United States v. Charles Woods

Citations: 301 F.3d 556; 59 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1012; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16686; 2002 WL 1905903Docket: 01-2819

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 20, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Charles Woods was convicted of narcotics distribution under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), with a sentence of 360 months for each count to be served consecutively. He appealed the conviction on three grounds: improper admission of tape recordings, violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The appellate court acknowledged a minor error in the admission of a portion of one recording but determined it was not substantial enough to warrant reversal.

Woods was identified as the leader of a crack cocaine distribution network in Peoria, Illinois, involving associates Towanda White and Melvin Rogers. The FBI conducted controlled drug buys using confidential informants Orlando Davis and David Roberson, with all relevant conversations recorded. On July 26, 1999, Roberson arranged a drug purchase from Woods, who was identified as the caller. The purchase was executed at a fast food restaurant, where Rogers sold Roberson 9.6 grams of crack. 

On August 9, 1999, another informant, Davis, contacted Woods and later arranged to meet White, who initially did not have the drugs and needed to retrieve them. During this time, Davis made narrative statements recorded by his device. The trial included testimonies from Davis, White, and Rogers, while Roberson was unavailable for testimony. White and Rogers testified under separate plea agreements with the government.

On February 16, 2001, it was revealed during a status call that a news reporter informed the government of Rogers' denial in state court that his shooting was drug-related. In response, the defense investigated Rogers' claim regarding a phone call from Woods while Rogers was hospitalized. The investigation revealed that hospital policy allowed only one clergy member and four visitors for a crime victim, and prior to August 9, 2001, Rogers had already received four non-clergy visitors. This led Woods to argue that Rogers was lying about Woods' presence in his hospital room.

On appeal, Woods presented three claims for a new trial: 

1. He contested the admission of recordings that captured only the conversations of Davis and Roberson.
2. He challenged the admissibility of Davis' statements to FBI agents, which were initially admitted for context but later categorized as present sense impressions. Woods argued these statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and constituted hearsay without a valid exception.
3. He asserted that newly discovered evidence demonstrated Rogers' dishonesty, which could have been used to impeach his testimony.

The government countered that Woods had either waived or forfeited his Sixth Amendment argument by not specifically objecting to the tape recordings. Waiver means an intentional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a failure to timely assert a right. The court noted that it could review for plain error if certain criteria were met, but ultimately concluded that no violation of the confrontation clause occurred.

Woods challenged the admissibility of audio recordings of his conversations with Roberson, arguing they constituted hearsay since Roberson did not testify. The court ruled the recordings were admissible as statements by a party-opponent under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Roberson’s comments were considered admissible to provide context or as adoptive admissions by Woods, who did not contradict Roberson during their discussions about a drug transaction, demonstrating intent to adopt Roberson's statements. The court referenced several cases affirming this principle.

The district court found the conversations' context, including non-verbal cues, supported the conclusion that Woods adopted Roberson's statements, making them material, probative, and reliable under the catchall exception (FED.R.EVID. 807). The absence of confrontation clause issues was emphasized, as the statements were Woods' own or adopted, thus not constituting hearsay. Woods' cross-examination of Roberson was deemed unnecessary since the jury was already aware of Roberson's status as a paid informant, which did not compromise the Sixth Amendment. 

Woods contested the existence of his participation in the conversations rather than their substance; an FBI agent confirmed his voice on the tapes, and Woods had the opportunity to cross-examine this agent. Finally, the narrative statements from Davis during the conversations were also admissible, either as adoptive admissions or under the catchall exception.

Woods has allegedly waived or forfeited the hearsay argument concerning recordings presented by the government, leading to a review for abuse of discretion. A guilty verdict can only be reversed if the evidentiary error substantially influenced the jury's decision, with Woods bearing the burden to prove this. The district court admitted Davis' statements under the present sense impression exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803, which allows statements made during or immediately after perceiving an event. The admissibility hinges on the absence of "calculated narration," as statements made with deliberation can misrepresent events. While parts of Davis' narrative were admissible as they described events as they occurred, certain statements directed at FBI agents were not, being deemed calculated and thus inadmissible. However, the impact of these inadmissible statements on the jury’s verdict was minimal, as they comprised less than one hundred words and were overshadowed by substantial incriminating evidence.

Regarding Woods' motion for a new trial, the denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. To succeed, Woods must demonstrate that new evidence meets four criteria: it must have been discovered post-trial, not previously discoverable with due diligence, material (not merely cumulative or impeaching), and likely to result in an acquittal. Although the prosecution introduced new evidence after the trial, Woods fails to meet the other three criteria, particularly as he was aware of relevant testimony prior to trial and did not pursue further investigation.

Woods' claim against Rogers' testimony hinges on several flawed assumptions. There is no record confirming whether Rogers was designated as a victim of violence by the hospital, which is crucial since if he wasn't classified as such, he would have had the right to unlimited visitors. Additionally, the hospital lacks records of specific visitors for individual patients. Furthermore, Woods argues that Rogers' state testimony contradicts his federal testimony because Rogers failed to mention Woods as a visitor during the state proceedings. However, this assertion is misguided, as Rogers' state testimony focused solely on events from August 7, 1999, while Woods visited on August 9, 1999. The evidence Woods presents as newly discovered is merely cumulative and could have been located before the trial with minimal effort. Consequently, the defendant's conviction is affirmed.