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Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Richardson

Citations: 759 So. 2d 190; 2000 La. App. LEXIS 755; 2000 WL 348968Docket: No. 32,951-CA

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; April 5, 2000; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Zola Richardson appeals a summary judgment in favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co., which sought to recover $1,273.44 on her credit card account, along with accrued interest and 25% attorney’s fees, as per the account agreement. Sears claimed Richardson defaulted despite attempts to collect via certified mail. Richardson responded with a general denial and, in December 1998, Sears filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by various documents including a demand letter with a signed receipt, affidavits from Sears employees verifying account details, and an unsigned credit card agreement. The affidavits confirmed the amount due as $1,273.44 as of September 8, 1998, and outlined the timeline of the account being monitored since August 26, 1998. 

In her response, Richardson submitted an affidavit with a "Sears Itemization Report," claiming it showed her balance as $1,035.77 as of May 1997, without prior records of payments or charges. She asserted there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the amount owed and challenged the reliability of Sears' affidavits, citing a lack of personal knowledge and maintained records. The court amended the summary judgment partially but affirmed it, indicating some merit to Sears' claims while recognizing potential discrepancies in the account records.

On May 5, 1999, a motion for summary judgment was argued in court, resulting in the trial court granting the motion in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court failed to recognize a genuine issue of material fact and that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendant contested the reliability of the documents submitted by Sears, claiming inadequate maintenance of her account records and lack of personal knowledge by the affiant regarding the owed amount. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, applying the same criteria as the district court, which requires that no genuine issue of material fact exists for a judgment to be granted. Supporting affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, contain admissible facts, and demonstrate the affiant's competence. Once the moving party establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show material factual disputes. Failure to do so necessitates granting the motion. Additionally, under LSA-R.S. 9:2781(A), a person who does not pay an open account within fifteen days of a written demand may be liable for reasonable attorney fees if judgment is rendered in favor of the claimant. The defendant's Sears credit card account qualifies as an "open account," and a written demand for payment was sent to her. The appeal centers on whether there is a genuine issue regarding the correctness of the amount claimed in the demand letter, with the court noting that certain evidentiary requirements cited by the defendant are not necessary for open account collection actions.

The 1987 amendment to LSA-R.S. 9:2781(A) removed the requirement to send invoice copies with written demands. The defendant acknowledged having an account with Sears, and the Hirway affidavit confirmed a balance of $1,273.44 due as of September 8, 1998. This evidence was deemed sufficient for a prima facie case under LSA-R.S. 9:2781, despite the absence of certain documents like the "Supplemental Affidavit of Correctness of Account." The defendant claimed discrepancies in the "Account Work Screen," which showed conflicting amounts but ultimately did not undermine the affidavit's validity, as it referenced a later date. The court found that the pleadings and affidavits established Sears' right to summary judgment, and the defendant's opposing affidavit failed to present specific factual disputes. The court determined the attorney’s fees of 25% were reasonable, emphasizing that LSA-R.S. 9:2781 mandates such fees for unpaid accounts. However, it amended the interest award, stating it should accrue from the date of judicial demand (October 20, 1998) rather than August 26, 1998, due to hearsay concerns in the supporting affidavit. The judgment was amended and affirmed, with costs assigned to the defendant. The application for rehearing was denied.