State v. Balams

Citations: 796 So. 2d 383; 1998 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 213Docket: CR-97-1094

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; May 14, 1998; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Peter Austin Bush, an attorney from Mobile County, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Chris N. Galanos of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit to approve his attorney fee declarations for 11 indigent cases. Bush had been appointed to represent several indigent clients and submitted a bill for services according to Alabama Code § 15-12-21(e), seeking payment from the State Comptroller’s Office. However, the fees approved by Judge Galanos were significantly lower than those submitted by Bush. Specific discrepancies included cases where Bush requested fees ranging from $232 to $818, while Judge Galanos approved amounts from $202 to $302. After being informed that Judge Galanos would not authorize certain expenses without prior requests for explanations, Bush filed the petition, also alleging that Mobile County’s indigent defense system was unlawful. The court considered whether mandamus relief was appropriate for reviewing Judge Galanos’s actions, citing previous cases that allowed such relief in similar contexts. The court emphasized that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued only when there is a clear legal right and no other adequate remedy. Given that Bush had no alternative means to protect his interests, the court found it necessary to grant his request. Additionally, the court noted that Judge Galanos lacked jurisdiction over fee claims for cases not tried in his court, highlighting the significance of jurisdictional matters. The court referenced the Sixth Amendment, which ensures the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, underlining the importance of adequate legal representation for indigent defendants.

The excerpt outlines the constitutional foundation for the right to counsel in Alabama, referencing the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment as established in Gideon v. Wainwright. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to counsel is fundamental to ensuring fair trials, especially for defendants who cannot afford legal representation. The text cites Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, highlighting the necessity of legal counsel for defendants to effectively navigate legal proceedings, understand charges, and prepare defenses. 

To implement this constitutional right, Alabama established an indigent defense system under Code of Alabama 1975, specifically Sections 15-12-1 et seq. Section 15-12-3 assigns the presiding circuit judge the responsibility of administering this system, while Section 15-12-4 allows the judge to appoint an indigent defense commission to provide advisory support. Section 15-12-21 details the court's obligation to appoint counsel for defendants who cannot afford representation, ensuring that both adult and juvenile defendants receive legal assistance when entitled. This provision reinforces the role of appointed counsel as officers of the court, tasked with representing and assisting defendants throughout the judicial process.

Parents, guardians, or custodians of juveniles in judicial proceedings are entitled to appointed counsel if they cannot afford one. The appointed counsel, acting as an officer of the court, is responsible for representing these parties. Counsel fees for cases in subsections (a), (b), and (c) are capped at $1,000 for total services, with specific billing rates of $40 per hour for in-court work and $20 per hour for out-of-court preparation. For cases involving capital offenses or life sentences without parole, the out-of-court fee limit is $1,000, plus full compensation for in-court work. Counsel can also claim reimbursement for pre-approved reasonable expenses. Bills for services must be submitted after the trial's conclusion, limited to the established amounts, and require approval from both the trial court and the State Comptroller for payment.

Bush argues that Mobile County's indigent defense system is flawed, claiming Judge Galanos improperly reviewed fee declarations without presiding over all cases and should have approved his fees as submitted. The State contends that Judge Galanos had discretion to adjust the fees and notes that a previous fee review system created a backlog of cases due to one judge's bias, prompting circuit judges to establish a new evaluation system for more impartial fee determinations.

In Mobile County, attorney fee declarations for indigent defense are submitted to a five-member commission that recommends payment amounts. These recommendations are then sent to a designated judge, currently Judge Galanos, for final approval. The process stipulates that fee declarations are not reviewed by the trial judge who presided over the case, which is a deviation from the requirements of Section 15-12-21. This section mandates that the trial court determine indigency and approve attorney fees based on bills submitted by counsel. Judge Galanos lacks jurisdiction to approve fees for cases he did not try, meaning he can only consider the fee declaration for State v. Terry Rawls, in which he presided.

The review process has resulted in 60-75% of fee declarations being reduced before payment is issued. Bush argues that this system is arbitrary and capricious, as it allows judges without firsthand knowledge of a case’s complexity or the attorney's performance to alter fee claims. The system overlooks the variability in attorneys' experience and the time required for case preparation, leading to inconsistent treatment of fee claims. The State contends that Judge Galanos has absolute discretion over fee approvals, but cited cases supporting this view pertain to different aspects of 15-12-21, focusing on reasonable expenses rather than the approval process for attorney fees. Consequently, the current operation of Mobile County's indigent defense system conflicts with the statutory provisions of 15-12-21, resulting in unfair treatment of attorneys.

A trial court's denial of funding for an expert pharmacologist has raised issues regarding the payment of attorney fees for appointed counsel representing indigent defendants. The court notes a lack of precedent for denying fee claims within statutory limits based on hours worked, emphasizing that trial preparation should be at the discretion of counsel. The attorney’s fee request, meticulously itemized and not exceeding the statutory cap of $1,000, is deemed legitimate under Ala. Code § 15-12-21, which mandates payment based on hours spent.

The court clarifies that it does not intend to allow blanket claims of $1,000 for each case, as claims will still be scrutinized by the presiding judge. It acknowledges that most appointed attorneys submit fees below the cap and emphasizes the professional integrity of attorneys who attest to the accuracy of their claims. Additionally, it criticizes Mobile County’s practice of not compensating for travel time and reducing in-court time claims, stating that such practices conflict with established guidelines from the Indigent Defense Commission of the Alabama State Bar.

The court asserts that appointed counsel should be compensated in accordance with these guidelines and condemns practices that violate statutory provisions, urging Mobile County to seek legislative changes if desired. It recognizes the essential role of attorneys in the justice system and directs that Bush file supplemental fee claims for unapproved portions with the respective judges for reimbursement.

Judges McCrae, Johnstone, Kendall, and Galanos are instructed to approve supplemental fee claims for specific cases, totaling $516.00, $16.00, $410.00, $412.00, and $234.00 respectively. Mobile County must revise its indigent defense system to ensure future fee claims are approved by the trial judge who handled the case, in accordance with statute 15-12-21. The petition for these approvals has been granted, with concurrence from Justices McMillan, Cobb, Brown, and Baschab. The excerpt references the Fourteenth Amendment, emphasizing citizenship and due process rights. It clarifies that statute 15-12-22(e) mandates the presiding judge or chief justice to approve attorney fee claims for appeals. Additionally, it notes that the statutory cap of $1,000 does not apply in cases involving capital offenses or potential life sentences, and affirms the constitutionality of the statutory cap as upheld in previous cases.