Tausha Prince, a Minor, by and Through Her Parents James Prince Kimberly Prince v. Jill Jacoby, Superintendent of Bethal School District Tim Sherry, Principal of Spanaway Lake High School Bonnie Kenigson, Assistant Principal of Spanaway Lake High School, Bethel School District in Their Official Capacities Bethel School District
Docket: 99-35490
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 9, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Tausha Prince, a minor represented by her parents, challenges the Bethel School District's refusal to recognize her Bible club, "World Changers," as an Associated Student Body (ASB) club, which would grant it equal benefits and access to school facilities. Instead, the district classified the club under Policy 5525, limiting its access compared to other student clubs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District, ruling that the Equal Access Act and the Establishment Clause prohibited the club from receiving the same advantages as other student organizations. Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined Prince's claims under both the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment, ultimately determining that the School District violated either the Act or Prince's First Amendment rights by denying the club equal status and access. The court reversed the district court's decision, asserting that the refusal to allow equal access to school facilities on a religion-neutral basis was unjustified.
Policy 5525, enacted by the School District in June 1994 to comply with the Equal Access Act, permits student-sponsored groups to meet at school with principal approval, provided they meet specific criteria such as being voluntary, student-initiated, and not interfering with school operations. These groups must be student-controlled, avoid mandatory religious activities, refrain from using school funds except for minor costs, and respect the constitutional rights of all individuals. However, they do not enjoy the same benefits as Associated Student Body (ASB) groups, which include access to ASB funding, participation in fundraising events, free yearbook appearances, enhanced publicity rights, and use of school resources.
Prince alleges that the denial of equal benefits for her group, World Changers, constitutes a violation of the Equal Access Act. The School District argues that granting equal status would disrupt the balance between the First Amendment's Free Speech and Establishment clauses, as it would lead to increased scrutiny of religious clubs and potentially imply school endorsement of those clubs, violating the Establishment Clause. The District contends that maintaining separate forums for ASB and Policy 5525 groups avoids viewpoint discrimination.
The district court ruled in favor of the School District, concluding that the Equal Access Act does not mandate equal treatment of student groups and that the distinction between ASB and Policy 5525 groups does not infringe on Prince's free speech or religious exercise rights. It determined the school is a "nonpublic" forum, meaning the School District's policies do not violate the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The review of the case is conducted de novo, assessing whether there are genuine issues of material fact and if the law was applied correctly.
The Equal Access Act (20 U.S.C. 4071-74, 1984) ensures that public secondary school students have the right to voluntarily participate in extracurricular groups focused on religious, political, or philosophical expression, provided that similar rights are granted to other student groups. It was enacted to address discrimination against religious student groups by school administrators who misinterpreted the First Amendment. The Act extends the principle of equal access, previously upheld for college students in Widmar v. Vincent, to secondary education. The constitutionality of the Act was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Mergens.
Key provisions of the Act prohibit public secondary schools receiving federal funding from denying equal access or discriminating against students based on the content of their meetings within a limited open forum. For the Act to apply, the school must be a public secondary institution that receives federal funding and has established a limited open forum allowing non-curriculum groups to meet.
In this case, Spanaway Lake High School qualifies under the Act, as it receives federal funding and has a limited open forum that includes the Bible Club. The dispute involves whether the School District's denial of benefits to the World Changers group, compared to ASB groups, constitutes a violation of the Act's provisions. Prince argues that the Act mandates equal treatment for religious groups, while the School District claims that providing a "fair opportunity" suffices without requiring uniform access. The interpretation of the Act's language, as guided by Congressional intent, will play a critical role in the resolution of this issue.
The document emphasizes the principle of strict statutory interpretation, asserting that the role of the court is to accurately reflect congressional intent without altering its provisions. Section 4071 of the Act prohibits the denial of "equal access" or "fair opportunity" to students wishing to conduct meetings in a "limited open forum," based on the content of their speech, including religious, political, or philosophical topics. While some terms such as "limited open forum" and "fair opportunity criteria" are defined, others like "equal access" and "discriminate against" are not, yet it is suggested that these terms have independent meanings. The use of "or" in the statute implies that each prohibition stands alone. Furthermore, the Act limits the school board's authority and defines additional terms related to secondary schooling and meeting contexts.
