Kurt Dixon Big Mamou, Inc. v. Mike Lowery, Individually and in His Official Capacity Tim Calhoun, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Louie Caudell, in His Official Capacity as Chief of the Little Rock Police Department City of Little Rock, Arkansas, Kurt Dixon Big Mamou, Inc. v. Mike Lowery, Individually and in His Official Capacity Tim Calhoun, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Louie Caudell, in His Official Capacity as Chief of the Little Rock Police Department, City of Little Rock, Arkansas
Docket: 01-1491
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 16, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Mike Lowery and Tim Calhoun appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment, contending they are entitled to qualified immunity. They argue that their actions, which involved assisting a private party in acquiring possession of the Big Mamou restaurant owned by Kurt Dixon, did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights nor constituted an unreasonable seizure under color of state law. Dixon cross-appeals, challenging the summary judgment granted to the City of Little Rock and its police chief, claiming they ratified the officers' actions by allowing them to remain at the restaurant despite Dixon's complaints of property deprivation.
Dixon had operated the Big Mamou and entered into a preliminary agreement with Aaron Omar to consolidate operations, retaining a 49% ownership stake. This agreement was contingent upon Omar providing documentation of ownership and a $25,000 note, but Omar failed to deliver this documentation, leading to a dispute. After Omar obtained a key to the restaurant through one of Dixon's employees, Dixon changed the locks. In response, Omar sought assistance from Captain Lowery and Sergeant Calhoun, requesting off-duty police presence to oversee a locksmith changing the locks at the restaurant, without Lowery investigating Omar's claims further. The court affirmed in part and remanded in part.
Lowery and Calhoun, in police uniforms, arrived first at the Big Mamou restaurant where they assisted Omar and a locksmith in changing the locks. They inquired about the restaurant's exits and monitored the situation as employees were instructed to leave and were escorted out. Lowery and Calhoun took possession of the restaurant keys after Omar's departure, allowing Dixon and his family limited access shortly thereafter. Despite this, all of Dixon's business records remained inside, and officers oversaw the removal of fixtures and personal property.
Dixon filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs Division of the Little Rock Police Department, providing statements by December 11, 1998. Omar later disclosed a $25,000 debt to Dixon under their contract. Lowery and Calhoun continued their off-duty employment at the Big Mamou until December 31, 1998, when Dixon initiated a lawsuit, leading the police chief to terminate their involvement.
Dixon has alleged a violation of his constitutional rights, specifically claiming unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, asserting that the officers unlawfully seized his property and retained possession beyond the initial seizure. Summary judgment is deemed appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the qualified immunity defense, particularly whether Dixon's rights were clearly established and violated, as assessed under judicial precedent.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable seizures of property, establishing that a seizure occurs with meaningful interference in an individual's possessory interests. A seizure without judicial authorization is inherently unreasonable unless it fits a specific exception. This principle is supported by various case law, indicating that actions taken pursuant to a court order would significantly challenge claims of unreasonableness. The Fourth Amendment necessitates a valid search warrant or proper consent for searches of private property, as searches without these are deemed unreasonable, barring exigent circumstances. Additionally, before a party is deprived of possession, a neutral officer or magistrate must establish probable cause to support the claim.
The text references a plurality opinion emphasizing that constitutional standards are met when state law requires creditors to provide adequate security and a factual basis for probable cause before state intervention in seizing property. It notes the risks of allowing governmental seizures without judicial oversight, which could undermine Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections. These constitutional safeguards apply whether the officer is acting in a civil or criminal capacity.
In the case at hand, the appellants do not dispute the established law but question Dixon's ongoing property interest necessary for a constitutional violation. They contend that documentation, including an asset purchase agreement and a lease assignment, negated Dixon's claim to sole possession. Although they acknowledge Dixon's arguable interest in the property, they assert that he lacked a clear right to possession until potential legal actions regarding the documents are resolved, ultimately missing the critical point of contention.
Dixon's claim centers on his exclusion from property rights rather than Omar's exclusion. The appellants have acknowledged that Dixon was misled into signing documents that supported Omar's position. It remains clear that Omar did not have the right to sole possession of the property, as Dixon had legitimate property interests. Employees informed the appellants that Dixon lacked the necessary documents to complete the deal and that their agreement was not finalized. The purchase agreement required the seller to relinquish possession upon closing, which had not occurred due to the absence of a closing date. Even if one assumes the deal was finalized and Omar had assumed the lease, Dixon retained interests in personal property and potentially in the business itself. Omar did not pursue eviction legally and admitted to the officers that he lacked a court order for possession, highlighting a dispute over entitlement.
