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Gulledge v. Gulledge
Citations: 738 So. 2d 1229; 1999 La. App. LEXIS 2355; 1999 WL 624093Docket: Nos. 32,561-CA, 32,562-CA
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; August 18, 1999; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Sandra Faye Gulledge filed a motion to set aside a consent decree that awarded sole custody of her daughter, Megan Ashley Gulledge, to David Allen Gulledge. The trial court denied her motion, determining that she had voluntarily consented to the decree. Sandra subsequently appealed this decision. The couple was married in 1982 and divorced in 1989, with joint custody of Megan established, designating Sandra as the domiciliary parent. Following various legal proceedings related to child support and custody, including concerns for Megan's mental health assessed by court-appointed counselors, David was granted sole custody on April 28, 1998, with Sandra receiving supervised visitation. After Sandra's motion to set aside the consent decree was rejected, she sought supervisory writs, which led to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court determined that she understood and agreed to the consent decree's terms. The legal framework referenced includes Louisiana Civil Code article 3071, which outlines the nature of transactions or compromises as mutual agreements to resolve disputes, emphasizing that consent judgments are binding due to the voluntary acquiescence of the parties involved. Such judgments can be annulled only for errors of fact or issues concerning the principal cause of the agreement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. The plaintiff argues that she did not consent to the stipulations of the consent decree, claiming she was coerced into acceptance and asserting that the trial court wrongly denied her motion to set it aside or to grant a new trial. The consent decree was based on a psychological evaluation by Dr. George Seiden, who recommended sole custody of Megan to David Gulledge and supervised visitation for Sandra Gulledge, along with family and individual therapy. During the motion hearing, the plaintiff testified that her attorney, Robert S. Noel, informed her only on the day of the hearing that the court was inclined to grant sole custody to the defendant and that not consenting would lead to an unfavorable trial outcome. She claimed she did not understand or agree to the decree's conditions, nor did she realize she could express her disagreement during the hearing. Although she initially stated she did not have prior access to Dr. Seiden’s deposition, she later acknowledged receiving a copy of his report and discussing it with her attorney before the hearing. The court found that the recommendations in Dr. Seiden's report matched those in his deposition, and the plaintiff was aware of the implications of the consent decree prior to the hearing. Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a lack of understanding or voluntary agreement to the consent decree, affirming the trial court's decision to deny her motion. The judgment was upheld, with all associated costs assigned to the plaintiff. The modified custody judgment from January 24, 1990, further clarified visitation guidelines and responsibilities following psychological evaluations.