The document asserts that Congress is presumed to have knowledge of existing judicial interpretations when drafting legislation, and therefore, the absence of definitions for "equal access" and "discriminate against" does not undermine the Act. The legislative history indicates that the Act aims to uphold the equal access principle articulated in the Supreme Court case Widmar v. Vincent, which established that religiously oriented student activities cannot be subjected to discriminatory treatment merely due to their religious nature. Overall, the Act is intended to ensure that religious speech receives the same protections as non-religious speech in public schools.
The term "equal access" mandates that religiously-oriented student activities must be permitted under the same conditions as other extracurricular activities in schools that have established a limited open forum, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Widmar. Legislative history indicates that "discrimination" encompasses the denial of permission for students to engage in voluntary extracurricular activities involving prayer or religious speech, particularly when non-religious activities are permitted. Discriminatory actions include harassment, unequal penalties, and outright denial of access, all of which violate the law.
Importantly, Congress differentiated between "equal access," "discrimination," and "fair opportunity," noting that proving discrimination may require demonstrating a discriminatory motive, but this is not necessary to establish a violation of access and opportunity. The Act does not treat these terms as synonymous; a restrictive interpretation that equates them undermines the legislative intent and effectiveness of the law.
The Act also outlines criteria for "fair opportunity," which delineate the school's responsibilities regarding access and discrimination while aiming to avoid excessive entanglement with religion to comply with the Establishment Clause. A school is deemed to provide a fair opportunity if it ensures that meetings are voluntary and student-initiated, without school sponsorship, that school employees are present only in a nonparticipatory role, that meetings do not disrupt educational activities, and that non-school individuals do not control or regularly attend student group activities.
Under 20 U.S.C. 4071(c), if the School District exceeds the provisions of this section, it may violate the Establishment Clause. For instance, mandatory student participation in religious meetings or school-sponsored religious activities would conflict with legal precedents that prohibit government endorsement of religion, as established in McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. The school has the right to disallow meetings that disrupt educational activities, as seen in Tinker v. Des Moines. Meeting the "fair opportunity" criteria does not fulfill the requirements for equal access and non-discrimination. Section 4071(d) further restricts the school board from mandating participation in religious activities, maintaining constitutional boundaries.
In Mergens, the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue involving a request from students to form a Christian club. The school board denied the request, fearing it would imply official support for the religious meetings, but the Court found this reasoning flawed. The Court emphasized that equal access must be granted to religious clubs on par with noncurriculum-related groups, as denying the Christian club the same benefits available to other student organizations constituted a violation of "equal access," rather than merely offering "fair opportunity." Thus, the School District's claim that providing "fair opportunity" suffices for "equal access" is insufficient.
Interpretation of the Act aligns with its legislative purpose, which aims to prohibit discrimination against religious and political clubs compared to other noncurriculum-related student groups. The Supreme Court emphasizes that statutory interpretation should consider the entire law and its objectives. The Act was enacted with bipartisan support to combat perceived discrimination against religious speech in public schools, as reflected in Committee Reports. A broad interpretation of the Act would support efforts to allow students to discuss religion before and after classes. The School District's argument that it need not provide equal access to the World Changers group is rejected.
Additionally, the School District contends that state regulations necessitate substantial control over ASB clubs, implying that granting ASB status to a religious group would constitute prohibited "sponsorship." However, the regulations do not align with the Act's definition of "sponsorship," which involves promoting or participating in meetings. The cited regulations do not require the district to engage in any manner with meetings of the World Changers group, undermining the School District's argument.
The School District's interpretation of regulations regarding the conferral of Associated Student Body (ASB) status on religious groups is deemed overbroad. The regulations define an "associated student body organization" as a formal student organization approved and controlled by the school district's board of directors, but do not mandate the district's approval of each affiliated club's constitution and bylaws. Instead, this approval is granted by the student council, as acknowledged by the principal of Spanaway Lake High School.
The regulations stipulate that the ASB, not individual clubs, submits a budget to the district superintendent, who then consolidates it for district-wide review and approval by the school board, while individual group budgets are approved by the student council. The involvement of the School District in ASB activities is limited and does not equate to promoting or leading any specific club, as emphasized by the precedent set in the Supreme Court case Mergens. The court ruled that the district's limited oversight does not imply impermissible sponsorship under the relevant Act or the First Amendment. Washington State regulations require the School District to exercise its general administrative powers without infringing on the voluntary nature of student participation in club activities. The interpretation of state regulations must align with federal law, affirming their validity under the Act.
