court determined that this was not the case, as the defendant, Patterson, contested the cause of the victim's injuries, with no overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Consequently, the court expressed "grave doubt" about the harmlessness of the trial court's omission and reversed the district court's judgment. The decision regarding the sufficiency of evidence to support Patterson's conviction was deemed unnecessary to address, given the flawed jury instructions. The jury, operating under incorrect guidance, did not consider whether Patterson could be guilty of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter based on simple assault. Thus, the court granted Patterson a conditional writ of habeas corpus for his release unless the state of Ohio initiates a new trial within 180 days, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
