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Cornelius v. Overstreet
Citations: 757 So. 2d 332; 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 153; 2000 WL 343996Docket: No. 98-CA-00539-COA
Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; April 4, 2000; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
In June 1995, the Chancery Court of Lee County granted a divorce between Robert T. Cornelius, Sr. and Helen G. Cornelius Overstreet, citing irreconcilable differences. Following the divorce, Helen filed a motion for contempt, claiming Robert violated their property settlement agreement by failing to pay $3,000 in back ad valorem taxes, which she had to pay to prevent foreclosure on their former marital property in Grand Saline, Texas. The chancellor ruled that Robert was responsible for the $3,000 plus interest and ordered him to pay Helen this amount along with her attorney's fees of $4,923.19. Robert appealed, arguing the chancellor erred in awarding the taxes and fees, asserting that he should not be liable since Helen had already paid the taxes prior to their separation agreement and final divorce order. He cited a provision in the settlement agreement releasing both parties from claims arising from their marriage. However, the court upheld the chancellor's decision, noting there was substantial evidence indicating Robert was obligated to pay the taxes as agreed in the property settlement. The court confirmed that Robert's admission of responsibility and the substantial evidence supported the chancellor's findings, thus affirming the lower court’s ruling. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed that property settlement agreements are enforceable contractual obligations from the date of the final divorce judgment, as established in Mount v. Mount. In this case, Robert was ordered to pay back ad valorem taxes as specified in the agreement with Helen, and the chancellor's ruling on this matter was upheld. Robert's appeal regarding the award of attorney’s fees of $4,923.19 to Helen was denied on the grounds that he did not object during the trial, thus waiving his right to contest it on appeal. The court noted that generally, attorney’s fees are not awarded if the recipient can pay, but highlighted that the chancellor found Robert in contempt for failing to meet his obligations, justifying the fee award. Furthermore, Robert is statutorily required to pay an additional 15% penalty on the affirmed judgment along with legal interest from the date of entry. The court also advised on proper procedural filings for similar cases, emphasizing the need for using 'complaints' or 'petitions' rather than 'motions.' Ultimately, the chancellor's decisions were affirmed, and all costs of the appeal were assessed to Robert.