Headrick v. Headrick

Citations: 788 So. 2d 784; 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 541; 2000 WL 1725468Docket: No. 1999-CA-00768-COA

Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; November 20, 2000; Mississippi; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Katie Headrick's appeal seeks to increase her alimony based on Richard Headrick’s increased net worth after their divorce. Richard counters by requesting termination of the alimony, citing Katie's alleged cohabitation with another man, termed a "defacto marriage." He also seeks a constructive trust, attorney’s fees, and a declaration that alimony provisions binding his estate are void for public policy reasons. The chancellor ruled the alimony was lump sum and non-modifiable, denying all relief sought by both parties. Richard appeals, claiming the trial court erred in labeling the alimony as lump sum, not terminating payments due to Katie's misconduct, failing to impose a constructive trust, and withholding attorney’s fees. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the chancellor’s decision.

The original divorce decree from February 21, 1984, mandated that both parties would not seek to alter any provisions without mutual agreement, except under specific circumstances, such as Richard's potential insolvency. Katie's request for increased alimony stems from Richard's financial gains after the sale of his business, which significantly bolstered his net worth. Richard, upon receiving Katie's modification motion, investigated her financial situation and claims she cohabited with a man named Mr. Henderson from 1989 to 1994, alleging the relationship resembled a marriage despite the absence of a formal ceremony.

Katie testified that she and Henderson had a rental agreement where Henderson paid her rent. She acknowledged a sexual relationship with Henderson early in their arrangement, which ended while he continued to reside in her home as a renter. After her divorce, Katie cohabited with Richard multiple times, during which they acted as a married couple and traveled together, but she ultimately ended the relationship in 1988 after contracting a sexually transmitted disease from him. Richard denied these claims.

The first three assignments of error relate to the characterization of alimony payments. Richard argues that the payments should be classified as periodic alimony, citing several reasons: they were not fixed or time-limited, adjusted for inflation over ten years, and terminated upon Katie's remarriage or death. He also pointed out that the payments were included as income for Katie and a deduction for him in tax filings, and Katie's motions indicated her belief in periodic alimony.

The chancellor concluded that Katie and Richard's 1984 divorce contract specified that alimony payments were fixed and could not be modified due to changing circumstances. The court ruled that Katie is not entitled to an increase in alimony despite Richard's increased wealth, nor can Richard terminate payments due to Katie's admissions of sexual relations with others. The court classified the alimony as lump sum, binding Richard's estate for payments, affirming that the agreement was intended to be non-modifiable and irrevocable, as confirmed by the court decree. The court referenced precedents indicating that not all criteria for lump sum alimony need to be met in every case.

The chancery judge and the parties intended their agreement to be a non-modifiable contract regarding alimony, which the court recognized as a property settlement or lump sum alimony, fixed in unalterable installments. The agreement stipulated that payments would continue regardless of Richard's death, thereby distinguishing it from periodic alimony. The court affirmed that Richard and Katie were bound by this agreement. The standard of review for chancellor decisions is limited to assessing abuse of discretion, while legal questions are reviewed de novo. The chancellor's ruling that the agreement constituted lump sum alimony was upheld, as it was neither manifestly wrong nor erroneous. 

Regarding attorney’s fees, Richard argued that the agreement mandated that a party seeking to modify the alimony should pay the other’s fees. The chancellor ruled that both parties sought modifications, nullifying their entitlement to fees. This conclusion was supported by the record, leading the court to affirm the chancellor's decision without finding any abuse of discretion. Consequently, the judgment denying the motion to modify alimony payments was affirmed, with costs of the appeal assigned to the appellant.