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United States v. Nazih Tadros
Citations: 310 F.3d 999; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23732; 2002 WL 31528575Docket: 01-4242
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 15, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Nazih Tadros was convicted of mail and wire fraud for defrauding multiple insurance companies by submitting false information regarding a purported disability and his ability to work. The government alleged that Tadros knowingly provided incorrect information in his insurance applications and benefit claims, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, as well as 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). The fraudulent activity stemmed from a car accident in April 1993, where police reported no injuries. Following the incident, Tadros sought medical treatment for neck and back pain, but medical evaluations revealed only pre-existing conditions. Throughout the fraud scheme, Tadros misrepresented his employment status and physical capabilities. He claimed to be the owner of a grocery store while applying for insurance, stating he performed no manual labor, but later asserted he was a laborer engaged in physical tasks when applying for benefits. Testimony from employees contradicted Tadros' claims, indicating he primarily handled paperwork and did not miss work except for vacations. The fraud involved four insurance companies, including Mutual Trust Life Insurance Company, where Tadros initially described his duties as non-labor-intensive. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Tadros' arguments regarding the government's disclosure obligations, the sufficiency of evidence, and the statute of limitations. On August 6, 1993, Tadros submitted a claim to Mutual for total disability benefits due to neck and back injuries and a concussion from a car accident, identifying his job as a clerk or maintenance worker with manual labor responsibilities. Mutual initially declined full liability but made a partial payment in December 1993 while investigating the claim. The remaining amount was settled for $94,050 in May 1994. Simultaneously, Tadros filed a Worker’s Compensation claim against Super Jet, asserting he was injured while on a work-related errand. Fireman's, the insurer, required him to see three independent medical examiners. Despite varying assessments of his injuries, all examiners concluded that Tadros was not totally disabled and could perform office work typical of a grocery store manager or clerk. During his medical evaluations, Tadros provided misleading information regarding his injuries and job duties. Dr. Gireesan, the first examiner, initially found injuries but recommended light work. Subsequent visits led to a diagnosis of impingement syndrome, yet he eventually recommended light duty work. Dr. Brackett expressed skepticism about Tadros' pain reports, suggesting he was exaggerating and could return to work unrestricted. Dr. Haskell also confirmed that while Tadros had some injuries, he was not permanently disabled and could perform sedentary work. In 1993, Fireman's initiated surveillance on Tadros, documenting him engaging in various activities that contradicted his claims of disability. Tadros' claim against Fireman's remained unresolved until he voluntarily dismissed it in March 2000. Tadros received $94,050 from Mutual on May 9, 1994, and the following day signed a disability insurance application with New York Life. He stated he was a grocery store manager and had only received treatment for high blood pressure in the past decade, denying any uncompleted treatments. He acknowledged a back condition from a 1993 accident but claimed it lasted only weeks. New York Life issued him a policy in October 1994. On February 10, 1997, Tadros claimed total disability due to diabetes, high blood pressure, fatigue, and dizziness, certified by chiropractor Dr. George Georgelos, without input from his regular cardiologist. He later submitted a job description indicating changes in his duties over the years. Following an investigation, New York Life denied his claim, rescinded the policy, and refunded his premiums. Additionally, the government alleged that Tadros fraudulently applied for a whole life policy with Prudential, claiming disability to obtain premium waivers. In his application, he described himself as a supermarket owner with management duties but later changed his job description to manual labor when applying for the waiver. During an investigation, a Prudential investigator found Tadros working in his office, where he claimed to be unable to perform cashier duties due to back pain, yet admitted to working at the store multiple days each week without specific responsibilities. Despite these inconsistencies, Prudential approved his premium waiver on January 17, 1994. Prudential granted a waiver to Tadros, requiring him to submit periodic documentation of his disability. In June 1995, Tadros reported being house-confined while working part-time, certified by Dr. R.F. Senno. However, by February 1997, he claimed total house confinement and no work, which was again certified by Dr. Georgelos. A third statement in January 1998 reiterated