Regulations requiring the School District to "sponsor" student clubs cannot exempt it from violating the Act, which mandates equal access to a "limited open forum" once established. If state regulations conflict with the Act, the latter must prevail, as established in Garnett v. Renton School District, where the court held that state constitutions cannot undermine federal rights. Consequently, the School District must provide the World Changers with access equal to that of Associated Student Body (ASB) groups.
The Act restricts school districts from using public funds beyond minimal costs for student-initiated meetings. The School District claims that ASB funds, which include participation in activities like craft fairs and auctions, constitute public funds and therefore fall under these prohibitions. However, the classification of ASB funds as "public" is irrelevant; the focus should be on whether these funds are indeed public based on their nature and the Act's intent. ASB funds are generated separately from general School District funds and are derived from voluntary sales of ASB cards and fundraising activities. Policy 5525 requires clubs not recognized by ASB to pay fees for participation in events and prohibits them from competing in ASB fundraising activities. ASB clubs access their funds through purchase order requests for necessary expenses.
The Act does not define "expend public funds," but the Supreme Court's ruling in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia serves as a relevant reference for interpreting this phrase. Although the Act is not directly tied to the Establishment Clause, its provisions, including section 4071(d), aim to prevent conflicts with Establishment Clause principles by prohibiting the use of public funds for religious groups. The Court in Rosenberger clarified that student fees, kept distinct from general university funds, were not considered public funds meant for general revenue, but rather a special fund for student activities that encompasses all forms of speech, including religious expression.
In a similar manner, the ASB funds at Spanaway Lake High School are intended to support club activities that align with the school's educational mission, and therefore, they do not qualify as "public funds" under the Act. The School District's actions against Prince and the World Changers amount to discrimination, as they are denied equal access to these funds based on their religious viewpoints. Additionally, the School District's Policy 5525, which imposes fees for yearbook appearances on certain clubs while allowing ASB clubs free access, constitutes unlawful viewpoint discrimination. The yearbook, funded through ASB resources, serves educational purposes, and charging certain clubs for participation while exempting others is discriminatory and violates the Act.
The School District contends that no clubs, including those under Policy 5525, have the right to use the public address system, although all clubs can access school bulletin boards. In contrast, it is asserted that ASB clubs have been granted broader access, including the public address system, while Policy 5525 clubs are limited to a single bulletin board. The court holds that the Act mandates equal access for the World Changers to both the public address system and bulletin boards, similar to ASB groups, as established in the Supreme Court case Mergens, which affirmed that religious clubs must have equal access to school forums for event publicity. Discrimination based on the religious nature of the club's activities is not permissible, although the school can regulate the manner and frequency of announcements for all groups.
Regarding meeting times, the School District claims that student/staff time is not noninstructional because attendance is taken and some instruction may occur. However, the Act specifies that "noninstructional time" refers to periods before or after actual classroom instruction, as clarified in Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees. At Spanaway Lake High, student/staff time involves scheduled activities, where students can meet for various purposes, including club meetings, as long as they are pre-arranged. Prince argues, referencing Ceniceros, that the Act requires equal access to student/staff time for the World Changers, similar to the treatment of noncurriculum-related clubs.
The parties agreed that no classroom instruction occurs during the lunch hour and that students are not required to stay on campus during this time. Consequently, it was determined that the lunch period qualifies as "noninstructional time" under section 4072(4). The case Ceniceros is not deemed controlling because there are key distinctions between the lunch hour and scheduled student/staff time. Although the School District acknowledges no "formal" instruction happens during student/staff time, it does not concede that "actual classroom instruction" is absent, as students may receive individual instruction during this period. The statute's ambiguity regarding the definition of "actual classroom instruction" necessitates examining the legislative history, which indicates that such instruction begins when student attendance is mandatory. Congressional debates clarify that periods like homeroom, despite not involving formal lessons, are considered part of the instructional day because attendance is required. Historical revisions to the Act further support that mandatory attendance delineates the start of "actual classroom instruction." Earlier bill versions intended to regulate activities during school hours were opposed by Congress members, who favored the final version that only pertains to before and after school activities. Statements suggesting otherwise were infrequent and often made by those opposed to the legislation.
