United States v. Marlin Anthony Clarke, A.K.A. Brandon Knowles, A.K.A. Brent Smith

Citations: 312 F.3d 1343; 2002 WL 31640773Docket: 02-13405

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; November 22, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Marlin Anthony Clarke, a Bahamian national, was convicted for illegally reentering the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2), following a guilty plea. Clarke appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of being prosecuted beyond the five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. 3282. 

Clarke's legal argument hinged on the assertion that he was "found in" the United States as of July 30, 1996, when Florida state authorities identified him via fingerprint comparison, claiming the INS's failure to discover his presence was due to their lack of diligence. However, the district court found that the statute of limitations commenced on July 9, 1999, when the INS became aware of his presence in Florida, leading to his indictment on October 3, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the indictment was not time-barred, as Clarke's prosecution fell within the five-year limitation period.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, any alien deported and who subsequently enters, attempts to enter, or is found in the United States can face fines or imprisonment. The statute outlines three distinct offenses: entering, attempting to enter, or being found in the U.S. The statute of limitations for prosecution under this provision is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3282, which stipulates that non-capital offenses must be prosecuted within five years of their commission. This timeline begins when the crime is deemed complete, which, in cases related to § 1326, occurs when the individual is 'found in' the U.S.

To be considered 'found in' the U.S., an alien must have entered surreptitiously, bypassing official immigration ports. The term 'found' is interpreted as 'discovered,' and several circuit courts have stated that the government must either be aware of or could reasonably discover the individual's illegal presence. Clarke contended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could have been informed of his presence on July 30, 1996, when Florida police confirmed his identity. However, the argument that knowledge from state police could be imputed to the INS was rejected, as there is no legal precedent supporting that notion. 

The Second Circuit's case of United States v. Mercedes supports this rejection; the court concluded that the statute of limitations did not begin upon the arrest by state authorities but rather when the INS became aware of the individual's illegal presence, emphasizing that the responsibility for immigration information does not transfer between state and federal authorities.

The phrase "found in" under 1326 refers specifically to the actions of federal immigration officials, establishing that a defendant is considered "found in" the United States when discovered by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials, not state authorities. This interpretation aligns with previous case law, including United States v. Coeur, which indicated that the relevant moment for the statute of limitations to begin is when federal officials recognize a defendant's illegal presence. Several cases, such as United States v. Acevedo and United States v. Herrera-Ordones, emphasize that the statute of limitations starts once the INS discovers a defendant's presence and identity. The court rejects Clarke's argument that the INS should have had constructive knowledge of his presence as of July 30, 1996, since Florida law enforcement did not notify the INS until 1999. There is no evidence indicating that the INS had procedures in place to detect Clarke's presence at an earlier date.

Clarke was deemed 'found in' the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) when INS officials identified him in Florida in July 1999, rather than state officials. Consequently, the government’s indictment dated October 3, 2001, was not subject to the five-year statute of limitations outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3282, leading to the district court’s proper denial of Clarke's motion to dismiss. The denial of such motions is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while the interpretation of statutes of limitations is assessed de novo. Should an alien be removed after a conviction for an aggravated felony, penalties can include fines or imprisonment for up to 20 years under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The court found the cases cited by Clarke—United States v. Gomez and United States v. DiSantillo—distinguishable as those involved scenarios where immigration authorities could have discovered the defendants' illegal status through typical law enforcement diligence. In contrast, Clarke's reentry into the U.S. was covert, preventing awareness by immigration officials at the time.