Diamond B Construction Co. v. Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development

Citations: 780 So. 2d 436; 2000 WL 1864458Docket: No. 00 CA 1323

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 21, 2000; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Diamond B Construction Company, Inc. (Diamond B) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) regarding bidding specifications for a highway project. Diamond B argued that the DOTD violated Louisiana's prohibition against closed specifications by requiring Portland cement concrete pavement, excluding asphaltic concrete as an alternative. Closed specifications, as defined by Louisiana law, refer to products specified to the exclusion of others of equal quality. Diamond B formally requested the inclusion of asphaltic concrete, which the DOTD rejected. Subsequently, Diamond B sought a preliminary injunction and a declaratory judgment asserting that the specifications constituted illegal closed specifications and that any resulting contract was null. The DOTD responded, claiming compliance with the law. The trial court held a hearing and ultimately denied the injunction, concluding that the specifications did not violate the law since the required product could be produced by anyone to specific standards or purchased at a standard price. Following the denial of the injunction, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOTD, dismissing Diamond B's suit. Diamond B's application for supervisory writs was denied as the trial court had already issued a judgment on the merits, leading to expedited appeals on both the injunction denial and the suit dismissal, which were processed together.

Plaintiff appeals the denial of a preliminary injunction, arguing that the District Court incorrectly interpreted Louisiana law regarding the definition of “product” in relation to Portland cement concrete and asphaltic concrete used in highway pavements. The plaintiff claims the court failed to adhere to precedent set in Stevens Concrete Pipe Products, Inc. v. Burgess and Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, and contends that these materials should be treated as equal in quality and utility, warranting a preliminary injunction to halt construction.

The court finds no merit in the plaintiff's claims, noting that the reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced and that Portland cement concrete does not fall under the definition of a prohibited product as per LSA-R.S. 38:2290. The court emphasizes that the bidding process was not compromised, confirming that both materials were available to contractors and that there was sufficient competition during bidding. 

Additionally, the court addresses the plaintiff's assertion regarding the application of the Louisiana Civil Code, stating that no specific provision was identified as being misapplied. It concludes that the trial court correctly interpreted the Closed Specification Statutes, affirming that the design specifications did not unfairly restrict competition. Ultimately, the court supports the trial court’s decision, stating that evidence confirms Portland cement concrete and asphaltic concrete are not equivalent in quality, performance, and utility, justifying the denial of the requested preliminary injunction.

The trial court properly denied Diamond B’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief, concluding that the claims lacked merit. The judgment from April 14, 2000, which rejected the application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, was affirmed. Diamond B is ordered to pay costs amounting to $1,225.71. Relevant legal provisions include LSA-R.S. 38:2290, which prohibits architects or engineers from submitting closed specifications for products in public construction unless necessary for utility or historical integrity. Additionally, LSA-C.C. art. 10 mandates that ambiguous legal language should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the law's purpose.