Opponents’ interpretations of the bill's meaning are deemed unpersuasive, with primary reference to the sponsors for clarity. The legislative history indicates that the Act does not require the School District to permit the World Changers to meet during student/staff time. The School District contends that granting Policy 5525 clubs equal access to school supplies, audio/visual (AV) equipment, and vehicles would lead to unlawful public expenditure beyond incidental costs associated with space provision, violating 20 U.S.C. 4071(d)(3) of the Act. Unlike fundraising activities, the use of supplies and equipment involves direct public funds, thus exceeding what is authorized under the Act. The term "meeting" is interpreted narrowly, suggesting that while basic elements like chairs and desks may be included, the Act does not mandate the provision of additional resources like AV equipment or vehicles.
The Act does require access to ASB funding, yearbooks, and bulletin boards, but not to student/staff time or school supplies. The constitutional implications of denied access under the First Amendment are considered only for claims not addressed by the Act, which does not permit states to infringe upon constitutional rights. The Act is not interpreted as setting the limits of First Amendment compliance, prompting an examination of whether the Bethel School District’s policy violates Prince’s First Amendment rights. The exclusion of Policy 5525 clubs from access to benefits granted to ASB clubs constitutes a violation of free speech rights, as established by the Supreme Court in Widmar. The Court emphasized that once the school created a forum for student groups, it must justify any discrimination or exclusion based on constitutional standards.
School facilities may be classified as public forums if school authorities have opened them to certain public segments, including student organizations. The term "limited open forum" established by Congress indicates a different standard than "limited public forum" found in free speech cases. Discrimination against student groups wishing to use these forums for religious worship and discussions constitutes a violation of their First Amendment rights. To justify such exclusion based on religious content, the University must demonstrate that its regulations serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.
Spanaway Lake High School has established a limited public forum where student groups can meet and use school resources. By granting these benefits, the school cannot deny access to some groups based solely on their religious expression without a compelling government interest. Even if the forum is not deemed open, government restrictions on speech must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Discriminatory practices against speech based on its message are generally unconstitutional, and restrictions cannot be based on the speaker's ideology or viewpoint.
The School District's restrictions against the World Changers club, which seeks to promote leadership and responsibility through Christian teachings, are based solely on its religious viewpoint. This violates the First Amendment, as the ASB forum's purpose is to support any lawful activity that fosters students' growth.
The World Changers organization aims to promote the spiritual growth of its student members and support the Spanaway community through charitable and philanthropic activities. It parallels the church's position in Lamb's Chapel, addressing personal, social, civil, and cultural growth from a religious perspective. The excerpt emphasizes that pursuing secular goals through a religious framework should not lead to exclusion from the Associated Student Body (ASB) forum, citing case law on viewpoint discrimination, which prohibits denying access to groups based on the religious perspective of their activities.
The School District contends that allowing World Changers access to ASB resources would violate the Establishment Clause. However, the excerpt argues that neutrality toward religion is essential in assessing potential violations. Granting the World Changers access would enhance neutrality rather than undermine it, similar to the Good News Club case. The analysis maintains that providing access to religious groups, even if they engage in sectarian activities, does not breach the Establishment Clause, as long as it is done neutrally.
Furthermore, it distinguishes between direct funding of religious activities and providing resources such as meeting space and supplies, asserting that such provisions do not equate to direct financial support for religious speech. Restricting access based on the potential use of facilities for religious purposes would contradict established precedents in similar cases. Thus, the School District's reasoning for denying access to World Changers under the free speech clause and the Establishment Clause is deemed insufficient.
Benefits to religion arising from government provision of secular services are incidental and conducted on a religion-neutral basis. The focus on criteria for fund distribution differs from cases involving direct aid to religious schools, where public funding risks state-sponsored indoctrination or symbolic government-religion union. In this context, any incidental advancement of a religious mission is attributed to the individual recipient, not the government, which only disburses benefits.
The School District provides funds to various student groups to support speech and activities, ensuring that multiple private choices influence aid distribution, thereby minimizing the risk of favoritism that could lead to religious establishment. There is no risk of government indoctrination since resources are allocated uniformly to all student groups, regardless of their viewpoints.
