United States v. Dwight A. Graham

Citations: 315 F.3d 777; 2003 WL 61293Docket: 01-4349

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 31, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Dwight A. Graham was convicted by a jury for distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). The conviction stemmed from an incident on August 24, 2000, when Graham sold two ounces of crack cocaine to Joe Rapier, a confidential informant working with the Vermilion County Metropolitan Enforcement Group (VMEG). Rapier, who had a history of drug transactions with Graham, was outfitted with surveillance equipment by law enforcement prior to the transaction.

On the night of the sale, Rapier contacted Graham, requesting to purchase crack cocaine. Graham instructed him to meet at Garfield Park, where they conversed before Rapier followed Graham to his uncle's house. After a brief wait, Graham returned and completed the transaction, exchanging the crack cocaine for $1,800. The interaction was recorded, and Graham was heard discussing the quality of the drug and instructing Rapier to keep the deal confidential. Following the sale, law enforcement tracked Graham's vehicle, obtaining its license plate and confirming it belonged to him. The cocaine was later seized from Rapier, weighing 56.5 grams and confirmed as cocaine base by forensic officers.

On appeal, Graham challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the prosecutor's closing arguments, and the district court's consideration of his prior conviction for sentencing. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, upholding both the conviction and the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment.

At trial, the jury reviewed tape-recorded interactions and heard testimonies from law enforcement who monitored Rapier. Both Rapier and law enforcement identified a second voice on the recordings as Graham's, though Graham's relatives could not confirm this. Evidence indicated calls to Rapier's cell phone originated from a phone registered to Graham's fiancée, with patterns aligning with Graham's work schedule. 

Graham provided an alibi, stating he left work at 11:30 p.m. on August 23, 2000, and went with co-worker Terrence Parker to a liquor store before visiting his fiancée, Sheila Walker, where they stayed for about ten minutes. They claimed to leave Walker's home around 12:30 a.m. and went to Parker's house until 2 a.m. Graham denied being near Garfield Park or visiting the gas station where law enforcement allegedly saw his vehicle. He also challenged Rapier's credibility and denied using Walker's cell phone that night.

The jury convicted Graham after a three-day trial. In his post-trial motion, he contended that the government did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the prosecutor made improper closing arguments. The district court upheld the jury's verdict, stating there was sufficient evidence for conviction and that the prosecutor's remarks were appropriate.

Graham, having a prior drug-related felony, faced a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years due to the quantity of crack cocaine involved. He unsuccessfully argued at sentencing that his prior conviction should not count due to being admitted to first offender probation under Illinois law. The district court sentenced him to the minimum of 240 months in prison, ten years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

Graham's appeal emphasizes the government's failure to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, facing a significant burden as he challenges the sufficiency of evidence. Courts typically uphold jury verdicts if any rational juror could find essential elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.

To convict Graham, the government needed to prove two elements: (1) that he knowingly distributed 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base, and (2) that he was aware the substance was controlled. The evidence presented included a tape recording of the transaction and cell phone records indicating conversations with Rapier. Witnesses identified Graham’s voice on the recording, while defense witnesses could not confirm it. Law enforcement observed Graham’s distinctive 1970 Cadillac at the transaction scene, and the tape indicated that the deal was to occur at Graham's uncle's home. The court upheld the district court's conclusion that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict, noting it would not question the jury's credibility assessments.

Graham also contested two statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments, claiming they compromised his right to a fair trial. The court applies a two-step analysis to assess claims of prosecutorial misconduct: first, determining if the remarks were appropriate; if not, examining the comments against the entire record for potential prejudice. In the first instance, the prosecutor referred to the observed vehicle as "Defendant's Cadillac." Since Graham did not object during trial, the court reviewed for plain error, requiring him to show that the remarks were both improper and prejudicial. The court found the prosecutor's statement was not improper, as it was a reasonable inference based on evidence presented, including license plate details and admissions from Graham regarding driving the vehicle. Thus, the statement did not constitute misconduct.

The prosecutor defended the credibility of witness Rapier against Graham's challenges, asserting that Graham had selected Rapier as a witness by selling drugs to him, which is typical in criminal dealings. Graham objected to this statement, leading to a review for potential abuse of discretion. The court found that the prosecutor's comment did not suggest coercion in Rapier's testimony but highlighted Graham's role in choosing the witness. The comment did not misrepresent the burden of proof, and even if deemed improper, it did not deprive Graham of a fair trial, as the district court provided a curative instruction emphasizing Graham's right to remain silent and he had the chance to respond in his closing argument. 

Regarding sentencing, Graham contested the inclusion of his prior drug conviction as a factor in determining his sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), which allows for enhanced penalties for individuals with past convictions. Although he was sentenced to probation for a 1994 felony possession, federal law classifies this probation as a conviction. The court affirmed that under federal definitions, Graham's prior conviction was correctly considered, rejecting his plea to overrule established Supreme Court precedent regarding the nature of convictions. Consequently, the court upheld the district court's judgment in sentencing Graham, affirming the decision.