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Henry Earl Dunn v. Janie Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
Citations: 302 F.3d 491; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16485; 2002 WL 1888802Docket: 02-40366
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; August 15, 2002; Federal Appellate Court
Henry Earl Dunn, the petitioner-appellant, challenges the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion by the district court, which aimed to allow him to file a timely appeal following the dismissal of his federal habeas corpus petition. Dunn was convicted of capital murder in Texas in 1995, with his conviction affirmed in 1997. After an unsuccessful post-conviction writ in 1999, he filed a federal habeas petition in January 2000, which was dismissed in June 2001. An untimely notice of appeal was filed by Dunn's previous counsel shortly after dismissal, followed by an untimely motion for leave to file an appeal. Both were denied, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed Dunn's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In January 2002, Dunn, through new counsel, filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment based on his attorneys' negligence in failing to file a timely appeal. The district court denied the motion in February 2002. Dunn subsequently appealed this denial, seeking a certificate of appealability. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot serve as a substitute for a timely appeal, as established in precedent. The court noted that while Rule 60(b) allows for reopening judgments due to mistake or neglect, the specific procedures under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) provide limited relief for untimely appeals. The court highlighted the importance of adhering to the finality of judgments and the necessity of following established procedural rules for appeals. A Rule 60(b) motion filed after the appeal period has expired cannot be used solely to extend the time for appeal, especially when the movant does not claim a denial of a fair hearing or seek modification of the district court's ruling. Dunn's motion aimed simply to vacate and reenter a judgment for the purpose of appealing, which conflicts with Rule 4(a)(5) that allows a 30-day window to seek relief from the time limit due to excusable neglect. Dunn argued that the district court misapplied the standard for excusable neglect as outlined in *Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership*. However, his reliance on *Pioneer* was misplaced because he did not request relief based on counsel's error affecting the judgment but sought to reenter the judgment solely for appeal purposes. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Dunn's Rule 60(b) motion and vacated the previously entered stay of execution. The case did not involve using Rule 60(b) to alter a prior habeas decision, which would require treating it as a successive habeas petition.