State v. Coston

Citations: 800 So. 2d 907; 2001 La. App. LEXIS 2360; 2001 WL 1359781Docket: No. 2000-KA-1132

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; September 5, 2001; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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On December 14, 1998, Stanley Coston was charged by the State with two counts of armed robbery, one count of burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and two counts of first-degree robbery. Coston pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 16, 1998. On January 11, 2000, the burglary charge was severed from the other counts. A jury convicted him of four counts of first-degree robbery on January 12, 2000. Subsequently, on February 7, 2000, the State filed a multiple bill of information, designating him as a third felony offender. The court sentenced him on March 10, 2000, to four years for all counts, to run concurrently and without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Following a hearing on the multiple bill on March 20, 2000, the court reclassified Coston as a second felony offender, set aside the previous sentences for counts three and four, and imposed a new sentence of forty years for these counts under La. R.S. 15:529.1, also to run concurrently and without parole, probation, or suspension. Coston subsequently changed his not guilty plea to burglary to an Alford plea and received a one-year sentence for that charge, also running concurrently.

The charges stemmed from five separate incidents. The first involved the armed robbery of Karla Zelaya on October 3, 1998. The assailant, later identified as Coston, approached her with a gun and stole her purse. The second incident on October 9, 1998, involved the burglary of Casey Valadie's home. The third incident on the same day involved Kathleen Costello, who was threatened by Coston while in her car; she ultimately surrendered cash but did not initially identify him in a photographic lineup, though she later did during a subsequent lineup.

On October 11, 1998, Michael Triay was robbed at gunpoint while securing his son in their car on Audubon Street; the assailant, who indicated he was armed, demanded money and fled on a bicycle after receiving cash from Mr. Triay. Mr. Triay provided a detailed description of the robber, including distinctive plaid underwear, which aided police investigations. Detective Louis Labat identified the defendant as a suspect, and Mr. Triay subsequently recognized him in a photographic lineup on October 15, 1998. 

Later that same night, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Nicole Farkouh was also robbed in her home, where she managed to give the assailant $23 before he fled when she asked to see his weapon. Ms. Farkouh later identified the defendant in a photographic lineup as well. 

At 4:30 a.m. on October 13, 1998, Officer Vernell Brown arrested the defendant near Chestnut and Upperline Streets after noticing he matched the description of a robbery suspect. Following his arrest, the defendant confessed to robbing Ms. Costello and to a burglary. A search warrant executed at his home resulted in the seizure of clothing items, including plaid underwear, which was identified by Mr. Triay. 

The State contests the trial court's decision to classify the defendant as a second felony offender instead of a third felony offender, arguing that the burden of proof rests on the State to demonstrate the defendant's prior felony and identity as the person convicted. This includes presenting witness testimony, fingerprint evidence, or photographs. If prior convictions stem from guilty pleas, the State must establish that the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights and knowingly waived them, as outlined in Boykin v. Alabama and further clarified in State v. Shelton.

The State has the initial burden to demonstrate the constitutionality of a defendant's guilty plea. Once met, the defendant must provide affirmative evidence of rights infringement or procedural irregularities. The State can establish the plea's constitutionality through a "perfect" transcript of the Boykin colloquy or, if using alternative documents, must have the trial court evaluate the evidence for compliance with the informed and voluntary plea requirement.

In this case, Officer Terry Bunch testified about matching the defendant’s fingerprints to those on an arrest register and examined documents related to the defendant’s guilty pleas in 1987 and 1994. The defendant contested the sufficiency of the 1987 documentation concerning Boykinization but conceded that the 1994 plea had no procedural issues. The State submitted a waiver of rights/guilty plea form, docket master, and minute entry for the 1987 plea, all indicating the defendant was represented by counsel, understood his rights, and voluntarily pled guilty. The guilty plea form was properly executed, and the minute entry confirmed the defendant's competency and voluntary nature of the plea.

The trial court's initial ruling that the evidence was insufficient to classify the defendant as a third offender was incorrect. The State's documentation shifted the burden to the defendant to demonstrate any rights infringement or procedural irregularity. The defendant's claim regarding the lack of proof of being advised of certain rights did not fulfill this burden. Ultimately, the State successfully proved that the defendant's plea was informed and voluntary.

The trial court incorrectly classified the defendant as a second felony offender, as the evidence presented supported a classification as a third felony offender. Consequently, the sentences related to counts three and four are vacated, and the case is remanded for appropriate sentencing proceedings. The defendant also raised an assignment of error regarding the joining of offenses for trial, arguing that the charges stemmed from five distinct incidents, which compromised his right to a fair trial. Under Louisiana law, offenses may be joined if they are similar or part of a common scheme, and the trial court has discretion to sever joined offenses if prejudice is shown. However, no motion to sever was filed in this case. The trial court could have ordered separate trials if it found potential prejudice, but generally, if the offenses are not complex and the jury is unlikely to be confused, severance is not necessary. The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate clear prejudice. In this instance, the defendant failed to establish such prejudice, as the charges of armed robbery and first-degree robbery are similar and could be tried together without confusing the jury.

