Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; October 9, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
The appeal involves Dante Dixon contesting the validity of his guilty plea, claiming that the District Court erred by incorrectly stating his maximum potential sentence as 40 years instead of the correct amount, which was 20 years for each count. Dixon argued that had he been aware of the accurate sentencing information, he might have opted for a not guilty plea. However, the court found that Dixon did not demonstrate any prejudice from the error and thus was not entitled to plain error relief. Nonetheless, the court remanded the case to the District Court for correction of the imposed sentence.
The case stemmed from a credit card fraud scheme orchestrated by Dixon and Michael Stubblefield, which involved creating unauthorized credit cards through fraudulent operations across multiple states, including New York and New Jersey. Dixon was charged with conspiracy to commit credit card fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2) and (b)(2). Initially informed of a maximum penalty of 10 years, or 20 years with a prior conviction, Dixon later entered a plea agreement that set the maximum for his charges at 20 years each, totaling 40 years. The plea agreement also included stipulations regarding loss amounts and potential sentence reductions based on acceptance of responsibility. In February 2001, Dixon waived indictment and pled guilty to the charges.
At sentencing, the District Court approved Dixon's request to keep the loss amount below $1.5 million, resulting in an increase of the base offense level from 6 by 11 levels per the plea agreement, rather than 12 levels as indicated in the presentence report. The court applied an additional 6-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) and (b), determining that Dixon was an organizer/leader of five or more participants and engaged in significant planning. A 3-level reduction was granted for Dixon's acceptance of responsibility, culminating in a total offense level of 20 and a criminal history category of V, which set a sentencing range of 63-78 months. Ultimately, the court sentenced Dixon to two concurrent terms of 75 months.
Dixon filed a timely Notice of Appeal. During appellate preparations, counsel discovered that Dixon had been misadvised regarding his maximum statutory exposure during various case stages, including the plea hearing. It was revealed that Dixon had been incorrectly informed that he faced a maximum of 20 years for each count (totaling 40 years), when the actual maximum was 5 years per count, summing to 10 years. The District Court maintained jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3231, and the appeal is under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
Credit card fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2) carries a maximum sentence of 10 years, which can double to 20 years for defendants with prior convictions. However, conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, per 18 U.S.C. 1029(b)(2), has a maximum of 5 years, or 10 years if there is a prior conviction. Misunderstandings led the Government, Dixon's counsel, and the District Court to erroneously conclude that the maximum penalty for conspiracy matched that of the substantive offense and that Dixon had a prior conviction, overstating his potential maximum sentence by 30 years.
Dixon now argues that the incorrect advice regarding maximum penalties deprived him of the right to a voluntary and knowing plea, prompting a request to withdraw his guilty plea, vacate his sentence, and remand the case to the District Court, claiming this misinformation violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1).
Rule 11(c)(1) mandates that before a district court accepts a guilty plea, it must personally inform the defendant of the nature of the charge, the mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible penalty. If a defendant fails to object to a Rule 11 error at the district court level, as Dixon did, he must meet the plain error standard on appeal, requiring him to demonstrate: 1) an error occurred, 2) the error was clear and obvious, and 3) the error impacted his substantial rights. If these conditions are met, an appellate court may correct the error if it undermines the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. Both the United States and Dixon acknowledge that the district court misinformed Dixon about his statutory maximum sentence, which is 5 years per count for a total of 10 years under 18 U.S.C. 1029(b)(2). The focus now shifts to whether Dixon can show the error affected his substantial rights and the overall outcome of the proceedings. This requires demonstrating that, had he been correctly informed about the maximum sentence, he would have chosen not to plead guilty. The assessment of prejudice must consider the entire record, including Dixon's circumstances and background. Ultimately, the court finds insufficient evidence to conclude that Dixon's decision to plead guilty would have changed had he been properly informed of the maximum sentence.
Defendant claims that if he had known the accurate sentence he faced, he might have opted for a jury trial instead of pleading guilty. His counsel expresses a desire to withdraw the plea based on this assertion. The defendant argues for a presumption that he would have rejected the plea had he received correct sentencing information, referencing case law. However, the court notes that the defendant did not clearly assert he would have pled not guilty if properly informed. Counsel's responses during oral arguments lacked definitive claims about Dixon's intentions, suggesting only a possibility of a not guilty plea.
The court finds that Dixon's hypothetical statements do not demonstrate an actual impact on his substantial rights. The record indicates several reasons why he might still have pled guilty, including a plea agreement that offered a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and limited the government from seeking a higher offense level increase despite qualifying for more severe penalties. The agreement also included a promise to refrain from bringing additional charges related to other fraudulent activities, which could have resulted in significant additional prison time.
Given the overwhelming evidence of Dixon's guilt and the benefits he received from the plea agreement, the court concludes there is insufficient evidence that proper information would have altered his decision. Even if a presumption of error were accepted, the court emphasizes that it did not seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial process. Ultimately, the court finds no plain error in the proceedings but acknowledges an additional issue that requires remanding the case to correct Dixon's sentence.
Dixon was originally sentenced to 75 months in prison on two counts of conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, but this sentence exceeded the statutory maximum of 60 months for each count under 18 U.S.C. § 1029. As a result, the court must remand the case for resentencing within the legal limits, ensuring that the new sentence does not surpass the original 75 months. The court declined to identify any plain error regarding Dixon's plea. The relevant sections of § 1029 outline the penalties for credit card fraud and conspiracy, specifying the maximum imprisonment terms based on the nature and circumstances of the offenses. Dixon was charged only under the conspiracy provision and not for the substantive offense of credit card fraud.
