Carl D. McQuillion v. William Duncan, Warden Attorney General of the State of California

Citations: 306 F.3d 895; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9857; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 11153; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20350; 2002 WL 31115518Docket: 00-55182

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 25, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Carl McQuillion, a California state prisoner, appeals the denial of his two consolidated petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing a violation of his due process rights when the California Board of Prison Terms rescinded his previously granted parole date from 1979, labeling it "improvidently granted." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that McQuillion had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his parole date, established by Supreme Court precedent, which necessitates a showing of "some evidence" to justify any rescission. The court finds that the Board’s rationale for rescinding the parole date merely reflected a disagreement with the earlier decision rather than supporting evidence, thereby failing to meet the "some evidence" standard. Consequently, the court reverses the district court’s ruling.

McQuillion was convicted of two counts of murder in 1973 and sentenced to seven years to life with parole eligibility. After a thorough hearing in 1979, the Community Release Board determined he was suitable for parole, establishing an initial release date of October 7, 1998. Following several progress hearings, McQuillion's parole date was advanced to March 7, 1995, due to his consistent credit accumulation. Had he received standard credit at the May 1994 hearing, his parole date could have further advanced to May 7, 1994, making that hearing crucial.

In May 1994, the Board reviewing McQuillion's case chose not to advance his parole date, instead referring the matter to the en banc Board to consider whether a rescission hearing should occur. On July 12, 1994, the Board decided to hold a hearing to assess whether the grant of parole from May 16, 1979, was improper due to insufficient consideration of several factors: the gravity of the commitment offense, McQuillion's prior criminal history, ambiguous psychiatric evaluations, lack of remorse for victims, and absence of vocational programming. During the September 1994 rescission hearing, McQuillion's counsel contested the relevance of remorse, leading to its removal from consideration. The panel then evaluated the remaining four factors. The deputy district attorney, while advocating for rescission, acknowledged that these factors had been previously considered by the granting panel. 

California's parole rescission process comprises two phases: first, determining if there is "good cause" for rescission, and second, assessing if the parole date should be rescinded based on an independent evaluation of suitability. After finding good cause on all four grounds in the first phase and deliberating for 27 minutes, the panel subsequently rescinded McQuillion's parole after a 13-minute deliberation in the second phase. McQuillion challenged the first phase's determination, filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was denied. This decision was upheld by the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. McQuillion then filed two consolidated habeas petitions in federal court, again asserting violations of federal due process. The district court denied relief, leading to McQuillion's timely appeal. A Certificate of Appealability was granted to examine whether McQuillion's due process rights were infringed when the Board rescinded his parole date, with jurisdiction established under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. The appellate review of the district court's decision is de novo under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

McQuillion contends that his due process rights were violated when the State denied his request to call members of the granting panel as witnesses during his rescission hearing. While due process generally includes the right to call witnesses, the court finds that this right does not extend to summoning decision-makers or factfinders, akin to calling a judge from a prior trial. The rescission panel had sufficient evidence from the record, including the transcript of the grant hearing and the granting panel's written decision, to assess whether the parole date was improperly awarded. California law presumes that all evidence presented was considered by the granting panel, and the panel had clearly outlined its deliberative process. McQuillion failed to demonstrate a specific need to call these individuals as witnesses, and thus his due process rights were not infringed. Furthermore, McQuillion argues that his liberty interest in parole was compromised when the Board rescinded his parole date. A valid procedural due process claim requires both a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest and inadequate procedural protections. The court's examination will focus on whether McQuillion possessed a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his parole date.

McQuillion's due process claim is considered under the habeas relief framework of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which mandates a deferential review standard established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA restricts granting habeas corpus relief for claims previously adjudicated in state court unless the state’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. Although McQuillion does not contest his trial conviction, his due process claim regarding state parole authority may have been adjudicated on the merits in state court, potentially subjecting it to AEDPA standards. 