Multiple offenses occurred in close proximity, both geographically and temporally, with victims clearly identifying the defendant through a photographic lineup and testifying about the incidents. Investigating officers meticulously documented each offense, and the defendant failed to present any evidence suggesting that the joint presentation of the crimes confused the jury or impeded the defense. There was also no indication that the offenses were joined to imply the defendant's criminal propensity, nor was there evidence of jury bias. The trial court acted within its discretion by not separating the offenses, especially since no motion to sever was filed.

In a subsequent assignment of error, the defendant contended that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion to suppress the identifications, claiming they were unduly suggestive and unreliable. The law requires the defendant to prove that an identification procedure was suggestive and created a likelihood of misidentification. An identification is considered unduly suggestive if it emphasizes the defendant. However, a suggestive identification can still be admissible if deemed reliable under the totality of circumstances. 

The reliability of an identification is assessed using a five-factor test established by the U.S. Supreme Court, which includes: the witness's opportunity to view the assailant, the witness's attention level, accuracy of prior descriptions, the witness's certainty, and the time elapsed between the crime and identification. The victims provided strong identifications due to the daylight conditions and their engagement with the assailant. Descriptions matched the defendant's characteristics and clothing found at his residence, and the victims expressed certainty in their identifications. The time between the offenses and identifications ranged from hours to nine days, with in-court identifications occurring 8 to 14 months later at a motions hearing and trial.

The defendant argues that his photograph in the lineup was improperly emphasized due to his head appearing larger and the lighter background compared to others, potentially influencing the victims’ identifications. Both Ms. Zelaya and Ms. Farkouh acknowledged these differences, yet testified their identifications were based on distinct features, particularly the defendant's eyes. Ms. Costello did not notice any discrepancies and recognized the defendant immediately. The court found the identifications reliable based on the totality of circumstances, ruling the defendant's claims meritless.

In his third assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court should have declared a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct, specifically concerning an inadmissible part of his confession. Mistrials are extreme remedies, granted only when substantial prejudice compromises a fair trial, a determination resting with the trial judge’s discretion. Before trial, the judge prohibited references to uncharged crimes. During testimony, the prosecutor mistakenly referenced a robbery, which he quickly corrected. The defendant claims this prejudiced him by implying a confession to the robbery in question. However, since the defendant did not object or request a mistrial at the time, the issue was not preserved for appeal. Even if it had been, the court found no evidence showing the jury was adversely affected, as the correction was prompt and unobtrusive. Thus, this assignment was also deemed without merit.

The defendant argues that his sentences for four counts of first-degree robbery are excessive. The court's prior ruling on the state's assignment regarding the defendant’s multiple offender status precludes further review of the excessive sentence issue for counts three and four. For counts one and five, the defendant faced a sentencing range of three to forty years without parole, probation, or suspension of the sentence, with the trial court imposing the maximum on both counts. Under Louisiana's Constitution, a sentence is deemed excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the crime or constitutes unnecessary suffering. A reviewing court evaluates whether the trial judge followed the sentencing guidelines in Article 894.1, which outlines the need for imprisonment. While the trial judge did not explicitly reference this article, non-compliance does not invalidate a sentence if there is a clear factual basis supporting it. A sentence will not be overturned for excessiveness if the record justifies the imposed sentence. The focus of appellate review is whether the trial court abused its broad discretion, not on whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. A trial court may only be found to have abused discretion if the punishment is disproportionate to the offense. The defendant claims that the lack of injuries to victims during the robberies makes the maximum sentences excessive.

The defendant committed robbery against Ms. Zelaya in daylight, threatening her with a gun and demanding her purse and keys. The jury reviewed an audiotape of her 911 call, which revealed her distress and emotional trauma, despite no physical injuries; she continues to experience panic when approached by cyclists. In a separate incident, the defendant entered Ms. Farkouh's home, demanded money, and terrorized her by implying he had a gun, which harmed her sense of security. Although neither victim sustained physical injuries, the psychological impact was significant. The court found sufficient factual basis for the imposed sentences and ruled that there was no abuse of discretion in sentencing. Consequently, the convictions and sentences for counts one and five were affirmed, while the multiple offender adjudication was reversed, leading to the vacation of multiple bill sentences on counts three and four, with a remand for further sentencing proceedings. The excerpt also references the precedent set by North Carolina v. Alford, allowing for a guilty plea to a lesser charge when there is strong evidence of guilt despite the defendant's claim of innocence. Additionally, it notes that Ms. Zelaya is now married and goes by Karla Zelaya Burman.