Calhoun, in his deposition, recognized Dixon's possessory interest when mentioning Omar's intention to terminate Dixon's rental of the property. The appellants' claim that Dixon's property rights were unclear is unconvincing; possessory interests, even in dispute, are constitutionally protected. Legal precedents support that the protection of property extends beyond undisputed ownership to any significant interest in property. The appellants effectively acted unilaterally in deciding possession amidst a clear property dispute, which is problematic under constitutional protections against wrongful seizure, as illustrated in cases like Soldal and Gentry, where governmental actions were deemed impermissible in the absence of clear possession rights or eviction orders.
Officers are not expected to analyze state court orders with the expertise of legal professionals but must rely on the judgment of a neutral judicial officer in property disputes, absent exigent circumstances or consent. The Supreme Court has emphasized that an officer's on-site assessment cannot replace a neutral official's informed evaluation, as a claimant's assertions only reflect their belief in their rights. In this case, while there is a dispute regarding whether Dixon had a clear property right to sole possession, it is established that he had a property interest in contention. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the seizure of property without a warrant in such situations, and the absence of exigent circumstances is acknowledged by the officers involved. The court rejects the notion that property sellers without compensation should be vulnerable to law enforcement-assisted confiscation. Law enforcement generally recognizes the necessity for a neutral determination of property rights, as evidenced by statements from officers involved, who acknowledged that police can only act with an eviction notice. An Internal Affairs report corroborates this understanding, noting the established isolation of police from civil matters like evictions and property disputes, indicating that experienced officers should not have acted as alleged. Although they assisted in securing the business, they did not execute an eviction or close it.
The Internal Affairs Division's analysis indicates that a reasonable officer would recognize their conduct as unlawful; however, this conclusion does not solely determine the summary judgment outcome. Summary judgment can only be granted if there are no material fact disputes and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conflicting statements from witnesses regarding the officers' actions, including their involvement in removing individuals from the premises, further preclude summary judgment.
Lowery and Calhoun arrived at the Big Mamou in a police vehicle, wearing official uniforms, and stood watch while locks were changed and employees gathered belongings. They informed the arriving Dixons that they had removed them and later allowed Dixon limited access, suggesting a civil resolution. The officers’ actions, which included taking possession of the restaurant's key and locking the premises, were not supported by a court order, distinguishing this case from prior rulings regarding lawful seizures. Allegations indicate the officers made statements suggesting they intended to occupy the premises long-term, further complicating the legal standing.
The court concludes that the appellants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity since Dixon has sufficiently claimed a constitutional violation, and reasonable officers would have been aware that their conduct was unconstitutional. The officers' defense that their presence was merely for security fails to hold given the presented facts.
Lowery and Calhoun acknowledge their presence during the re-keying of the building by Omar, who provided them with a key and directed them to offer overnight security while he took possession of the premises. They contend that their actions, which included asking employees to leave only after Omar claimed his ownership rights and changed the locks, did not constitute participation in the seizure of property. However, the court finds that their involvement in the re-keying process contributed to the seizure, referencing the case of Soldal, where the presence of law enforcement during property removal was deemed a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the court affirms the district court's denial of the appellants' summary judgment on qualified immunity.
In the cross-appeal, Dixon claims that the City and police chief's policies allowed officers to determine the appropriateness of their off-duty work, leading to violations of his constitutional rights. The district court found that Dixon did not demonstrate that these policies showed deliberate indifference to individual rights, leading to an affirmation of the district court's ruling. Additionally, Dixon asserts that the City and police chief ratified the officers' actions by not ordering them to leave the Big Mamou after he reported the deprivation of property. The court notes the potential for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions officially sanctioned by municipal policymakers but identifies a lack of clarity in the record regarding material facts on this issue. Consequently, the court remands the case for further exploration of the potential municipal liability related to the officers' continued occupation of the property.
The court affirms the district court's decision in all respects except regarding the liability of the City and police chief for permitting officers to continue their employment at the Big Mamou until December 31, 1998. This specific issue is remanded for further examination of Dixon's complaint and the development of the record. Although other officers were involved, the appeal focuses solely on Lowery and Calhoun. The court emphasizes that in reviewing the summary judgment motion, all inferences should favor the non-moving parties. Dixon's argument that he could not establish exclusive possession is countered by the fact that he was denied any possession, despite his claimed forty-nine percent interest in the restaurant, which is recognized as a protected property interest. Arkansas law provides mechanisms to resolve tenant disputes and address unlawful dispossession through legal avenues, such as ejectment for nonpayment of rent or unlawful detainer actions.