The School District's ASB fund, composed entirely of student fees, is not used to fund religious services. The World Changers organization operates as a student group, not a religious entity. Funds are paid to external vendors, not directly to the organization. Supreme Court precedent states that government funds cannot be prohibited merely because they are used by a group for sectarian purposes, provided access is granted on a religion-neutral basis. Therefore, the provision of school supplies and transportation with public funds remains consistent with legal standards, even if the services are utilized for religious purposes.
The Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana program that provided various educational materials and equipment to parochial schools, affirming that such aid is permissible under the Establishment Clause if offered neutrally and secularly. It emphasized that the provision of school supplies and vehicles for field trips does not constitute direct funding of religious organizations, as it merely ensures equal access to public services. The Court referenced Mergens, clarifying that students are mature enough to discern that permitting religious group access does not equate to government endorsement of religion. Concerns about coercive pressure on students were dismissed, with the Court stating that the school could mitigate any perceived endorsement through clear communication. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the School District must grant the World Changers equal access to school resources, concluding that the School District violated Prince's rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The district court's judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, the significance of Senate Report 98-357 was noted in relation to the Equal Access Act.
The excerpt details various statements from representatives regarding the Equal Access Act, emphasizing significant amendments made to the original bill that addressed concerns about student-initiated religious meetings in public schools. Key points include:
- Rep. Frank expressed initial opposition to the bill but indicated support for the revised version, noting it now restricts meetings to before and after school hours, eliminating the previous ambiguity regarding non-instructional time.
- Rep. Ratchford, who also opposed earlier versions, highlighted that the new bill deserves support due to its clear limitations on meeting times.
- Rep. Smith confirmed that schools maintain control during school hours and must treat all groups equally when allowing or denying meeting requests after school.
- Rep. Slattery noted concerns about potential abuses in the earlier bill, which did not limit meetings to specific times, and stated that religious meetings should not coincide with compulsory school activities.
- Rep. Synar reaffirmed support for the revised bill, which ensures that religious meetings are student-led and occur only outside of school hours.
- Rep. Schneider mentioned that his original reservations were addressed, allowing for student-initiated meetings only before or after school.
- Rep. Hall and Sen. Levin reinforced that voluntary meetings can take place in classrooms during off-hours, reflecting a consensus on the improved provisions.
- Rep. Kastenmeier, while acknowledging improvements, pointed out that some issues remain unresolved.
These statements collectively underscore a shift towards a more regulated framework for student-initiated religious meetings, ensuring they do not interfere with regular school activities.
The timing of activities permitted by the legislation remains ambiguous, particularly regarding whether they can occur during the school day. Legislative discussions indicate that activities may be limited to before and after school, yet this interpretation could confuse school administrators and potential challengers. Supporters assert that the revised bill allows access to school facilities during noninstructional hours, which they interpret to include any time outside actual class periods. They argue that schools cannot discriminate against student-initiated groups meeting during non-instructional times, such as lunch or scheduled free periods. Conversely, opponents of the bill, including Sen. Cranston, express concerns that it requires schools to permit religious activities during instructional hours.
Circuit Judge Hall concurs with the majority opinion, addressing dissenting views regarding the Establishment Clause and its implications for equal treatment of student groups. He emphasizes that the legality of government actions must consider their purpose, invoking prior cases to illustrate that neutrality toward religion is crucial for upholding programs against Establishment Clause scrutiny. The dissent references the McCollum case, noting that the school's intent was to promote religion rather than facilitate a neutral student speech forum, leading the Supreme Court to rule against the school’s program due to its exclusive religious focus.
The document asserts that utilizing the public school system to assist religious groups in promoting their faith violates the principle of separation between church and state. It clarifies that previous cases, such as *McCollum*, do not support the idea that the Establishment Clause prohibits all student religious activities in public schools during mandatory attendance. Instead, they highlight the necessity of preventing schools from implementing programs that advance religion. The excerpt emphasizes that the Supreme Court has not established a doctrine that requires an outright ban on religious activities during school hours. It also refutes the dissent's claim that allowing religious clubs to use school facilities creates a perception of endorsement, referencing cases like *Good News Club*, *Rosenberger*, and *Mergens*, which affirm that schools must provide equal access to forum spaces for religious groups if they open those spaces to others. The focus for Establishment Clause considerations is on equitable treatment among groups permitted to access school facilities rather than on any perceived favoritism toward religious groups.