For McQuillion to qualify for relief on due process grounds, the state must have violated a liberty interest recognized by the Supreme Court. It is clarified that the Supreme Court need not have ruled on identical facts to establish 'clearly established' law; it suffices that a relevant rule exists. The Supreme Court has determined that California prisoners, including McQuillion, possess a cognizable liberty interest in parole release. This principle derives from decisions in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Board of Pardons v. Allen, which state that while there is no inherent right to early release, a state's use of mandatory language in its parole statutes creates a presumption favoring parole unless specific findings dictate otherwise. California's parole scheme employs similar mandatory language, as illustrated in California Penal Code § 3041(b), thereby affirming the existence of a constitutional liberty interest for inmates seeking parole.

The Nebraska statute mandates that the Board of Parole must release a committed offender eligible for parole unless specific adverse factors are present (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-1,114(1)). Similarly, the Montana statute requires the board to release prisoners when there is a reasonable probability of safe release, focusing on societal interests rather than clemency (Mont.Code Ann. § 46-23-201). Although California's parole scheme has not been directly ruled to create a protected liberty interest, the courts have assumed it does, consistent with the principles established in Greenholtz and Allen. The California scheme establishes a presumption in favor of parole release unless defined statutory criteria are met. Furthermore, California regulations allow for rescission of a granted parole date for "good cause," which includes subsequent disciplinary conduct, psychiatric deterioration, or new information affecting the decision. The Board must follow these criteria, which indicates that McQuillion had a legitimate expectation of parole that is protected under the Due Process Clause.

The State contends that Sandin v. Conner (1995) has replaced the "mandatory language" standard established in Greenholtz and Allen regarding due process liberty interests created by prison regulations. Sandin clarified that the inquiry into liberty interests should shift from a focus on mandatory language to assessing whether a restraint imposes atypical and significant hardship compared to ordinary prison life. This ruling primarily pertains to internal prison disciplinary regulations and does not undermine previous decisions regarding liberty interests in parole, as confirmed by cases following Sandin. 

The California parole scheme, which generally creates a protected interest for prisoners, is particularly significant in McQuillion's case due to his prior grant of a parole date, which establishes a specific expectation of release. The Board's decision stating "Parole Granted" enhances this expectation. Therefore, McQuillion possesses a constitutionally protected interest in freedom from confinement, supported by the substantive criteria set by the State that dictate his potential release or the conditions under which it may be rescinded.

A constitutionally protected liberty interest was established for McQuillion, prompting an examination of whether the deprivation of this interest lacked adequate procedural protections, thereby violating due process. The standard for due process in parole rescission aligns with the requirements set forth in prison disciplinary proceedings, specifically the necessity for "some evidence" to support administrative decisions. This principle, derived from *Superintendent v. Hill*, asserts that due process does not necessitate a stricter evidentiary standard than a factual basis for decisions.

In reviewing the parole rescission determination, the inquiry focuses on whether there was "some evidence" supporting the panel's finding of "good cause" for rescission. Good cause can arise from: 1) disciplinary conduct after the grant of parole; 2) psychiatric deterioration; or 3) new information suggesting that parole should not proceed. The "improvidently granted" basis for rescission has a broad interpretation in California law, allowing for rescission if new circumstances indicate earlier decisions were flawed or if the original panel failed to consider significant factors.

However, this ground does not permit a new panel to re-evaluate the original decision based solely on a different interpretation of facts already considered. Recent California court rulings have reinforced the need for a rescission panel's findings to be grounded in a failure to consider important factors rather than merely differing assessments of previously evaluated evidence.

In Caswell, the California Court of Appeal clarified that rescission cannot be justified solely on the Board's verbal assertion of "cause"; there must be sufficient factual support for the Board's determination. The court emphasized that if the basis for rescission relies on a claimed inadequate consideration of evidence by the granting Board, it must reflect more than just a disagreement with the original decision. Specifically, the rescission panel must identify a specific conclusion from the granting panel and demonstrate how that conclusion is inconsistent with the evidence.

The court criticized the interpretation of a prior case, In re Johnson, which suggested that differing reasonable opinions on suitability could justify rescission. Caswell clarified that allowing rescission based solely on differing opinions would undermine the integrity of parole decisions, as "some evidence" of unsuitability is typically present in every hearing, potentially leading to arbitrary rescissions. Instead, the focus should be on whether the original panel's findings and conclusions are reconcilable with the evidence presented. Rescission is warranted only when the original panel’s determinations cannot be justified by the evidence or if the panel ignored critical information relevant to the suitability factors.