his house confinement, followed by another in November 1998, citing constant pain and inability to work since 1993. After the premium waiver, the policy accrued cash value, and Tadros took multiple loans against it between 1997 and 1999 without repayment. Surveillance in September 1996 captured him leaving home and engaging in various activities, contradicting his claims of disability. Further footage in June 1997 and May 1998 showed him lifting heavy items and performing physical tasks. Medical records from Dr. Jafar Al-Sadir, his cardiologist since 1995, revealed no debilitating conditions; he treated Tadros for high blood pressure and cholesterol but was never informed of any disability claims until 2001, when he refused to certify Tadros as disabled. Similarly, a visit to Dr. Cohen in August 1993 yielded no significant findings, and Tadros did not report any pain despite his claims of total disability following a car accident. An examination by rheumatologist Dr. James Curran in October 1997 also indicated unremarkable results, with no request for a disability certificate from Tadros. The jury was presented with evidence indicating that the defendant, while claiming disability, engaged in personal business activities across various Chicago establishments on numerous occasions. On July 23, 2001, the jury found the defendant guilty on ten out of eleven counts. The defendant, Tadros, appeals, alleging a Brady violation due to the government's failure to provide audiotapes recorded by Prudential during conversations with him. The government contends it never had possession of the tapes prior to trial, and under Brady v. Maryland, it is obligated to disclose only evidence that it possesses, which is favorable and material to the defense. To establish a Brady violation, Tadros must demonstrate that the government suppressed evidence, that the evidence was favorable, and that it was material to the trial. The court noted that the Brady rule does not apply to evidence not held by the government that the defendant could have discovered through reasonable effort. The government had already provided Tadros with a letter indicating Prudential's recording practices, thus negating any suppression claims. Moreover, Tadros failed to show that the tapes would have been beneficial to his defense or material to trial issues, with defense counsel admitting a lack of evidence supporting their relevance. Consequently, the district court did not err in ruling that there was no Brady violation. Additionally, Tadros claimed insufficient evidence for the fraud charges, but the court stated that it must review the evidence favorably for the prosecution and can only overturn on grounds that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To establish a violation of mail or wire fraud statutes, the government must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud, had the intent to defraud, and utilized the mail or wires to further that scheme. In this case, the evidence showed that Tadros intentionally defrauded insurance companies by applying for disability benefits, exaggerating his injuries, and misrepresenting his job duties. He falsely claimed to perform manual labor while actually only doing office work and misled investigators about his responsibilities. Tadros's claims of being house-confined contradicted evidence of him running errands and managing his business. The government proved that he knowingly used the mail and wires for this fraudulent activity. Tadros contended that the scheme was complete when he received final payments in May 1994, arguing that the indictment in April 2001 exceeded the five-year statute of limitations. However, evidence indicated that he continued to submit fraudulent information well after May 1994. The government does not need to show a successful scheme to prove fraud violations. The statute of limitations for mail and wire fraud begins with the mailing of fraudulent material, with each mailing being a separate offense. The indictments included multiple fraudulent mailings to Prudential and New York Life that occurred within the five-year limit, affirming the validity of the charges. Consequently, the judgment of the district court was upheld. Tadros filed a claim with BlueCross Blueshield of Illinois for medical expenses related to a car accident, asserting that the injuries were not work-related and that he had no other insurance. A grand jury indicted the defendant on April 12, 2001. During oral arguments, the defendant's counsel suggested the possibility of an imposter making calls to Prudential, but there was no evidence to support this claim. Under the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341), Tadros does not need to have mailed items personally; the statute applies to anyone who "knowingly causes" fraudulent materials to be delivered by mail or private carrier. The government must demonstrate that the defendant acted with knowledge that the use of mail or wires was foreseeable in the ordinary course of business. Additionally, evidence of fraudulent activity before April 12, 1996, while outside the statute of limitations, is still relevant to proving the defendant's involvement in a scheme to defraud and his intent to do so.