Establishing a speech forum with permissible restrictions based on speaker identity or speech content does not equate to governmental endorsement of religion when like groups are treated equally and unlike groups differently. The dissent's concern regarding the mandatory attendance during student/staff time adds complexity but does not inherently suggest endorsement of religion. Equal treatment of ASB and Policy 5525 clubs during this time is reasonable and does not imply inequality. Permission for meetings is indicative of the school's support for student growth rather than religious endorsement. The Establishment Clause only prohibits excessive entanglements that advance religion, not all entanglements. Teachers are not positioned to require religious activities during student/staff time; they can manage club activities to ensure they align with school policies. Concerns about teachers being influenced by sectarian groups are unfounded, as the presence of various officially recognized student clubs mitigates impressions of endorsement. Ultimately, concerns of perceived endorsement are largely self-imposed by petitioners, as the school can control the messages conveyed to students.
A school does not violate the Establishment Clause by allowing groups to meet during the school day on a religious-neutral basis. However, Judge Berzon dissents with respect to Part IV(B) of the majority opinion for two main reasons. First, requiring Spanaway Lake High School to permit religious activities during mandatory student/staff time (SS Time) infringes on the Establishment Clause, as this period is essential to the school day and attendance is compulsory. The distinction between mandatory attendance periods and voluntary ones is crucial. Second, Berzon disagrees with the majority's stance that the Establishment Clause allows the provision of public resources, such as school vehicles and supplies, for religious purposes. This interpretation exceeds prior rulings, such as Mitchell v. Helms, by permitting the use of taxpayer-funded resources for religious activities in public schools.
Berzon emphasizes that SS Time is a significant part of the instructional day, occurring during a scheduled class period with mandatory attendance. Students risk receiving an "F" for non-attendance and must participate in school-related activities. The majority correctly identifies that Congress, via the Equal Access Act, differentiates between mandatory and voluntary attendance periods, mandating equal access only during the latter. This distinction aligns with a body of Supreme Court jurisprudence acknowledging a heightened risk of unconstitutional entanglement when religious instruction coincides with public school attendance. Citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., Berzon notes that the Supreme Court previously ruled against programs that integrated religious instruction into mandatory school settings.
Students released from secular studies for religious instruction were required to attend those religious classes, and attendance reports were submitted to secular teachers. In the McCollum case, the Supreme Court found a violation of the Establishment Clause, emphasizing that mandatory attendance at religious classes, as a condition of being excused from secular education, constituted an improper use of tax-funded public schools to support religious groups. The Court noted that this arrangement contradicted the principle of separation between Church and State, as public school resources were used to promote religious teachings.
The excerpt draws parallels to the Spanaway Lake High School situation, arguing that if students are exempted from secular activities to participate in religious meetings, it similarly violates the Establishment Clause. Despite changes in the legal landscape since McCollum, the core principle remains: the Establishment Clause prohibits religious activities in public school buildings during mandated school hours.
The Good News Club case is cited to illustrate that the Court distinguishes between religious activities that occur after school hours—permissible under the Establishment Clause—and those that occur during school hours, which are not allowed, as seen in previous cases like Lee v. Weisman and Edwards v. Aguillard. Thus, the excerpt reinforces the idea that student participation in religious activities during compulsory school hours is unconstitutional.
The release time program was upheld because religious classes did not occur on school property, and there was no evidence of public schools enforcing attendance at religious schools through truancy penalties. The Supreme Court's analysis in Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens confirmed that the Equal Access Act does not violate the Establishment Clause, as it applies only during "noninstructional time," thus avoiding mandatory attendance issues. The court referenced the Mergens case and previous rulings, indicating that mandatory attendance at religious classes during school hours would contravene the Establishment Clause.
In Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of the San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., the Ninth Circuit aligned with this interpretation, ruling that lunchtime qualifies as noninstructional time under the Equal Access Act since no classroom instruction occurs during this period, and students are not required to stay on campus. The court maintained that lunchtime meetings proposed by Ceniceros, akin to after-school meetings approved in Mergens, would not breach the Establishment Clause.
