United States v. Juan Ramirez, Also Known as "Tony Tko", Also Known as "Scarface" Luis Ramirez Ernesto Martinez, Also Known as "Ene" Justin Perez, Also Known as Gem Haydee Huertas Lnu1-98cr0438-006, Also Known as Rafaelito Albert Colon Shirley Calcano Freddy Santiago Jose Colon, Also Known as Mike Odiot Demetrius, Also Known as J. Boogie Manuel Gonzalez, Also Known as Manny Julio Castillo, Also Known as Tito, Lnu2-98cr0438-014, Also Known as John Doe 2, United States of America v. Juan Ramirez, AKA "Tony Tko", AKA "Scarface" Luis Ramirez Ernesto Martinez, AKA "Ene" Justin Perez, AKA Gem Haydee Huertas Lnu1-98cr0438-006, AKA Rafaelito Albert Colon Shirley Calcano Freddy Santiago Jose Colon, AKA Mike Odiot Demetrius, AKA Boogie Julio Castillo, Manuel Gonzalez, AKA Manny

Citations: 297 F.3d 185; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15335Docket: 00-1664

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 30, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendant-appellant LNU2-98CR0438-014, referred to as "Doe #2," appeals a September 14, 2000 order that transferred him to adult status under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Defendant-appellant Manuel Gonzalez also appeals an August 8, 2000 judgment of conviction and sentence following his guilty plea, primarily contesting the district court's decision to transfer him to adult status. The appeals for both defendants, involving common legal and factual issues, were consolidated for disposition. The court addressed challenges to the transfer orders only, affirming the district court's decisions, concluding there was no abuse of discretion in transferring the defendants from juvenile to adult status. Both defendants were charged under the Juvenile Delinquency Act for offenses related to their involvement in the 165th Street Organization, a criminal enterprise in the Bronx engaged in narcotics trafficking and violent acts. Doe #2 faced allegations of ten acts of juvenile delinquency, including serious crimes such as armed robbery and murder, occurring from 1994 to 1999.

Doe #2 is charged with involvement in the armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Francis Soto on March 15, 1995, and a subsequent armed robbery on May 22, 1996. After the 1996 robbery, he pled guilty in New York to criminal possession of a weapon, receiving a sentence of one to three years. Released on parole in 1997, he was later rearrested in 1999 for parole violations. On April 19, 2000, the government sought to transfer Doe #2 to adult prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 5032, with the United States Attorney certifying his juvenile status, the violent nature of the offenses, and substantial federal interest. After hearings on August 10 and 14, 2000, the district court determined that rehabilitation was unlikely and ordered the transfer, a decision Doe #2 now appeals.

Manuel Gonzalez faced eleven juvenile delinquency charges from 1994 to 1998, including racketeering, murder, and various violent crimes. On September 18, 1998, the government sought to prosecute him as an adult under 18 U.S.C. 5032, with similar certifications regarding his juvenile status and the nature of the offenses. A hearing on July 28, 1999, led to the district court denying mandatory transfer but granting discretionary transfer due to the likelihood of rehabilitation being low. Gonzalez initially appealed the transfer order but later withdrew the appeal. On November 23, 1999, he pled guilty to multiple charges, receiving a stipulated thirty-five-year sentence and waiving his right to appeal. He attempted to withdraw his guilty plea on February 28, 2000, but later retracted this motion during a court hearing where he reaffirmed his waiver of the right to appeal.

The defendant acknowledged understanding the waiver of his right to appeal if sentenced at or below the guidelines, retaining the right to appeal only if the sentence is inconsistent with those guidelines. On August 8, 2000, the district court sentenced Gonzalez to thirty-five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $150 special assessment. Gonzalez's appeal centers on the alleged abuse of discretion in transferring him from juvenile to adult status. The court confirmed that the transfer order is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, providing jurisdiction over the appeal. 

The discussion then addresses the applicability of the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA) to individuals who turn twenty-one during prosecution. The JDA governs federal cases involving juveniles under eighteen and those who have not yet reached twenty-one at the time of filing. It allows for probation or limited detention for those found guilty of acts committed before turning eighteen, contrasting with longer sentences for adults. The JDA mandates transfer to adult status for juveniles aged fifteen or older charged with serious crimes, while discretionary transfers are also permitted when deemed in the interest of justice. The JDA applies if the defendant committed the crime before turning eighteen and is under twenty-one when charged, with the court determining applicability based on the defendant's age at the time of the offenses.

The Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA) does not explicitly clarify its applicability when a defendant, having committed a crime before turning eighteen, is charged before their twenty-first birthday but turns twenty-one during the proceedings. Doe #2 is currently twenty-three, and Doe #3 is twenty-four. The panel hearing Doe #2's case sought further briefing on this issue, and both Doe #2 and the government argue that the JDA remains applicable despite the defendant reaching twenty-one during the process. Courts have consistently ruled that JDA applicability hinges on the defendant's age at the time juvenile information is filed. It has been established that jurisdiction under the JDA does not end when a defendant turns twenty-one. This interpretation is reinforced by cases from the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, which indicate that juvenile jurisdiction can persist if the defendant was indicted before turning twenty-one. The potential complications of rushing proceedings or delaying them to avoid adult classification support maintaining JDA applicability. Thus, the district court rightly exercised its JDA jurisdiction over Doe #2 and Gonzalez, as their juvenile informations were filed when they were both twenty. 

The JDA also has significant implications for sentencing. A defendant aged eighteen to twenty-one charged with juvenile delinquency faces a maximum of five years in prison or three years of probation. However, Doe #2 could face life imprisonment if prosecuted as an adult, and Gonzalez, already convicted as an adult, received a thirty-five-year sentence. Consequently, the court must assess whether transferring Doe #2 and Gonzalez to adult status serves "the interest of justice," with the burden on the government to demonstrate the need for such a transfer, given the presumption favoring juvenile adjudication.

To determine the appropriateness of transferring a juvenile to adult status, the district court must evaluate six specific factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. 5032. These factors include: the juvenile's age and social background, the nature of the alleged offense, the extent and nature of prior delinquency, present intellectual development and psychological maturity, past treatment efforts and responses, and the availability of treatment programs for behavioral issues. The court's decision to transfer is discretionary and will only be overturned if there is an abuse of discretion, which occurs when required factual findings are not made or are clearly erroneous. The district court can weigh these factors differently based on individual case circumstances, often placing greater emphasis on the nature of the offense and the potential for rehabilitation, while also considering the threat posed to society by juvenile crime.

In this specific case involving John Doe #2, who was aged 15 to 18 at the time of the alleged crimes, the district court thoroughly evaluated the six factors. It found that Doe #2's age and psychological maturity were neutral, while his social background, intellectual development, and availability of treatment options weighed against transfer. Conversely, the serious nature of the alleged crimes and Doe #2's history of recidivism supported transfer. The court also considered his current age relevant to the potential suitability of juvenile rehabilitation programs. Overall, Judge Carter's findings were well-reasoned and adhered to legal precedents, leading to the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion in the transfer decision.

Doe #2 was fifteen at the time of the 1995 Soto murder and seventeen during a 1996 armed robbery. By the time of the government's information filing, he was twenty and twenty-one when the district court ordered his transfer to adult status. The court noted several serious charges against him, including murder, linked to his involvement with a criminal organization, and expressed concern about his ongoing criminal activity post-parole, including a prior conviction for gun possession and a robbery arrest in 1993. The court highlighted his failure to rehabilitate despite prior opportunities, his continued engagement in narcotics trafficking, and his lack of motivation to change, particularly given his parental responsibilities, which he neglected upon returning to prison. The district court conducted a thorough review of all six statutory factors relevant to the transfer and found no clear error in its evaluation, concluding that the transfer was justified.

Regarding Manuel Gonzalez, the government contended that by pleading guilty and waiving his appeal rights, he also waived any challenge to the transfer order. While typically a guilty plea waives most challenges, the court determined it unnecessary to rule on this since the district court acted within its discretion in transferring Gonzalez to adult status. The court assessed each of the six statutory factors, acknowledging factors favoring him, such as his social background and psychological maturity, but ultimately decided that the severity of the crimes and his history of recidivism warranted the transfer in the interest of justice.

Defendant Gonzalez faces multiple serious charges, including murder, linked to his alleged involvement in a criminal organization. His prior conviction for robbery raises significant concerns about the risk he poses to society, particularly regarding juvenile crime. The court is particularly troubled by Gonzalez's ongoing tendency toward criminal behavior. Despite his claims of being influenced by co-defendant Juan Ramirez, evidence indicates that Gonzalez acted independently, notably participating in a drug smuggling operation while incarcerated for robbery. Given that rehabilitation is a key goal of federal delinquency laws, the government has shown that rehabilitation is unlikely in this case. Therefore, the court deems the transfer of Gonzalez to adult status as appropriate. 

The district court evaluated all relevant factors concerning the transfer, committed no errors, and acted reasonably in its decision. Consequently, the court affirms the transfer to adult status and the conviction of Gonzalez, rejecting his additional arguments on appeal. The orders regarding Gonzalez and Doe #2 are upheld by the appellate court. The relevant legal framework includes the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), which mandates transfer for individuals over sixteen who commit serious offenses and have prior convictions.