The analysis from the Caswell court is considered relevant in evaluating the parole rescission in this case. Under federal due process as established by the Supreme Court in Hill, and reaffirmed in Jancsek, California law mandates that there must be "some evidence" supporting the rescission of parole. The Caswell court reviewed five grounds cited by the rescission panel and determined that four lacked sufficient evidentiary support, criticizing the panel for its reliance on a subjective disagreement with the grant hearing's outcome. It underscored that the granting panel had received extensive material and that the prisoner had adequately addressed all relevant questions during the hearing. The court noted California law allows for a presumption that the panel considered all evidence presented. Only the fifth ground was upheld, which indicated a significant misinterpretation by the granting panel regarding the criminal conduct related to a victim, leading to an inappropriate decision on the prisoner's parole suitability. This specific finding was deemed central to the rescission panel's conclusion. 

In applying the due process standard from Hill to the current case concerning McQuillion, the court examined the four grounds for rescission and found none were supported by "some evidence." Consequently, McQuillion's due process rights were violated due to the improper rescission of his parole.

The rescission panel determined that the granting panel inadequately considered the severity of McQuillion's offense, specifically a double murder. The rescission panel noted that the granting panel's examination of the crime lacked thoroughness and did not resolve key disputed issues. During the hearing, McQuillion admitted guilt but attempted to frame his actions as self-defense, claiming his victim was reaching for a gun. He also assisted his accomplice in the second murder by providing his weapon. The rescission panel criticized the granting panel for not fully acknowledging the gravity of the double murder and the short five-year parole consideration.

The rescission panel's critique was deemed insufficient because it failed to identify specific findings related to the granting panel's assessment of the crime's severity and McQuillion's suitability for parole. Merely expressing dissatisfaction with the granting panel's thoroughness lacked substantive analysis, as highlighted in Caswell v. California. The rescission panel's observations about the execution-style nature of the crime, conflicting witness accounts, and McQuillion's acceptance of responsibility had already been meticulously examined by the granting panel, which considered extensive evidence, including a probation report and testimony from a deputy district attorney. McQuillion acknowledged his role in the deaths of both victims, framing his actions within a narrative of a planned robbery gone wrong, although he accepted responsibility for the outcomes.

The granting panel interrogated McQuillion regarding a woman's claims that she overheard him and his partner discussing the crime, specifically statements about the method of killing and the partner's actions. McQuillion denied her account, asserting she did not hear what she claimed. The panel highlighted inconsistencies between their accounts and sought specific details about the crime and its aftermath.

The panel is presumed to have thoroughly evaluated all available evidence, including the witness's testimony and McQuillion's initial denial of guilt. The report indicated the panel acknowledged the severity of McQuillion's offenses, noting aggravating factors such as his choice to proceed with the crime despite having the opportunity to stop and the intent to prevent a witness from testifying. Discretionary enhancements for firearm use and first-degree murder were also applied.

The rescission panel's conclusion that the granting panel inadequately considered the gravity of McQuillion's offense was deemed unsupported by evidence. Despite the rescission panel's disagreement with the granting panel's decision, it did not indicate a lack of consideration of the evidence.

The rescission panel also claimed that the granting panel failed to adequately address McQuillion's prior criminal history, which included multiple armed robberies and a prison escape during which he committed additional robberies. However, the granting panel had discussed McQuillion's extensive criminal history during the hearing, including uncharged offenses and escape details. The granting panel's report confirmed that it considered McQuillion's past crimes, including one member expressing concern about his subsequent criminal behavior prior to deliberation.

The panel expressed significant concern regarding the severity and nature of McQuillion's crimes, particularly noting that all occurred within a three-year timeframe and that he had no juvenile record. This careful consideration indicated that his criminal history was adequately evaluated by the granting panel. The rescission panel failed to identify specific findings or factual errors in the granting panel's decision and merely presented its own interpretation of McQuillion's criminal history without demonstrating that the granting panel overlooked critical information. Consequently, the granting panel's conclusion was not deemed inconsistent with the evidence presented, and it was concluded that the rescission panel's disagreement lacked sufficient grounds to constitute "some evidence" of good cause for rescission.