Furthermore, the majority opinion noted no existing legal precedent allowing religious activities on school premises during mandatory attendance periods, suggesting that such activities would be perceived as an endorsement of religion, as indicated in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia.
SS Time is designated for school-related activities, and students are required to choose from a limited set of options during this mid-day period, which does not allow for truly voluntary participation. They cannot opt for non-school activities like visiting friends or engaging in leisure pursuits. The School District's selection of activities suggests an endorsement of those activities, including any religious meetings, which implicates school employees in religious practices. SS Time is treated as a scheduled class, with attendance recorded, meaning teacher involvement extends beyond mere supervision to actively guiding discussions towards the intended school-related themes. If a religious group like World Changers meets during this time, the teacher would need to ensure discussions align with the group's religious focus. In contrast, after-school meetings would only require custodial oversight. The document argues that Congress intended to limit religious activities in public schools to after-class hours to avoid any endorsement or entanglement by the state, which the majority opinion overlooks, suggesting there is no Establishment Clause violation. Additionally, the majority decision mandates that Spanaway Lake High School provide the World Changers access to school supplies and equipment on par with non-religious groups, which is contested. The dissent argues that allowing public funds to support religious activities violates the Establishment Clause, as established by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.
The Mitchell decision upheld a federal program that allocated funds to state and local agencies for educational materials and equipment for both public and private (including religious) schools, affirming that neutrality is important but not sufficient for constitutional compliance under the Establishment Clause. The Court emphasized that aid must support secular functions of religious schools, not religious activities, and Justice O'Connor highlighted the necessity of safeguards to prevent any government aid from being diverted to religious purposes. These safeguards included the provision of only secular materials, prohibitions on aid for religious worship, assurances from non-public schools for secular usage, and monitoring for compliance.
The majority opinion in the current case does not consider the significance of O'Connor’s views in Mitchell and instead relies on the Rosenberger case, which allowed some diversion of school supplies for religious purposes. However, the majority overlooks that funding in this case comes from the School District’s general tax revenue, contrasting with the context of Rosenberger, which did not involve general tax funds. The Student Activities Fund is characterized as belonging to the students, not as government resources. Additionally, the majority attempts to frame the School District's lending of supplies as a matter of "private choice," akin to the voucher program in Zelman, but this mischaracterizes the situation since the School District, rather than students, controls the decision to provide access to resources.
The excerpt analyzes the potential implementation of a private choice program for distributing supplies and services within a school district, particularly in relation to extracurricular activities. It suggests that while the distribution of supplies might not easily accommodate private choice like tuition aid, a system could be established where students receive materials or vouchers for activities of their choosing. However, it notes that individual students at Spanaway Lake High School do not exercise such private choices, and the current distribution resembles that seen in the Mitchell case, which Justice O'Connor indicated does not qualify as a private choice program.
The text emphasizes that providing supplies and transportation does not constitute direct financial support to religious organizations, referencing O'Connor's opinion in Mitchell. It asserts that the School District must allow equal access to its resources for non-religious uses by groups like the World Changers, but must prevent the use of these resources for religious activities, such as worship or instruction. For instance, while the World Changers could use school supplies for secular announcements, they would not be allowed to create religious materials.
Furthermore, it argues that the School District should determine the safeguards necessary to ensure that publicly funded resources are used solely for secular purposes, aligning with the requirements established in Mitchell. The dissenting opinion highlights the majority's failure to recognize these essential limitations under the Establishment Clause, asserting that the World Changers club, which explicitly promotes religious activities, should not be allowed to utilize school resources for religious purposes.
Justice O'Connor's opinion on the Establishment Clause, despite receiving only four votes, is controlling due to its reliance on narrower grounds compared to Justice Kennedy's opinion, which garnered support from two Justices. In instances where a divided Court lacks a single rationale with the backing of five Justices, the prevailing interpretation is that of the Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds, as established in Marks v. United States. The only notable published decision aligning with the majority's stance on religious activities in public schools is Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, which was reversed by the Third Circuit but vacated by the Supreme Court due to lack of standing. O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell also governs cases distinguishing her view from the plurality opinion, as it is based on narrower reasoning and does not command a majority. Additionally, her concurring opinion in Rosenberger is significant because it was critical to the majority, and her narrower perspective in that case further refines the broader statements made in Rosenberger, thereby establishing the precedence of her later opinion in Mitchell.
