Stuart H. Smith, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant

Citations: 296 F.3d 380; 2002 WL 1401004Docket: 01-31436

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; July 17, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Stuart H. Smith, Jr. was employed as a third officer on a cargo vessel and was discharged by Waterman Steamship Corporation following a collision with a dock on October 3, 1992. Smith, a member of the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (the Union), argued that his discharge was without cause and sought the Union's assistance in filing a grievance as per their collective bargaining agreement. The Union delayed action on the grievance pending the completion of a Coast Guard investigation, which concluded in July 1999. Meanwhile, Smith initiated a lawsuit against Waterman in July 1993, which was unsuccessful. In January 1994, the Union informed Smith that it would not pursue the grievance, citing that he had abandoned the process by not providing the Coast Guard report and by filing litigation independently.

Smith later sued the Union for failing to pursue his grievance, leading the Union to file for summary judgment based on the six-month statute of limitations under the National Labor Relations Act. The district court ruled that Smith's claim constituted a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation and agreed with the Union on the statute of limitations, ultimately granting summary judgment in favor of the Union due to the expiration of the time limit. Smith appealed the application of the six-month statute, while the Union cross-appealed the district court's finding of a breach of duty.

A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Smith's claim, filed under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, was determined to be a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation. A union breaches this duty when it acts in a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory manner. Smith alleges damages due to the Union's refusal to pursue a grievance related to his October 4 discharge, thus clearly stating a claim for breach of fair representation.

There is no federal statute of limitations specifically applicable to a § 301 claim or a fair representation claim. Courts typically borrow from the most analogous state statute, but if state limitations conflict with federal law's purpose, federal statutes or common law may be used. For suits against both an employer and a union, the six-month limitations period in § 10(b) is applicable, as established in DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters. 

The question arises whether the six-month period applies to a standalone fair representation claim against a union. It should apply, as the Supreme Court, while focusing on hybrid cases, analyzed the two causes of action separately and found that legal malpractice was an inadequate state analogy for a federal duty of fair representation claim. The Court considered § 10(b) to be more suitable, given that it establishes a six-month period for unfair labor practice charges, which are more analogous to breaches of a union's duty of fair representation. 

The district court correctly applied the six-month limitations period from § 10(b) to Smith's claim, which he asserted under § 301, thereby aligning with the precedent set in DelCostello.

Smith contends that he cannot be held liable under section 10(b) due to his status as a supervisory employee. However, this status is deemed irrelevant since he filed a duty of fair representation claim under section 301. As a supervisory employee, he would not qualify as an 'employee' under section 2(3) of the NLRA, which excludes supervisors from this definition, thereby barring him from suing the Union for violating section 8 of the NLRA, as established in NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp. Furthermore, section 10(b) pertains to specific causes of action rather than types of individuals. By its explicit language, it applies to section 8 causes of action and, by analogy, to section 301 and duty of fair representation claims, as affirmed in DelCostello. Consequently, the six-month statute of limitations in section 10(b) is applicable to Smith’s action against the Union, regardless of his supervisory status. The district court's application of this statute and subsequent summary judgment in favor of the Union is upheld. Additionally, the Union's cross-appeal, which argued that the district court incorrectly found a breach of fair representation, is rendered moot by the affirmation of the summary judgment. Thus, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.