Additionally, the rescission panel argued that the granting panel inadequately considered psychiatric evaluations. It referenced concerns raised in a 1974 psychiatric evaluation about McQuillion's need for therapy and a subsequent 1976 report from Dr. Darnard expressing disagreement with earlier assessments. The panel noted that although McQuillion underwent several psychiatric evaluations, the granting panel had discussed these reports in detail during the hearing. Specifically, they highlighted a 1974 report indicating a neurosis impacting his ability to urinate in public, along with a 1976 report from Dr. Gilbert stating McQuillion had an "excellent" parole prognosis and a low expectation of violence. However, the panel also acknowledged Dr. Dainard's skepticism regarding this prognosis, suggesting it should be considered "guarded at best."

McQuillion stated he never met Dr. Dainard and acknowledged that a review based solely on paper records could lead to Dr. Dainard’s conclusions. The granting panel highlighted a recent report by Dr. Nuerenberger, which praised McQuillion's progress in prison and suggested that future psychiatric service needs could be determined at discretion, indicating that parole conditions should also be based on factors beyond psychiatric evaluations. The rescission panel sought to establish "good cause" by arguing that the granting panel's reliance on Dr. Nuerenberger's report overlooked significant psychiatric issues from earlier evaluations. The granting panel had emphasized that the absence of psychiatric contraindications significantly influenced its decision to grant parole. However, the rescission panel failed to present evidence supporting its objections, lacking specific findings that showed reliance on Dr. Nuerenberger's report over others. The granting panel had reviewed all psychiatric reports during the hearing, including a 1974 report that was not intended to assess parole suitability and did not pose public safety concerns. Additionally, the granting panel considered Dr. Dainard's comments and McQuillion's clarification about their lack of prior interaction. Ultimately, parole suitability decisions are based on the severity of the offenses and public safety considerations, per California Penal Code § 3041(b).

The granting panel determined that a psychiatrist's opinion, based on a diagnosis unrelated to McQuillion's current dangerousness, was not relevant, and thus, Dr. Nuerenberger had no obligation to consider it in his parole suitability assessment. The rescission panel's perception of inconsistencies in psychiatric reports may have been misleading; however, the granting panel thoroughly evaluated the evidence at the time of the parole decision, and the rescission panel cannot re-evaluate that evidence now. 

Regarding McQuillion's vocational training, the rescission panel cited his lack of completed vocational training as a reason for rescission but did not clearly indicate whether this was an issue the granting panel inadequately considered or if it deemed McQuillion's failure to acquire training post-grant as grounds for rescission. The record shows the granting panel had an extensive discussion with McQuillion about his prison activities and accomplishments, including leadership roles and participation in various programs, which were significant in their parole suitability determination. The panel acknowledged his exceptional adjustment in prison and commended his plans for a community re-entry program.

Therefore, the rescission panel's assertion that vocational training was inadequately considered lacks support, as the granting panel had already addressed McQuillion's qualifications and plans in detail. Any disagreement from the rescission panel regarding the granting panel's conclusions does not constitute valid grounds for rescission.

The rescission panel failed to identify any inconsistency between the evidence reviewed by the granting panel regarding McQuillion's post-release skills and the conclusions reached by that panel. Additionally, the rescission panel's rationale for justifying rescission based on McQuillion's lack of further vocational training after being granted parole was deemed insufficient. The panel's inquiry focused on whether he had completed recognized vocational programs since his parole grant in 1979. It concluded that McQuillion had not met any vocational requirements up to the date of the continued grant. However, this post-grant behavior was irrelevant to the rescission panel's task of determining whether the original grant of parole was improvident based on the May 16, 1979 hearing panel's considerations. The original panel could not have evaluated future behavior that had not yet occurred. California law does not support the rescission panel's view that McQuillion's failure to pursue vocational training post-parole serves as a valid reason for rescinding parole. The criteria for rescission, as outlined in California regulations, do not stipulate that a lack of further efforts to demonstrate worthiness post-parole can justify rescission. Ultimately, the four grounds cited for rescinding McQuillion's parole lacked sufficient evidence of the granting panel's failure to adequately consider relevant information. Consequently, McQuillion is entitled to habeas relief due to a due process violation regarding his parole rescission. The district court's decision is reversed and remanded with directions to grant the writ.